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## THOMISTIC PSYCHOLOGY AND FREUD'S PSYCHOANALYSIS



### STATEMENT OF THE THESIS

PREVIOUS to the last war there seemed to exist a certain immisceability among the three major approaches to the study of human nature: the philosophical psychological, the empirical psychological and the psychoanalytic. This is not to say that every writer or researcher felt himself obliged to remain within the confines established for his discipline, but only to acknowledge that a hard core of the practitioners of one approach labored in ignorance and even disdain of the labors of those who used other approaches. Since the war, the situation seems to have changed. As a result of practical collaboration, psychologists and psychoanalysts have begun to find common interests; as a result of the generally felt need for broader contexts of thought, philosophy is be-

ginning to win acceptance with students of a more empirical cast of mind. This situation should be welcome to Thomists, especially to those who see no formal line of distinction between the philosophical and empirical approach to any object of science. For them, any truth is grist for the mill, no matter how or by whom discovered, a challenge to the integrating power of the fundamental Thomistic principles and an opportunity to enrich their science by a further application.

Within this context, I should like to suggest that it would be profitable for students of St. Thomas to investigate the writings of Sigmund Freud. I do not mean this in the merely superficial sense, that, because Freud is widely read and discussed, we also should know something about him, if only to be abreast of current thinking. Nor do I mean it in the more praiseworthy but still inadequate sense, that because the Freudian methods of therapy have proved useful in curing some types of mental disturbances, we should understand enough of the matter to be able to use them or recommend their use. I mean the thesis in a more formal sense, that, namely, there are Freudian concepts which can be integrated into the content of Thomistic psychology, where they would provide valuable elaborations in the speculative order.

A number of objections immediately come to mind. In what sense does St. Thomas' psychology need addition or elaboration? And if it needs some kind of development, why look to psychoanalysis, and, if one must look to psychoanalysis, why to Freud?

To take up the second question first, it would seem evident that psychoanalysis, even as a study of human nature, has made great contributions to our understanding of man, uncovering truths which were previously hardly suspected and certainly greatly undervalued. If, then, we hold, as we do, that there is no need to defend the profundity and accuracy of St. Thomas' psychology, it would seem hard to believe that there is no substantial area of agreement between the two points of view, no intersection of their respective insights. For it seems



hard to allow that there could be two profound penetrations into human nature which were entirely disparate, entirely unprofitable for speculative analysis and comparison.

This is not to assert that only psychoanalysis has provided material interesting to the Thomist psychologist. It would certainly be useful to integrate also the findings of empirical psychologists, especially, for instance, Gestalt schools. However, since empirical psychology initially turned its attention to the problems of external sensation, and even to the more physiological aspects thereof, and has consequently effected its greatest contribution in these areas in which philosophical interest is relatively thin, while psychoanalysis has from the beginning plunged into the areas of deeper perceptions and basic motivations, in which areas philosophy is also more intensely concerned, psychoanalysis seems to hold out at present a promise of greater immediate rewards to the philosophical investigator.

Granting, then, the value of a philosophical study of psychoanalysis, why Freud? For all his genius and influence, it is widely admitted that Freud had some fundamental limitations, even within the field of psychoanalysis itself, so that subsequent psychoanalysis has found itself not only making substantial additions to his theories, but also correcting them in basic principles. It would follow, then, that a Thomist, looking for materials and insights in psychoanalysis, ought to look at more contemporary forms of the discipline rather than at the more purely Freudian position. There is no doubt that the developments since Freud and aside from Freud cannot be neglected, and simply because they present *in toto* a fuller and more accurate picture than did Freud. Nevertheless there is a certain justification in beginning the philosophical study with Freud, not only because of his historical priority, but also because his is the greatest single contribution to psychoanalysis, and the basis of later developments, and also because, even when a master has been corrected by his school, his original insights often contain more than his followers have perceived.

In one sense, therefore, ignoring later developments, it seems not invalid to begin in the beginning with Freud's own theories.

To return now to the first objection, why and in what sense can it be said that St. Thomas' psychology needs elaboration? To answer this objection, it would be best to appeal to St. Thomas himself. In his commentary on Aristotle's *De Sensu et Sensato*, he expounds his notion of a complete psychological science, dividing the science into three stages of investigation.<sup>1</sup> In the first, the soul itself is treated more or less abstractly. In the second, the living composite or animate thing is considered in general, and in the third, each species of living thing is specially treated. Now St. Thomas himself wrote two *ex professo* psychological works in the first stage, the Commentary on *De Anima* and the Disputed Question *De Anima*. In the Commentary, he consistently notes the points at which the investigation is broken off, to be taken up again in other books, as developments of the second stage.<sup>2</sup> He has also two works

<sup>1</sup> "And as diverse genera of sciences are distinguished according to the way in which things are separable from matter in diverse ways, so also in the single sciences, and especially in natural science, the parts of the science are distinguished according to the diverse mode of separation and concretion. And because universals are more separate from matter, therefore, in natural science we proceed from the universals to the less universal, as the Philosopher teaches in the first book of the *Physics*. Whence he begins to treat natural science from those things which are most common to all natural things, namely, motion and the principle of motion, and then he proceeds through the mode of concretion, or application of common principles, to certain determined mobile things, among which are living bodies. Concerning these he also proceeds in a similar way, distinguishing this consideration into three parts. For first, he considers the soul in itself, as in a certain abstraction. Secondly, he considers those things which pertain to the soul according to a certain concretion, or application to the body, but in a general way. Thirdly, he makes a consideration applying all these things to each species of animal and plant, determining that which is proper to every species. The first consideration, therefore, is contained in the book *De Anima*." St. Thomas, *De Sensu et Sensato*, lect. 1, # 2.

<sup>2</sup> "And he (Aristotle) calls it a 'history' (namely, his tract on the soul) because he treats of the soul in a certain summary, not carrying it out to the final investigation of all that pertains to the soul itself in this tract. For this is the sense of 'history.'" *I de Anima*, lect. 1, # 6.

"Finally then he concludes with an epilogue what was said 'figuratively,' that is, in a kind of summary, for each of the senses. For he determines these in a special way in the book *De Sensu et Sensato*." *II de Anima*, lect. 23, # 550.



in the second stage, the commentaries on *De Sensu et Sensato* and *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, and none in the third. These, of course, represent by no means the total of his psychological doctrine, for he constantly expounds problems in psychology throughout his writings, and in some books, especially in the *Summas*, in the Commentary on the *Sentences* and in the *De Veritate*, he develops theses in psychology at great length. Nevertheless, if we only consider the titles of the works of Aristotle, which St. Thomas cites, in the Commentary on *De Sensu et Sensato*, as developments of psychology in the second and third stages, it will be immediately evident that there are many subjects which St. Thomas did not treat explicitly, and not hard to deduce that there are more. Thus he mentions Aristotle's works on death and life, on health and sickness, on youth and age and the causes of longevity, on sleep and waking, on the causes of movement in animals and on the habits and parts and generation of animals.<sup>3</sup> Many of these subjects are, of course, assigned, in the modern scheme of sciences, to biology or physiology rather than to psychology properly speaking, but their relations to psychology have not been overlooked, and they appear also in psychological texts. In any event, they belong to psychology according to St. Thomas' mind, although he did not treat of them except here and there and in passing. For this reason it seems safe to say that there are tracts of Thomistic psychology as yet unfinished, and, having said this, we turn again to the material offered in psychoanalysis to see if anything of value can be found.

It should be made clear from the beginning, as it will be developed more at length shortly, that the psychologies of St. Thomas and Freud are radically and essentially opposed, and that, moreover, we are following St. Thomas. These two men could hardly have been more in opposition, nor would it serve

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"He (Aristotle) determines this (the organ of appetites) in the book *De Causa Motus Animalium*. For in this book (*De Anima*) he intends to determine concerning the soul in itself." *III de Anima*, lect. 15, #831.

See also II, lect. 9, #349 and III, lect. 14, #807.

<sup>3</sup> *De Sensu et Sensato*, lect. 1, ##2-6.

our purpose to neglect or misunderstand the nature of this opposition. We can, in fact, hardly expect any benefit from the work of integration until the shape of the dichotomy is made clear. Therefore we must proceed in two steps, first, by outlining the incompatibility, and then by studying the useful compatibilities.

It should also be noted that the problem before us will be fairly definitely limited in scope. What we desire to do is to examine as precisely as possible the concepts of man, or of human nature, as held by St. Thomas and Freud respectively. For the sake of manageability we must exclude as far as possible the greater part of their philosophy and theology, as well as the use of psychoanalysis as a technique for investigation and as a therapy. The burden of the discussion must be confined to a comparison of what Freud called his metapsychology with St. Thomas' notion of human nature.

#### THE CONTEXTS.

Nevertheless, the broader aspects of a philosophy cannot be entirely excluded from consideration even when the particular point at issue is deliberately confined, and especially if the point is the nature of man.<sup>4</sup> For a philosopher's concept of man is necessarily influenced by his general metaphysics, or better, by his outlook on all reality, his *Weltanschauung*. His concept of man is a part of a greater complex of thought, belief, feeling, opinion and so on, and willy nilly gains or suffers from this context.

We consider then briefly, first, the general outlook of St.

<sup>4</sup> We are not going to take seriously Freud's frequent assertion that he was not a philosopher and had no desire to philosophize. In fact, although he exerted himself enormously in the accumulation of data, and in this respect deserves the commendation of empirical science, he was also and perhaps more intently concerned with the analysis of these data, in the investigation and determination of the *causes* of the facts he uncovered and organized, constantly searching for more and more exact theories to embrace these facts, and not adverse to extending a theory, once he had evolved it, to the explanation of major problems in religion, art, ethics, etc. Indeed it was largely for this penchant for speculation that his work was so long criticized or disregarded by more strictly empirical psychologists.



Thomas. For St. Thomas the fundamental division of the universe is in terms of act and potency. Act is that by which things are, by which they are determined, formed. It is being in the fullest sense, the prime requisite for action, and action itself. Potency is that which is not yet, that which is therefore undetermined, as yet unformed, and therefore the principle of change and motion in things. It is being in a tentative and possible sense, the prime requisite for becoming.

Seeing potency in every part of the visible world, and understanding that potentiality is never realized except by and through and for actuality, St. Thomas inevitably moves from the visible world to the invisible, where the principle of all things is found in the Pure Act who is God. All lesser things must therefore have come forth from God; all things with potentiality in themselves, and change and becoming, are derived things. But by their very change and becoming they may become more actual, approaching therefore more closely to the Pure Act from which they first proceeded. The summation, therefore, of all truth is in this: that all things have come forth from God and seek to return to Him, and this under His guidance and by His inspiration.

In the material world, man is unique, in that he possesses a spiritual principle, in virtue of which he is an image of God, and in the strength of which he can make more and more perfect this image, by God's grace, knowing and loving Him. In the beginning, each man is potential in this respect—the clean tablet on which nothing is written—but in the end, he is, as it were, deified by his contact with God, and this is his God-given destiny.

For Freud, the outlook is quite different. For him, the fundamental nature of the universe is that of a blind and purposeless mass of energizing matter. Evolving through space and time, the interactions of moving parts of matter have fortuitously produced certain more or less unified masses of matter and energy which we call living things. Among them are ourselves.

The basic law of these living things is the law of the material

universe—to move, to discharge energy. In man this law appears as the pleasure principle, for it is pleasurable to discharge energy and painful to contain energy undischarged. Man is bound to the law of maximum pleasure, which is found in the constant and unfettered release of the energies which are constantly building up within him.

There is no purpose nor destiny to man, unless you count as purpose the various twists and turns of human effort, by which men try to avoid whatever hinders the discharge of energy. But in the true sense of final causality, of destiny, there is nothing—all causality is efficient, the propulsion from behind seeking the path of least resistance.

Here, then, is the fundamental conflict between St. Thomas and Freud. St. Thomas looks on the universe and sees God, who created the material and spiritual worlds, and guides them in every detail through His providence. In the world is the ensouled animal, man, who is given a high destiny by God, namely, to find his fullest unfolding and realization in the return to God, by God's grace, through the knowledge and love and service of God, until he meets God face to face, becoming thereby to a degree himself deified.

Freud sees no God and no spiritual being; he sees only matter. There is neither purpose nor destiny, but only blind and random release of material energies. Of this whole man is no more than a homogeneous part, a product of the mass of energizing matter not essentially different from any other part.

#### ANTINOMIES IN THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN NATURE.

In the light of this basic dichotomy, it is small wonder that the thoughts of St. Thomas and Freud seem entirely incompatible. Moreover, we can spell out the opposition in more specific antinomies within the limits of the special point we are considering, the nature of man.

Freud is, as has been said, monistic; he posits a monolithic materialism in human nature. Man is matter and ruled by material forces, wholly and entirely and indeed mechanistically.



This is an outlook which Freud absorbed from his earliest teachers and from which he never departed. Freud is also voluntaristic, not in the sense that he posits the existence of a will as a free spiritual faculty, nor even in the sense of positing a will as any kind of distinct human faculty. He is voluntaristic in the sense that the Germanic philosophy of his time was voluntaristic, as positing motive energy, impulse to action, the constant propulsion from within, as the essence of human activity. And because he is a materialist with a mechanistic bent, and a voluntarist in the sense described, he is also a determinist, holding that each individual is necessarily and ineluctably propelled in each single action and in the whole course of his life span of activity.

St. Thomas, on the contrary, is a dualist, holding indeed for an animality in man, but not denying the spirituality. And while man must move in obedience to the laws of animal nature on the part of his animality, he must also obey the laws of spiritual nature on the part of his soul. Man's life, then, is a tension and a balance, between laws and energies of two sorts; a balance which should redound wholly to his advantage, but which can also lead to stress and conflict. Furthermore, the essence of human activity is not internal propulsion—St. Thomas is not voluntaristic in this sense. For him there is in man, besides the natural appetites which impel him from within, the elicited appetites which follow perceptions and are governed by them, and these latter appetites are the more important ones. There are sense responses for sense knowledge and spiritual responses to spiritual knowledge, and in this latter field is found the appetite which can be called simply the appetite of man, the will. Since the will, moreover, follows reason, which is the highest power of perception in man, and commands, all else being equal, the lower appetites, a unity under reason is effected in man's activities, in virtue of which man can rightly be considered as a predominantly rational being. For St. Thomas, then, appetites follow knowledge both in the sense of being elicited by knowledge and in the sense of

being ultimately ruled by rational knowledge. Freud, on the other hand, speaks of appetites as things independent of knowledge, arising and developing to their full stature without reference to an eliciting perception, and only attaching themselves to images and ideas after they have reached maturity, and for the sake of easier discharge of their psychic energy.

As a consequence of his dualistic conception of man, and of the realization that the appetites are governed by the perceptions which elicit them, St. Thomas can substantiate man's sense of his personal freedom with sound arguments, for an appetite ruled by a rational power, with its capacity to perceive and weigh universal values, is an appetite free to elect among finite values. While Freud, then, leaves nothing in man to chance and nothing to free choice, everything being predetermined by the force and direction of the basic impulses arising from his biological substrates, St. Thomas holds that much in man is of free election, some is from basic impulse and some fortuitous.

St. Thomas, therefore, is hierarchic, for he defines an order of specifically different powers and energies in man, some ruling and directing others, some of more value than others, and all clearly distinct one from the other even while all are ordained to work together in a close harmony. There are the orders of spiritual and material, as have been mentioned, and the orders of cognitive, appetitive and executive. In another sense, there is the speculative order, ordained to contemplation and admiration of the truths of things which cannot be produced, and the practical order, ordained to action and manipulation, in those things subject to man's disposition.

For Freud, on the contrary, there is no real hierarchic diversity in man. There is only one basic energy, undifferentiated and indeterminate in itself, which suffers an accretion of special "faculties"—if we can call them faculties—as reactions to external realities. There is, therefore, for Freud only one real value—the release of the basic energy, in accordance with the pleasure principle, by which man is oppressed and



by whose pressure is constructed the illusory structure men call values. For St. Thomas, of course, the structure of objective values is real, a hierarchy towards which men respond and strive according to their several capacities; a hierarchy, indeed, which corresponds, according to divine providence, with the nature with which man has been endowed.

### RECONCILIATIONS

Enough has been said to show that St. Thomas and Freud are not only basically in opposition in matters of religion and ethics, as is generally presumed, but also in the fundamental principles in which the nature of man is conceived. The dichotomy is radical, built up as it is on a series of flat contradictions. And yet I should like to suggest and defend now the proposition that St. Thomas would have found much in psychoanalysis, and even in some of its fundamental conceptions, which would not have sounded strange to him. To express this in another way, I do not believe that Freud's valid observations necessarily involve the philosophical positions in which he developed them, but rather integrate, and even more effectively, into Thomistic psychology. As a first step in the defense, I should like to analyse some of St. Thomas' psychological ideas which do not seem alien to psychoanalytic conceptions.

Let us take up first that element in human nature which is today called the unconscious. It was Freud who first realized in an adequate way the significance of the unconscious in man and who first devised effective techniques for exploring it. How did he conceive the unconscious? The basic notion, of course, as the name indicates, is that of a part of man's psychic nature which is totally impervious to introspection, to reflection or consciousness. What goes on there is a sealed book, no matter how significant its contents. What goes on there is unconscious not only in the sense in which habitual knowledge and memories are kept unconsciously, i. e., as latent, but in the sense that there is ordinarily no possibility at all of resurrection or recall.

a. *The Id.*

In this unconscious sphere is the Id. For Freud, this is the primary part of human nature, the part man has from the beginning and the part which governs all the rest; first, therefore, in time and nature. Within the Id arise continuously the basic instincts, which are physical or physiological energies transmuted into psychic impulses, which thereupon seek inexorably for release according to the pleasure principle. The release is found through motor activities and motor activities are associated with images and ideas. Thus it comes about that appropriate images and ideas, i. e., those which have once successfully effected a release of energy, and pleasure, draw to themselves the basic psychic impulses, become "cathected" with psychic energy. It happens, however, that some of the methods used to obtain pleasure actually result in pain, if the method used meets with opposition or punishment in reality. The images then to which the instinctual impulses have attached themselves excite pain in the consciousness even in anticipation, and are henceforth rejected from consciousness. In these rejected images we find the beginnings of the true unconsciousness.<sup>5</sup> Rejected images and ideas, still cathected by psychic energies, are massed in the unconscious, where they are continuously active—unconscious thought—constantly combining and dividing among themselves, and displacing their emotional charge from one to another, all for the sake of finding some image which will be acceptable to consciousness and consequently able to constitute a mode for releasing instinctual energies. The Id, then, is dynamic, constantly generating impulses; amoral or bestial, insofar as it seeks pleasure regardless of the customs or morals obtaining in outside reality; extra-spatial and extra-temporal, because the limitations of space and time have no meaning to the basic impulses; and illogical, containing even contradictory impulses simultaneously.

<sup>5</sup> The affective elements in the Id, while not manifest to consciousness, are not considered part of the unconscious, strictly speaking, because they are unknowable in themselves. The unconscious in the true sense embraces those elements which are knowable in themselves, the images and ideas, which have become unknowable because of some psychic interference.



Where can such a conception fit into St. Thomas scheme of things? At first sight, nowhere. St. Thomas, has, of course, a finely worked out notion of the nature of passions, but these passions are responses to sense perceptions, susceptible to the rule of reason and the imprint of virtue, and certainly available to introspection. To the degree that this represents the whole of his conception, it bears slight resemblance to the instincts of the Id. But it is not the whole. In his Commentary on the *Sentences*,<sup>6</sup> we find St. Thomas describing sense appetites in another way, saying: "The irascible and concupiscible name the sense appetite insofar as it is complete, and distinct in different parts, and tending to reason; whence in man the irascible and concupiscible obey reason. But sensuality names the sense appetite insofar as it is incomplete and undetermined, and more depressed; and therefore it is said that there can be no virtue in it, and that it is perpetually corrupted; and from its very indetermination it has a certain unity." Again he says:<sup>7</sup> "Sensuality names the sensitive part insofar as it is more depressed into the flesh, as it does not follow the rule of the will, but moves by its own motion, and therefore there can be no virtue in it." This is the part of man which is the source of the *actus primo primi*, the *fomes peccati*, the part of man from which erupt sudden and violent appetites.<sup>8</sup> This same doctrine is repeated in the *De Veritate*.<sup>9</sup>

Moreover, a likeness can be seen in the primary divisions of sensuality, as seen by St. Thomas and Freud. St. Thomas divided the sense appetites into the irascible and the concupiscible; Freud held for the libido, or life instinct, and the destrudo, or instinct of aggression and death. St. Thomas even uses the term libido in the precise sense of concupiscence unsubjected to reason.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 27, a. 3. *De Verit.*, q. 25, aa. 4-7.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, a. 5.

<sup>10</sup> "Libido moreover signifies an inordinate concupiscence which is not totally subjected to reason." *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 27, a. 3.

Finally, although Freud (while he denied it explicitly) often treated the libido as nothing more nor less than sexuality, which is a far cry from St. Thomas' notion of concupiscence, yet St. Thomas acknowledges sexuality as the strongest and most rebellious part of concupiscence, pointing out that even when used normally and virtuously it overthrows the use of reason,<sup>11</sup> and that the generative organs are so unruly that they are like separate animals in man.<sup>12</sup> He speaks of no other part of sensuality in such striking terms.

If we can accept, then, a substantial identity between the sensuality of St. Thomas and the instinctual part of Freud's Id, we can begin to elaborate that notion in Thomistic psychology, for Freud examined in detail what St. Thomas mentioned more or less in passing. We can, moreover, go on to make a comparison between the conflict of sensuality and reason which St. Thomas often notes, and the conflict between the Id and the Ego of Freud. Not, of course, that Freud's Ego, with its principle of reality, bears much comparison with St. Thomas' concept of the power of reason. The Ego is a derivation from the Id itself, superimposed, as it were, on the Id, drawing its energy from the Id; its sole function is to devise or discover means for obtaining the pleasure the Id seeks in ways compatible with external reality. This is a far cry from reason,

<sup>11</sup> ". . . thus in conjugal intercourse, though the pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change." *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 34, a. 1, ad 1. "Now there is a loss of reason incidental to the union of man and woman both because the reason is carried away entirely on account of the vehemence of the pleasure, so that it is unable to understand anything at the same time, as the Philosopher says, and again because of the tribulation of the flesh. . . ." *Ibid.*, Suppl., q. 49, a. 1.

<sup>12</sup> "As Augustine says, it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason. . . . But . . . we must consider the natural cause of this particular member's insubmission to reason. . . . This is the case with these two organs (namely, the heart and the generative organs) in particular because each is, as it were, a separate animal being, insofar as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they have their proper movements naturally. . . ." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 17, a. 9, ad 3.



a power in its own right, superior to sense power, ordained to grasping the essence of reality. But granting all this, the conflict between the two elements is not dissimilar, as a conflict between the impulses in the order of sensuality and especially of the flesh, and the rule of reason, or reality. Nor are the effects of the conflict dissimilar, as each man recognized: distortion of reason, repression of appetite with the possibility of sickness both mental and physical.<sup>13</sup>

b. *Unconscious knowledge.*

So much, for the moment, for the instinctual impulses of sensuality; what about the notion of unconscious ideas and

<sup>13</sup> "Moreover, from the fact that the soul imagines something and is vehemently affected towards it, a change takes place sometimes in the body, which leads to sickness or health, without the action of the physical principles which naturally cause sickness or health in a body." *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 99.

"Since there is in man a two-fold nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to his reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of the reason remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 3, ad 2.

"In evidence of which it should be noted that according to the order of nature, on account of the tying together of the powers of the soul in one essence, and (of the union) of the soul and the body in one composite being, the higher powers and the lower powers and the body overflow from one to the other whatever superabounds in any one of them, and thus it is that the body becomes cold or hot, or sometimes sick or healthy, and even dies, on account of some apprehension of the soul; for it sometimes happens that death comes from joy or sorrow or love. . . . And likewise a change in the body redounds to the soul. For the soul joined to the body takes on the complications of the body, becoming insane or docile and so on. . . . Likewise there is a redundancy from the higher powers to the lower ones; when a passion in the sensual appetite follows from an intense motion of the will, and the animal powers are withdrawn or impeded from their acts by intense contemplation. And on the other hand, there is a redundancy from the inferior powers to the superior ones; as when reason is clouded by a vehement passion in the sensual appetite so that it judges as if simply good that thing which affects a man by passion." *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 10.

"If, on the other hand, the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope

images? Does St. Thomas have any place for cognitive elements which are formally unconscious, that is, strictly unconscious in Freud's sense? We are not, of course, speaking now of principles *quo*, structural elements or cognitive instruments *by which* man thinks or imagines, such as the faculties themselves, the impressed species, the active intellect—these are all certainly unconscious. But can there be unconscious *objects* of thought, actually existing in man unconsciously? Again, at first glance, it seems not, for St. Thomas sees every act of knowledge as the object of some other act, up to the act of the intellect which is known by the intellect itself. Where then is there room for unconscious knowledge, and hence for unconsciously motivated appetites and actions?

I believe that there is, in fact, ample room for these concepts in St. Thomas' psychology. For one thing, while he establishes a full range of consciousness in theory, he puts many limitations on it when he considers it in actual operation. For instance, any cognitive power can focus on only one element of its present object clearly at one time; the rest is known only confusedly.<sup>14</sup> Couple this limitation with the fact that an intense act on the part of one power may impede even completely the perceptive power of other faculties, and the possibility of unconscious cognition becomes greater.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, it would seem

of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that. Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 37, a. 2.

<sup>14</sup> "Therefore it is to be noted that all intelligible forms are of one genus. . . . For all refer to the same intellective power. And therefore all can be together at once in potency in the intellect, and similarly in incomplete act. . . . In order, however, that it actually understand, it is necessary that the species according to which it understands be in perfect act, and therefore it is impossible that it actually understand by diverse forms together at the same time. . . . It should be noted, however, that a thing can be one in one way and many in another way, as the continuum is one in act and many in potency. And if the intellect or a sense bears on such things as they are one, they are seen all together; if, however, as they are many, that is, each part being considered by itself, then the whole cannot be seen at one time." *De Verit.*, q. 8, a. 14. See also *I Cont. Gent.*, c. 55.

<sup>15</sup> "When the mind is intent, in its act, upon distant things which are far



that the passions themselves are never known directly, but only indirectly through the bodily commotion they cause, and this commotion is known only to the sense of touch, which is the least discerning of the senses. And finally, the acts of man (*actus hominis*) are unconscious, and yet provoked by an image.<sup>16</sup>

Another Thomistic thesis which seems to involve unconscious thought or imagery to an even greater extent is the thesis on habit formation. St. Thomas speaks several times of the process by which a series of actions can become so "learned" that it is performed unconsciously.<sup>17</sup> Such a series of actions, however, depends on a series of imperating passions, for the execution of physical motion is through the sense appetites. There is, therefore, either an unconscious pattern of images eliciting these passions, or else they operate without images. Moreover, what is true of habitual action is true also of habitual passion, for the responses of the sense appetites are subject also to

removed from the senses, the intensity of its application leads to abstraction from the senses. . . ." *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 173, a. 3, ad 2.

"Or we may say that the reason why one power is hindered in its act when another power is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for such an intense operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from the principle of life the inflow that the other powers or members should receive." *Summa Theol.*, Suppl., 82, 3, ad 4.

<sup>16</sup> "Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.

<sup>17</sup> "In a work of virtue, both election and execution are necessary. Now discretion is required for election; for executing whatever is already determined, promptness is required. For a man who is actually executing a work does not have to think much about the work; for this, as Avicenna says in his *Metaphysics*, would rather hinder than help him, as is plain in the citharist, who would be greatly impeded if he had to give thought to touching each single chord, and similarly for the writer, if he had to think about the formation of each letter. And hence it is that passion preceding election impedes the act of virtue, insofar as it impedes the judgment of reason, which is necessary in electing; however, after the election is perfected by the pure judgment of reason, a consequent passion helps more than it hinders, because if it disturbs the judgment of reason in some way, nevertheless it makes for promptness in action." *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 7, ad 3. See also *II Physics*, c. 14, # 268.

habituation. But, as we know, passion affects judgment—unconscious passion, then, would unconsciously affect judgment—and St. Thomas holds that this process can go so far as to destroy man's apprehension of all but the primary laws of nature.<sup>18</sup> If an opinion can be hazarded at this point, it would be that the most promising openings to a Thomistic "depth psychology" lie here.

### c. *The Super-ego.*

Returning again to Freud, we find another important element of the unconscious, the Super-ego, which Freud equates with

<sup>18</sup> ". . . through the act of the sense appetite it happens that an animal actually imagines those things which were previously stored in memory. Moreover, this can also happen in man through an act of the intellectual appetite, insofar as the higher appetite moves the lower." *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 11, ad 4.

"Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite. . . ." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 77, a. 1.

"And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, (i. e., an image is aroused in the imagination by a bodily change as happens in dreams) before the apprehensive principle, since as the Philosopher observes, 'lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved.' It also happens, through the rousing of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 80, a. 2. See also *De Verit.*, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 77, aa. 1, 3, 7,

"So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the *fomes*, in other animals has simply the nature of a law . . . But in man, it has not the nature of law in this way, rather it is a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, insofar as it is a penalty following from the divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of law." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 91, a. 6.

But as to the other, i. e., the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states, were not esteemed sinful." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 94, a. 6.



conscience or the sense of morality. It would be too great a distortion of St. Thomas' views to allow this equation. The Super-ego is a badly eviscerated conscience, lacking the heart of true conscience which is to make an objectively valid judgment of what is morally good to do here and now. The Super-ego is at once too objective, insofar as it is nothing more than the wholesale introjection of some authority's expressed will, and too subjective, insofar as it is a fixed formation unresponsive to personal criticism and evaluation. And yet, if we examine St. Thomas' views on the generation of an act of faith, especially on the part the will plays in this act, and apply these ideas to purely human faith, considering how much is accepted as the norm for action without any understanding of the proper reasons, and how much the great emotional rapport of a child for his parents may confirm and solidify these norms in his mind, we can see how, even in St. Thomas' terms, there is room for an unreasoned and unreasoning ethical imperative heavily charged with more or less unconscious emotion, and how this might pass for conscience in many. In short, it seems possible to recreate the Super-ego in Thomistic terms, even though it would not correspond to conscience or morality. And if Freud's insights into the operations of the Super-ego give us some ideas about the genesis and nature of erroneous or badly formed and childish consciences, we have gained valuable psychological material for application to moral questions.

d. *Other Freudian concepts.*

Before concluding I should like to mention briefly some other Freudian concepts which seem susceptible to Thomistic interpretation. The idea, for instance, of sublimation, by which libidinous energies which cannot be directly discharged in any manner acceptable in the light of the prevailing ethics of the society in which one lives, and which are therefore transformed into the energies which produce science, art, politics, religion, and so on, would not be valid as such to the mind of St. Thomas. Nevertheless, the idea of the soul's energies being concentrated

in one field of endeavor, and thereby weakened in another, is quite in accord with his thought, as it is indeed with common sense. The element of truth in the notion of sublimation is a part of ordinary as well as philosophical tradition.<sup>19</sup> Other ideas which have gained immensely from Freud's study and interpretation, but which are not radically novel, are susceptible to inclusion in any valid psychological system. Examples of these ideas are the notion of fixation, by which an object of love or libido so attaches the energy of the psyche that the further and normal development or maturing of the individual's personality is impeded and stunted, and the notions of condensation, displacement and substitution, which do much to illuminate the subtleties of the imagination, especially the creative imagination. The activity of censorship in the mind, and the consequent repression of images and ideas, fits in well, it seems to me, and gains a certain additional elucidation from St. Thomas' idea of the redundance of appetites, especially the redundance of the will to the senses. For when reason, with its wider range of apprehension, sees the unacceptability of some idea or image, and the will following reason moves in repugnance to that idea and its derivatives, the sense appetites respond with a concurring repugnance, and the normal associations of the imagination, which are strongly affected by the passions, are necessarily impeded.

#### CONCLUSION.

The ideas outlined above are offered by way of suggestion and introduction, in the belief that the analogies between the concepts of St. Thomas and Freud deserve to be studied. I should like, therefore, to conclude in terms somewhat like these: that many of Freud's observations and deductions about human nature are valuable additions to our concept of man, even to a concept which is essentially Thomistic, that many psychological theses which St. Thomas has presented in their general

<sup>19</sup> The devil finds work for idle hands.



principles can be enlarged with Freudian material. This does not mean that Freud's concept of man was essentially correct, and far less does it mean that his ideas on religion, morality, art, politics, etc., were valid or even valuable. It does mean that Freud contributes to the rounding out of the concept of human nature, and that he does this in a unique way. For Freud gave emphasis to a part of human nature which was largely undervalued before his time. He gave due weight to the unconscious forces at work in men's minds, and, even more importantly, offered ingenious and effective ways of exploring this unconscious. He also detailed with remarkable insight and thoroughness the interworkings of mind, senses and appetites, and pointed out the often surprising influence of sexuality in seemingly unrelated spheres.

While we surely regret the serious errors in his work, and even more the harmful influence of some of these errors, we cannot refuse to accept the content of truth, for such an approach was no small part of St. Thomas' own strength.

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## THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE

545

The action by which man achieves his ultimate goal is neither making, nor doing, but contemplating.<sup>1</sup>

THIS sentence makes the most important point to be considered in any consideration of theoretical and practical knowledge. If it is true that man is ordered to contemplation as his ultimate end, and if contemplation consists in theoretical and not practical knowledge, then the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge is a crucially important one. At the same time, it is of equal importance to appreciate the complementary relation also obtaining between these two kinds of knowledge and to grasp the consequences which follow from seeing one as ordered to the other.

The distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge is a fundamental matter and, to a certain extent, a simple problem. Nevertheless, at the present time as well as in the past, this distinction has been ignored, confused or denied. The unhappy consequences which have followed have affected man's understanding of the nature of knowledge itself, the divisions of knowledge, and, by no means least important, the sort of education which human beings should have if they are to be developed in a truly liberal manner. It is of importance, then, to examine precisely what theoretical and practical knowledge mean and how they differ from each other. The point of emphasis which I should like to make in particular is that, although the two are differentiated from each other by the two ends of knowledge and action, nevertheless the distinction is not to be construed so absolutely that the two are viewed

<sup>1</sup> *The Saint Xavier College Self Study*. A Progress Report. (Chicago, 1953), p. 18.

as wholly in opposition. This opposition is sometimes carried to the extreme of denying one for the sake of the other. It is just such an extreme that tends to be revealed in the history of philosophical thought on the problem. As a result of spirited argument between strongly partisan advocates of one or the other kind, it is not easy to tell whether practical knowledge has more often been banished for the sake of theoretical knowledge, or whether concern for practical knowledge has been so overwhelming that theoretical knowledge is dismissed as abstruse, vain, and even meaningless.

Rash attacks are often made against positions rashly taken. Exaggerated and exclusive claims for theoretical knowledge were made, in one form or another, from Descartes through Kant and Hegel to the present day. The primary aim of Descartes in his *Discourse on Method*<sup>2</sup> was to apply to all branches of knowledge a wholly *a priori* mathematical method, starting from an intuition and proceeding exclusively by deduction. This conception of knowledge would obviously suppress all practical knowledge.

Immanuel Kant can hardly be charged with seeking to eliminate practical knowledge from the domain of science. Indeed, there is some justice to the remark of Turner that "Kant, whose express purpose was to deliver philosophy from scepticism, might well look back at Hume, the sceptic, and exclaim, 'There, but for the categorical imperative, goes Immanuel Kant!'"<sup>3</sup> But if Kant was aware to a great extent of the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge, nevertheless his understanding of theoretical knowledge had the inevitable effect of severing its relation to the real order. Probably from Kant, as from no other single writer, arose the conception of theoretical knowledge as "speculation" in a pejorative sense of the term—a spinning of theories in the mind. Kant himself, of course, sought to place theoretical knowledge,

<sup>2</sup> The full title of Descartes' work is *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences*. Cf. *Descartes. Selections*, edited by R. M. Eaton (New York, 1927), pp. 1-37.

<sup>3</sup> W. Turner, *History of Philosophy* (Boston, 1929), p. 548.



particularly metaphysics, on an objective, critical basis, but the effect was otherwise for many of those who came after him. And they had some justification for their position in reading in Kant sentences like the following: "Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or certain conceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be discovered by means of experience."<sup>4</sup>

In Hegel, even more idealistic in the philosophical sense of the term than Kant, the theoretical is elevated at the expense of the practical. Despite Hegel's professed interest in areas of practical philosophy, the theoretical approach is always paramount and action is always subordinated to thought as, indeed, it must be for one who claims "the rational alone is real," and "all becoming is a development of thought."<sup>5</sup> Once the utter primacy of the thinking spirit is asserted, the precise character of practical knowledge with its ultimate relation to action and appetite is hopelessly lost.

In contemporary times, the theoretical often continues to vanquish the practical completely or, to say the same thing in a reverse way, the practical has become theoretical. This tendency has become particularly noticeable in the area of moral philosophy, the domain of practical science *par excellence*. In an influential work in the moral field early in this century, G. E. Moore proposed an aesthetic contemplation, i.e., a purely theoretical consideration, of goodness and beauty; as a consequence, the analysis of the good became separated from achieving the good in action, the end to which moral and practical knowledge should be ordered.<sup>6</sup> Quite recently, J. M. Keynes analyzed the effect Moore's doctrine had on Cambridge students, remarking that "Nothing mattered except states of mind. . . . These states of mind were not connected with action or achievement or with consequences."<sup>7</sup> A. C. Ewing wrote,

<sup>4</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. M. Müller, Transcendental Logic, Second Division, Book II, Chap. III, Sect. VII.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Hegel's Introduction to *The Science of Logic* in *The Philosophy of Hegel*, edited by C. J. Friedrich (New York, 1958), pp. 177 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (London, 1903).

<sup>7</sup> J. M. Keynes, *Two Memoirs* (London, 1949), p. 83.

barely over a decade ago, that ethics "is a discussion of what good is, not of what things are good, and it is therefore neither an attempt to commend certain values (good things) nor to give advice on the solution of concrete moral problems."<sup>8</sup> If ethics cannot be understood as a practical science, distinct from theoretical science by its object and mode, then there is no recognition of the domain of practical science at all. This tendency to conceive moral philosophy in terms of a purely theoretical investigation has been intensified by contemporary analysts who restrict the domain of practical science to problems of purely logical analysis and semantics.

But if in the minds of some all knowledge has become theoretical, in the minds of others no knowledge is legitimate unless it is ordered to some practical end. This view, perhaps more familiar to us in the United States, holds that purely theoretical knowledge is at best an extravagant waste of time, and at worst dangerously deceptive. This view is an ancient one, widely held, for example, in early Roman philosophy, which was wholly practical in aim, subordinating theoretical inquiry to practical problems of conduct. And early in the period of modern philosophy, Francis Bacon tells us:

Although the roads to human power and to human knowledge lie close together, and are nearly the same, nevertheless on account of the pernicious and inveterate habit of dwelling on abstractions, it is safer to begin and raise the sciences from those foundations which have relation to practice, and to let the active part itself be as the seal which prints and determines the contemplative counterpart. . . . Now these two directions, the one active the other contemplative, are one and the same thing; and what in operation is most useful, that in knowledge is most true.<sup>9</sup>

The continued empirical and often practical bent of English

<sup>8</sup> A. C. Ewing, *The Definition of the Good* (London, 1947), p. 212. Ewing seems to recognize that as a science ethics cannot be practical in the sense that prudence is practical. But, like many others, Ewing leaps from the wholly practical order to the purely theoretical order, overlooking the precise sense in which ethics, though dealing with theoretical truths, is still a practical science.

<sup>9</sup> F. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, Book II, Aphorism 4. Cf. Burt, *The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill* (New York, 1939), pp. 89-90.

philosophers, such as Locke and Hume, are too well known to dwell upon.<sup>10</sup>

In contemporary times, John Dewey has been the apostle of the practical ordering of knowledge. True enough, his proximate philosophical antecedents in large part are found in William James, whose pragmatism emphasized the purely utilitarian aspect of knowledge: ideas are true to the extent they give us satisfaction in action.<sup>11</sup> Dewey pushes this utilitarian approach to knowledge further, and it is not without considerable significance that his philosophy has come to be called "instrumentalism." Knowledge is primarily, if not exclusively, an instrument for dominating our environment, for achieving practical results.<sup>12</sup>

Dewey's discussion of theoretical and practical knowledge in his *Quest for Certainty* shows little, if any, appreciation of what theoretical knowledge properly is. Indeed, at times he views man's attempt to engage in contemplation as nothing more than a distrust he feels in himself, and as a desire to get beyond and above himself. The fear of uncertainty has driven man to retire within himself in pursuing purely theoretical knowledge. "Hence men have longed to find a realm in which there is an activity which is not overt and which has no external consequences. 'Safety first' has played a large role in effecting a preference for knowing over doing and making."<sup>13</sup>

Dewey asks the question: "What is the cause and the import of the sharp division between theory and practice?"<sup>14</sup> The question is a good one in the sense that it implies that the division between theoretical and practical knowledge has been

<sup>10</sup> Cf. especially Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Section I.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. W. James, *The Meaning of Truth* (New York, 1909).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Ferrer Smith, O.P., "A Thomistic Appraisal of the Philosophy of John Dewey," *The Thomist*, XVIII (April), 127-185. Dewey "dedicated his philosophic life . . . to the implementation and exploitation of the practical and the extirpation of what he considered the obstructionist chimeras resultant upon any affirmation of the speculative." (p. 128)

<sup>13</sup> J. Dewey, *Quest for Certainty*. Cf. *Intelligence in the Modern World*, edited by J. Ratner (New York, 1939), p. 279.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 278.



made too sharp, too absolute. Yet the question itself is a theoretical question, not a practical one, and Dewey is not a theoretical thinker. His answer is to subject theoretical knowing to practical considerations. "To say that the object of philosophy is truth is to make a moral statement which applies to every inquiry. . . . To assert that contemplation of truth for its own sake is the highest ideal is to make a judgment concerning authoritative value."<sup>15</sup> This observation has the effect of turning a speculative interest in knowledge into a moral attitude. And to the extent that Dewey envisages purely theoretical knowledge, he contrasts it unfavorably with practical knowledge, regarding it as less adequate and even defective.<sup>16</sup>

What remains implicit and perhaps vague in the instrumentalism of John Dewey becomes explicit and thorough-going in communistic philosophy, particularly in dialectical materialism as formulated by Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin. The radical subordination of theoretical knowledge to practical knowledge, of all knowledge to action, constitutes the basic thesis of the philosophy of communism.

Engels remarks: "Communism, insofar as it is theoretical, is the theoretical expression of the position of the proletariat in this struggle (between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie) and the theoretical summing up of the conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat."<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 302.

<sup>16</sup> "What is sometimes termed 'applied' science, may then be more truly science than is what is conventionally called pure science. For it is directly concerned with not just instrumentalities, but instrumentalities at work in effecting the modifications of existence in behalf of conclusions that are reflectively preferred. Thus conceived the characteristic subject-matter of knowledge consists of fulfilling objects, which as fulfillments are connected with a history to which they give character. Thus conceived, knowledge exists in engineering, medicine and the social arts more adequately than it does in mathematics and physics. Thus conceived, history and anthropology are scientific in a sense in which bodies of information that stop short with general formulas are not." Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, as quoted by Ratner, *op. cit.*, p. 945.

<sup>17</sup> F. Engels, "The Communists and Karl Heinzen," in *Karl Marx, Selected Works*, prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow, edited by V.

The extended essay of Engels, entitled *Ludwig Feuerbach*, is perhaps the best single description of the doctrinal views of dialectical materialism, containing an evaluation of Hegel, a criticism of the materialism of Feuerbach, and an exposition of the main tenets of dialectical materialism.<sup>18</sup> In the 1888 edition of *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Engels added, as an appendix, eleven theses on Feuerbach written by Marx in 1845. The content of these theses brings out clearly how Marx views the complete ordering of all thought to action. The following remarks are particularly relevant.

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the object, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the *object* or *contemplation* but not as *human sensuous activity, practice*, not subjectivity. Thus it happened that the *active* side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really differentiated from the thought-objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as activity *through objects*. Consequently, in the *Essence of Christianity*, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-Jewish form of

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Adoratsky (New York, 1933), p. xv. To this remark of Engels, Adoratsky adds: "The struggle of the proletariat cannot be successful without a revolutionary theory which completely reflects and explains the whole complicated process of historical movement and serves as a guide in changing the world. Scientific communism includes practical revolutionary activity as an indispensable constituted part. But this activity must be guided by scientific theory. Marx considers it the task of science 'to reveal all the forms of antagonism and exploitation' in order to assist the proletariat to abolish them. Thus, in the hands of Marx, Engels and Lenin, science serves the proletarian revolution; it accomplishes the greatest work of history." (*ibid.*, p. xv.)

<sup>18</sup> In mentioning Hume and Kant in this essay, Engels observes that what is decisive in their views has already been said by Hegel, so far as this was possible from an idealist standpoint, and adds: "The materialistic additions made by Feuerbach are more ingenious than profound. The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice, *viz.*, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conceptions of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible 'thing-in-itself.'" (*ibid.*, p. 432).

appearance. Hence he does not grasp the significance of "revolutionary," of practical-critical, activity. (Thesis I).

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, i. e., the reality and power, the "this-sidedness" of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. (Thesis II).

But the most revealing line on the outlook of Marx's thought is the last thesis: "The philosophers have *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point however is to *change* it."<sup>19</sup> (Thesis XI).

A revolutionary outlook is certainly a practical matter. If one is planning a revolution, Marx, Engels and their modern disciples are skilled guides to follow. With such an aim, it is not surprising that all knowledge is to be subjected to action. And within the limits of practical objectives, especially when divorced from any measure by theoretical truths, it must be acknowledged that in many respects the Marxist understanding of practical knowledge is highly effective and powerful. It is equally a thorough subordination of the theoretical to the practical. But if man is not ordered primarily and ultimately to a wholly practical end, to an utter transformation of reality that involves a destruction of the natural order itself, then the Marxist doctrine is fundamentally wrong and radically perverse. The Marxist position, significantly coming as late in the history

<sup>19</sup> These quotations are taken from *Karl Marx, Selected Works*, pp. 471-473. Stalin adhered to the same view: "Theory is the experience of the labor movement in all countries, taken in its general form. Of course, theory becomes immaterial if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory. But theory can become the greatest force in the labor movement if it is built up in indissoluble connection with revolutionary practice, for it, and it alone, can give to the movement confidence, the power of orientation and an understanding of the inner connection between events; for it, and it alone, can help us in our practical work to discern how and in which direction classes are moving not only at the present time, but also how and in which direction they will move in the near future. Lenin himself said and often repeated his well-known thesis, that: 'Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.'" (*ibid.*, p. xx.).



of thought as it does, is the most thorough ordering of theory to practice that human thought has ever advanced. It is the logical consequence of all positions placing man's end within the limits of his own practical manipulation. The ultimate consequence, which Marx and his followers have no hesitancy in taking, is the denial of the transcendence of God and the order of creation, and the accompanying effect of making man a technological god and the order of creation a product of human technological transformation.

The only answer to the thorough-going doctrine of Marxism is to begin with a right understanding of the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge, to see a fundamentally complementary relation between the two, and to grasp the sense in which it is impossible, so far as knowledge is concerned, to depart entirely from the theoretical order. Having given a brief survey of what some notable thinkers have had to say on the subject, let us now approach theoretical and practical knowledge from as objective and analytic a position as possible.

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The starting point is the recognition of the fact that human intellectual knowing is conceptual knowing. It is impossible for us to know anything intellectually except by the production of a concept serving as the indispensable sign and likeness of an object.<sup>20</sup> It is such intellectual knowing that is divided into theoretical and practical knowledge.

As we have already noted, theoretical and practical knowledge are distinguished from each other in terms of their ends. Aristotle remarks, simply, "For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action."<sup>21</sup> Basically, the distinction between the two amounts to no more than this; nevertheless, the little excursion we have taken into some history of thought on the matter suggests that we should examine the distinction carefully and comprehensively.

<sup>20</sup> I exclude, of course, the unique situation with respect to the Beatific Vision in which the divine essence is united immediately to the created intellect without the intermediary of even a concept. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 12, a. 9.

<sup>21</sup> *Metaphysics*, Book II, 993 b 20. Cf. also *On the Soul*, Book III, 433 a 14-21.

Let us approach this same distinction from another point of view. Let us consider theoretical and practical knowledge from the standpoint of the object known, a consideration that leads to some far-reaching consequences.

In theoretical knowledge, the object known is a non-operable one, which is to say that it is an object about which nothing can be done in terms of any transitory activity. In such knowledge, the object is primary. In seeking to know what a flower is, for example, I must study and analyze the flower itself. Contrary to Kant, I must seek to know whatever I can about the flower in itself, and not merely know my knowing of it. The flower as an object is the measure of my knowledge of the flower; my knowledge is not the measure of the flower. I do not impose my knowledge on the flower; in a literal sense, the flower imposes itself upon me and I must submit to it in order to know it. There is, in other words, a given order of reality which I must accept and understand. Theoretical knowledge consists in knowing this real order.

In practical knowledge, the contrary is the case. The object is an operable one. As a knower, I am the measure of such an object and the object must conform to me. If I wish to make a chair, I have a certain idea of such an object and I impose this conception on the appropriate matter. In the work which is achieved, I am the measure and the cause, and the finished product depends primarily on me.

In the *Summa Theologiae* St. Thomas discusses the distinction between theoretical or speculative knowledge and practical knowledge in connection with the question on God's knowledge. The essential doctrine on theoretical and practical knowledge is thus summarized in the context of discussing God's knowledge, and because the distinction is treated both formally and comprehensively, the major part of the article will be quoted.

Some knowledge is speculative only, some is practical only, and some is partly speculative and partly practical (*aliqua vero secundum aliquid speculativa et secundum aliquid practica*).

In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, in relation to the things

known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine things. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing—as, for instance, if a builder were to consider a house by defining and dividing, and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as they are operable, for *operable* means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; *for the practical intellect differs from the speculative by its end*, as the Philosopher says. For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of operation; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder were to consider how a house can be made, but without ordering this to the end of operation, but only toward knowledge, this would be only a speculative consideration as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore, knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known is merely speculative (*speculativa tantum*). But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical (*secundum quid speculativa et secundum quid practica*); and when it is ordained to an operative end it is strictly practical.

In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable.

But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly. . . .<sup>22</sup>

Because there has been considerable confusion on the distinction as well as the relation between theoretical and practical knowledge, let us summarize in outline form the full division of theoretical and practical knowledge as indicated in the article in the *Summa Theologiae* by St. Thomas.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 14, a. 16. The article is entitled "Whether God has a Speculative Knowledge of Things?" The translation is taken from the *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, edited by A. C. Pegis (New York, 1945). I have added the Latin phrases in parentheses where I have thought the English did not fully catch the original text.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. also *De Veritate*, q. 3, a. 3.



## THEORETICAL

## PRACTICAL

1. *Theoretical absolutely**In no way practical*

Theoretical on part of object,  
of mode of knowing, and of end  
of knower.

This is knowledge of an object which is non-operable with respect to the knower, e. g., our knowledge of natural or divine things.

2. *Theoretical formally**Radically practical*

Theoretical on part of mode of knowing and of end of knower.      Practical on part of thing known (object).

This is knowledge of an operable object by way of definition and division (resolutive mode) rather than in an operable way (compositive mode), e. g., an artist's knowledge of a house by defining it through genus and difference.

3. *Theoretical relatively**Formally practical*

Theoretical on part of knower.      Practical on part of object and of mode of knowing.

This is knowledge of an operable object in an operable manner—how to make or do something (compositive mode), but purely for the knowledge, and without the intention of ordering the knowledge to operation, e. g., scientific knowledge of how to become temperate or to build a house.

4. *In no way theoretical**Absolutely practical*

Practical on part of object,  
mode of knowing and end of  
knower.

This is knowledge of an operable object, in an operable way, and with the *intention* of making or doing something, e. g., the knowledge which an artist has when he proposes to make a statue, or which a man has in performing a moral act. This is the knowledge of art and prudence, and needs a principle of exercise—intention.

In the article quoted from the *Summa*, it is important to note that the knowledge God has of Himself is purely theoretical. God could not have a practical knowledge of Himself, for He would have to know Himself as an operable object, which implies the absurd consequence that He would have to make Himself. This consequence, however, in effect has been taken, as it logically must be by anyone who holds the primacy of practical knowledge.

From this brief, but basic, presentation of theoretical and practical knowledge in St. Thomas, let us note two fundamentally erroneous positions concerning the division of theoretical and practical knowledge.

The first position flows from an idealistic approach to knowledge. In an idealistic theory of knowledge, whether the knowledge in question is theoretical or practical, the knowing subject is always primary and the object secondary. It is such a view that provokes the unfavorable and widespread belief that theoretical knowledge is a form of *a priori* mental construction with the consequent imposition of such mental construction upon reality. In the idealistic approach to knowledge, there is a radical confusion between the theoretical and practical kinds of knowledge. The idealistic approach is theoretical by intention but practical with respect to mode of knowing and operation: the knower becomes the measure of reality. As Hegel has insisted, the rational alone is real; all being is thought realized and all becoming is a development of thought.<sup>24</sup>

The second position is the Marxist approach, an opposite extreme although similar in one important respect. The thorough-going Marxist principle is to revolutionize the existing world by transforming practically all existing reality. This, of

<sup>24</sup> Cf. also Hegel's Introduction to *The Science of Logic*. For example: "Pure science includes *thought insofar as it is just as much the thing in itself as it is thought, or the thing in itself insofar as it is just as much pure thought as it is the thing in itself*. Truth, as science, is pure self-consciousness unfolding itself, and it has the form of self in that what exists in and for itself is the known concept, while the concept as such is that which exists in and for itself." Quotation taken from *The Philosophy of Hegel*, edited by C. J. Friedrich (New York, 1953), p. 185.

course, is a completely practical ordination of knowledge and an outright denial of the legitimacy of knowledge for its own sake, which is to say, theoretical knowledge. Nevertheless—and this is the respect in which it has a similarity to the theoretical mode of procedure—Marxism recognizes the object, to some extent at least, as a measure, for Marx and his followers never cease to berate the primacy of the knower in any form of idealism. Yet the object, for Marxism, is only a potential something, an indeterminate thing not yet formed. The end of knowledge, therefore, is to make the object (reality) over in the likeness of the knower. This is a radical paraphrase of the knowledge of God Who creates reality in the likeness of Himself. The Marxist understands himself like a god, but a god who has practical knowledge only. This is a mild way of saying that, for Marxism, the existing order of things must be overthrown in a thorough revolution—and this order of things extends from matter in its least formed state to man himself. The technique of brain-washing and mass purges takes on considerable significance in this context. In a word, the supremacy of the practical order in Marxism means that the given natural order of creation is only matter for the art of dialectical materialism, an art that does not imitate nature, but destroys it in order to impose a perverted human reconstruction of reality.

Let us conclude by emphasizing three important points concerning the division of theoretical and practical knowledge.

First of all, from the standpoint of knowledge itself, theoretical knowledge is superior and more perfect. We know primarily in order to know, that is, to understand what is true. Furthermore, all sciences either are theoretical or are ordered to theoretical sciences. All sciences, theoretical or practical, attain theoretical truth. Consequently, we are educated, in the proper and formal sense of the term, primarily to understand and not to act. We may learn by doing in some respects but we do ultimately to learn—to know theoretical truths. In a society and culture largely pragmatic and practical in ordering and



outlook, such a view is not well received, but the truth of this position does not depend upon a given cultural situation at a given time; it depends upon the nature of human beings, a nature that is essentially characterized by rationality. Being rational specifies being ordered to knowledge. And just as the ultimate end of all created things is their assimilation to God, so for man this assimilation consists in knowledge of God. This knowledge, natural or supernatural, can only be theoretical. To suppose that such knowledge is practical is to suppose that God is something to be made or somehow subject to our action.

Secondly, practical knowledge necessarily depends on theoretical knowledge and is ordered to it. Within the domain of knowledge itself, it is impossible to leave wholly the theoretical order, for even in a practical science we are still concerned with theoretical truth and with what the natures of things are. Practical knowledge is ordered to theoretical knowledge in the sense that our final end is knowledge and not action.

Thirdly, the division of knowledge into theoretical and practical is not, however, an absolute division and can be easily exaggerated. We should not suppose, as has sometimes been assumed, that this division implies two orders of knowledge absolutely distinct and wholly separated from each other. The division of theoretical and practical knowledge is not a division based on being as such, but is a division based on a finite way of knowing. In God, there is no real distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge with respect to what He knows of Himself; His knowledge is uniquely theoretical. In man, while there is a division of knowledge into theoretical and practical, it is a division manifesting the ordering of practical knowledge to theoretical knowledge, culminating in the knowledge of God.

St. Thomas explicitly teaches, and the point is confirmed by a sound analysis of knowledge, that all science is ordered to theoretical science and thus to the knowledge of God.

Furthermore, that which is capable of being loved only for the sake of some other object exists for the sake of that other thing

which is lovable simply on its own account. . . . Now, all practical sciences, arts, and powers are objects of love only because they are means to something else, for their purpose is not knowledge but operation. But the speculative sciences are lovable for their own sake, since their end is knowledge itself. Nor do we find any action in human affairs, except speculative thought, that is not directed to some other end. . . . So, the practical arts are ordered to the speculative ones, and likewise every human operation to intellectual speculation, as an end. Now, among all the sciences and arts which are thus subordinated, the ultimate end seems to belong to the one that is perceptive and architectonic in relation to the others. For instance, the art of navigation, to which the end, that is, the use, of a ship pertains, is architectonic and preceptive in relation to the art of shipbuilding. In fact, this is the way that first philosophy is related to the other speculative sciences, for all the others depend on it, in the sense that they take their principles from it, and also the position to be assumed against those who deny the principles. And this first philosophy is wholly ordered to the knowing of God, as its ultimate end; that is why it is also called *divine science*. So, divine knowledge is the ultimate end of every act of human knowledge and every operation.<sup>25</sup>

The distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge is based primarily on a finite manner of knowing and in terms of two basic kinds of objects: a necessary, non-operable object and a contingent, operable object. This is the way things are and the way we know. We exist ultimately to know, not to do, and with respect to what we know, we know ultimately in order to know and love God. This truth is the basis for ordering all knowledge to theoretical knowledge, and is likewise the basis for all educational theory and practice. Thus we return to the starting point, but perhaps with more understanding and appreciation: The action by which man achieves his ultimate goal is neither making, nor doing, but contemplating.

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<sup>25</sup> *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chap. 25. Image Book Edition (New York, 1956), pp. 100-101.

## VALUE AND "ESSENTIALIST FALLACIES"

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THE problem of value cannot be relegated to a pigeon hole marked "ethics" and dealt with when philosophical questions considered more fundamental are already settled. Failure to grasp the full bearing which the problem has on all analysis largely accounts for the high degree of antipathy to "essence" curiously shared by certain exponents of linguistic analysis and certain champions of atheist *Existenzphilosophie*. Books like Professor J. O. Urmson's *Philosophical Analysis* and G. Bergmann's *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism*, reflect our increasing awareness that earlier positions of the linguistic movement were as metaphysical as the traditional philosophies they attacked. The recent translation of Sartre's major work *L'Être et le Néant* into English may serve indirectly to make it more clearly understood that contemporary linguistic analysis still rests on metaphysical foundations (as sympathetic critics have already been pointing out). But much more important is the hint given by Sartre's dubious handling of "essence" and "value" that the metaphysical assumptions underlying what Bertrand Russell has labelled "The Cult of Common Usage" are self-stultifying and self-contradictory. *L'Être et le Néant* should be prescribed reading for those linguistic philosophers who prescribe most earnestly the therapies of Ludwig Wittgenstein for *dis*-solving philosophical problems.

Both the admirers of Wittgenstein and the devotees of Sartre have set themselves the task of exorcising superstitions about "essence." But whereas the latter would decry an "essentialist fallacy" as a tragic misunderstanding of the human situation, the former would regard it as a tiresome, but very natural misconception of the way words work. Sartre attacks thinkers like Diderot for suppressing the role of God but retaining the concept of a fixed, preconceived human nature; Wittgenstein teases those who share St. Augustine's belief that all words are



the labels of ostensible entities. To call for a verdict of "essentialist fallacy" the Sartrean has to make open assertions about the kind of world we live in; but many linguistic philosophers hold they are simply pointing to facts that must, on reflection, be admitted by sensible folk of any conviction. Let us take three examples of the linguistic approach.

The slim volume *Aesthetics and Language*<sup>1</sup> claimed in all innocence on its baby-blue cover to offer "a fresh, unbiased scrutiny of the linguistic confusions of traditional aesthetics." The first contributor, Professor W. B. Gallie, launches an attack on Croce and Idealist thinkers. These, we learn, are typical victims of "the essentialist fallacy" in presupposing that a word like Art must stand for some *one* thing. The aesthetician's only valid functions, he concludes, must be of a piecemeal nature, like upholding the differences between the art forms and assessing the applicability of comparisons and analogies. Any budding metaphysicians who seek the essence of Art are thus summarily dismissed. Mr. T. D. Weldon in his book *The Vocabulary of Politics* claims that political theory, too, has been vitiated by "the primitive and generally unquestioned belief that words . . . such as 'State,' 'Citizen,' 'Law' and 'Liberty' have intrinsic or essential meanings which it is the aim of political philosophers to discover and explain." (p. 11) But actually "to know their meaning one need only know how to use them correctly, that is, in such a way as to be intelligible in ordinary and technical discourse." (p. 19) The assumption that all words are proper nouns produces "the illusion of real essences" and its uglier step-sister "the illusion of absolute standards." And compare the famous statement of the later Wittgenstein ('*Philosophical Investigations*' I's. 116): "when philosophers use a word—'knowledge,' 'being,' 'object,' 'I,' 'proposition,' 'name'—and try to grasp the *essence* of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever used in this way in the language game which is its original home?—What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday usage."

<sup>1</sup> Blackwell, 1958.

The plausibility of these three examples rests on two foundations, one legitimate and one which the "essentialist" is entitled to challenge. First, it takes a desperately dogged ostrich to deny that words like "art," "law" and "being" are used in a wide number of ways. Second, (if I may adopt Mr. R. M. Hare's pet pair of terms), it is all too easy to graft onto a largely *descriptive* sense of "meaning"—"the way we do use and understand words"—a largely *evaluative* sense with a value something like this: "the way we should and would understand words if our concepts were appropriate to reality." Consider two examples of this latter sense. A brash Londoner tells his country cousins: "You don't know what comfort MEANS until you've lived in TOWN." A passionate convert affirms he never knew what happiness, (or gratitude, or fellowship), *meant* until a Billy Graham rally changed his way of life. This sense hardly fits Weldon's<sup>2</sup> claim that to know words' meanings it is enough to be able to use them "in such a way as to be intelligible in ordinary and technical discourse." But what ground is there for saying that, in effect, the three philosophers cited play on the evaluative connotation of "meaning?" Simply this: all three imply that once we understand how we do use words, we already have the answer to the question "how should we use them?" Otherwise they could not conclude so confidently that once we understand the workings of our language we will have no right to claim that a legitimate puzzle or mystery remains; hence that we will no longer be justified in asking for the essence or the real meaning of the word we queried. Rather similar chains of argument have been employed against ethical "Naturalism," against traditional Christian equations between goodness and being or goodness and the real object of human desire, and against the concept of God as an *ens necessarium*. Those who currently

<sup>2</sup> Weldon's confusion might similarly lead him to condemn Kierkegaard for writing: "a precise and correct linguistic usage associates therefore dread and the future. (*Concept of Dread*, p. 82). "Correct linguistic usage" for Kierkegaard must mean here "a usage appropriate to reality." Fowler's "English Usage" and Dr. Gallup are *hors de combat*.

purvey such arguments may claim the support of G. E. Moore or Kant or Hume but their chief strength is to exploit the ambiguity of "meaning" (and so derivatively of "logical"), to dissuade us from the legitimate procedure of positing new entailment relationships to meet levels of experience which transcend the coarsest common sense. Not that all advocates of linguistic therapy should be tarred with the same brush. Professor Gilbert Ryle, for instance, declines to play upon this ambiguity,<sup>3</sup> and insists that philosophy is concerned with "use" not "usage": "appeals to prevalence are philosophically pointless." But Ryle's more overtly evaluative and teleological sense of "use" hardly delivers him from the "liberal" dilemma to be discussed later.

The charge of "essentialist fallacy" like the charge of "naturalist fallacy" can, therefore, sometimes be met with the simple retort: "but I am not looking for a *meaning* in the descriptive sense you imply." Such a course would not have been immediately open to Plato for he is often guilty of extreme confusion about "meaning." But take another analysts' whipping boy, the target of positivists and crypto-positivists from Carnap onwards. The appeal to metaphysical insight to justify *mis*-usage would be far more open, for example, to Heidegger—though he specializes elsewhere in obscurity on the question of value—if someone made such a charge against his essay *On the Essence of Truth*. For there he first expounds a variety of popular and traditional meanings of "truth" ("Existence and Being," pp. 321-25), expounding what Wittgenstein would call their "family resemblances." He then expresses himself dissatisfied with the inadequacy of popular opinion and feels called upon to soar to heights of metaphysical speculation in search of the essential meaning of truth. Perhaps indeed the feature that makes leading existentialists most repugnant to many linguistic philosophers is their typically "essentialist" procedure—despite their dramatized rejection of the role "essence" plays in systems like those of Plato and

<sup>3</sup> "Ordinary Language," *Philosophical Review*, 1953



Aquinas. The analyst may complain that Plato's search in *The Republic* for the essence of Justice was barely more philosophically primitive and linguistically inept than Heidegger's redefinition of Truth; or than Kierkegaard's writings on Truth as Subjectivity and on "Angst" as dread of *nothing* (closely followed by Heidegger and Sartre); or than Camus' on the Absurd or than Marcel's and Buber's on "Thou."<sup>4</sup> Indeed the link with Plato is there. Not that they literally seek a παράδειγμα ἀνακείμενον ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ but, like Plato's *Republic*, existentialist writers always imply and frequently assert that the world we live in and our thoughts about it confront us as a vocation and a challenge (evaluative terms) to reshape our concepts and so reorientate our outlook. This implication and the light shed by considering evaluative uses of meaning should make it clearer that the "essentialist fallacies" of traditional philosophy arise not always from misreading of the loom of language but sometimes quite legitimately from the traditional view of the world as a continuum of fact and value.

Michael Foster has spoken of a "humanist" view,<sup>5</sup> Miss Iris Murdoch of a "liberal" or neutral view of the world as being presupposed by most exponents of linguistic analysis. According to the latter view, as she put it in a broadcast talk on "Ethics and Metaphysics," morality does not "adhere to the stuff of the world." This would certainly explain both the disjunction of *is* and *ought* in so many current analyses of ethics and the obscuring of the evaluative connotations of "essence." It would not, of course, justify the way some analyses play on the ambiguity of "ethics" and "meaning" in order to gain certain benefits from their "neutral" accounts of these terms—a sleight of hand necessary to maintain the appearance of talking about the same "morals" and "meaning" as the man in the streets.

<sup>4</sup> For an extreme example of "essentialism" cf. the pre-war Sartre's Husserlian enquiry: "is the imaginary function a contingent and metaphysical specification of the essence 'consciousness' or should it be described as a constitutive structure of that essence?" (*The Psychology of Imagination*, p. 201 ff.)

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Faith and Logic* (edited by B. Mitchell), pp. 192 ff.

It might, however, be thought to follow that there are two self-consistent accounts of philosophy:<sup>6</sup> the traditional view whereby man's indissoluble (but "transcendable") bewilderment in the labyrinth of words reflects the value-ridden, vocational character of the world he meets in experience; and the "liberal" view of a neutral world where philosophy progresses, in Mr. Stuart Hampshire's words, towards becoming "a proper empirical study of the forms of language." But though the traditional view can at least be made self-consistent (while it will remain unsympathetic and unacceptable to many), the "liberal" view does suffer from an inner contradiction which may without gross exaggeration be labelled an "essentialist fallacy." There is a certain degree of analogy with the self-contradictory procedures of atheist existentialists like Camus, Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir (or the Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit*) who devalue the world but still cling to a vocational account of philosophy. But there is more illumination in first considering how and why Sartre openly entertains something like an "essence" of man in the back parlor after loudly proclaiming the defenestration of "human nature" into the main street.

Sartre asserts in *L'Etre et le Néant*<sup>7</sup> (p. 76): "*il s'ensuit que ma liberté est l'unique fondement des valeurs et que rien, absolument rien ne me justifie d'adopter telle ou telle valeur. . . . En tant qu'être par qui les valeurs existent je suis injustifiable.*" Miss Murdoch in her book *Sartre* (pp. 47-48) discusses his dubious shift from a technical, descriptive account of certain value terms in *Being and Nothingness* to a highly evaluative, popular account in his later works *What is Literature?* and *Existentialism and Humanism*. But Sartre, (not so unlike the most self-righteously "neutral" linguistic philosophers), has already surrendered more significantly to objective value in that earlier work. Miss Murdoch may be correct in saying

<sup>6</sup> Certainly Miss Murdoch implied that both are legitimate metaphysical competitors in her broadcast and in contributions to symposia in Supplementary Volume XXX of the Aristotelian Society and in a special Oxford number of "The Twentieth Century" for June, 1955.

<sup>7</sup> *Being and Nothingness*, p. 38.

that concepts like "*être-en-soi*" and "*être-pour-autrui*" are hypothetical or mythological and do not constitute "a metaphysical theory of human nature." But what are we to make of his frequent insistence on certain *interpretations* of empirical phenomena as *correct* or incorrect, notably that man *is to be seen* as a free agent however oppressive his circumstances<sup>8</sup> and that the self is to be seen as a unity and not a collection of occurrences whatever some psychologists may say?<sup>9</sup> This laying down of an interpretation or "*seeing as*" for man's ambiguous self-experience as the right one is all too like what is involved in positing an "essence." M. Naville replies in the concluding discussion of *Existentialism and Humanism* that Sartre has repudiated "human nature" but given almost exactly the same job to the phrase "human condition." And the stupifying expression "*ontologie phénoménologique*" does not obviate the harsh reality that *Being and Nothingness* repudiates "essence" and gives much of its job to "structure." Indeed Sartre is here forced to objectify his value judgments on the interpretation of experience in order to establish a basis for philosophizing and to make his account of value as an illusory aspiration sound at all plausible. For philosophy must presuppose that our experience can be rendered to some extent *intelligible* (evaluative term) and, as F. C. Copleston pointed out: "the theory of forms presents us with a world which is not simply and solely a Heraclitean flux but a world shot through, as it were, with intelligibility."<sup>10</sup> Man can pose like Sartre or Hare as the autonomous arbiter who allots value (and so intelligibility) to the world: but in order to prevent the chaos from overwhelming every basis for philosophy he must, however implicitly, recognize his own free selfhood. And this is to raise value to the status of fact, to realise "heteronomy."

<sup>8</sup> Especially Pt. IV, Ch. I, ii.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. II, ii. Nor is the seeing—as of essence—value heteronomy avoided, only made extraordinarily immediate, by posting a pre-reflexive *cogito*. (EN, 16 ff.) The de-reified "process" of a so-called "non-egological consciousness," (*Recherches Philosophiques*, 1936), would still seem a substance—in nonsensical disguise—to a Humean atomist. And rightly.

<sup>10</sup> *Aquinas*, pp. 88-89.



Hume's greatest achievement was to show, not entirely wittingly, that the problems of causality and selfhood are value problems, problems of *right* interpretation in a sense of right that science cannot in principle discuss; hence that without yielding ground to something like intuitionism and objective value, philosophy is eventually driven from scepticism to hypocrisy or silence. The self cannot be descriptively "reduced" to a "bundle of sensations" except by a presupposing a self-deceiving self that performs such a reduction. The self cannot be descriptively reduced to "freedom choosing freedom," to a "concept," to a "working hypothesis," etc., because these words presuppose, for their very significance, a stable self that receives the attribute "freedom," or that conceptualizes and hypothesizes.<sup>11</sup> Admirers of Hume and Nietzsche at their most sceptical may protest against making the self an "instantaneous kernel" of heteronomy; but *they* are even more determined than Sartre to have their cake and eat it, i. e., to go on talking. "*Wovon man nicht sprechen kann darüber muss man schweigen*":<sup>12</sup> linguistic analysis has ignored, in its search for "neutrality," the major insight of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.

What bearing does this have on the suggestion that the "humanist" and "liberal" outlooks of analysts involve something which might be called an "essentialist fallacy?" A fallacy is likely to be involved when a metaphysical viewpoint is simultaneously embraced as an integral part of an analytical procedure and excluded by the procedure's corollaries. It is typical that Wittgenstein in his long discussion of "seeing as"<sup>13</sup> concerns himself with ambiguity and conceptual complexity—and not at all with ultimate justification for an outlook. It is typical of many analysts, but really suicidal, for

<sup>11</sup> This point is illuminated by Wittgenstein's curious insistence in the *Philosophical Investigations* that pots and roses cannot literally "think" or "feel" because, such verbs depend for their significance on the background of human personality; by Ryle's discussion of the "systematic elusiveness of 'I'" in *The Concept of Mind*; and by Marcel's discussion of thought and intelligibility, *Metaphysical Journal*, pp. 102-117.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Jacques Maritain's remark that the only legitimate course for sceptics who deny all possibility of knowing any truth is absolute silence.

<sup>13</sup> P. I., II, xi.

G. J. Warnock to write of Berkeley:<sup>14</sup> "He did not think of himself as inventing simply a *new* way of looking at the world, but rather as expounding the *right* way, the only way in which one sees things as they really are. But this, I think, is only to say that he, like other metaphysicians, had his illusions." Foster and Miss Murdoch have made sound cases that the approach of many linguistic philosophers is only compatible with a "humanist" or a "liberal" outlook—but are such outlooks compatible with themselves? Of course, it follows from the popular disjunction of fact and value that there is no *right* way of looking at the world; yet, without positing a humanist or liberal outlook as the *right* one, so many "analytical" chains of argument are not even dubious; they simply cannot get started.

Much as they might hate to be mentioned in the same breath, certain advocates of linguistic analysis and atheist *Existenz-philosophie* are led by their denial of "essence" and objective value into fallacies and tangles far more self-stultifying than Plato's. If a Republic of Letters is to bear investigation, it must cease to support itself by purveying what is officially forbidden fruit on an unofficial black market. The traditionalist can afford to face the charge of "essentialist fallacy" unmoved if he reaffirms the challenge of the world as a continuum of fact and value; reaffirms the Socratic challenge of philosophy as vocation to reveal vocation; reaffirms that man's indissoluble bewilderment in the labyrinth of words reflects the essence of the created world he meets in experience. George Herbert caught that essence more clearly than any philosopher in his poem "the Pulley," where God says of man in the world:

Yet let him keep the rest,  
But keep them with repining restlessness;  
Let him be rich and weary, that at least,  
If goodness lead him not, yet weariness  
May toss him to My breast.

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<sup>14</sup> *The Revolution in Philosophy*, p. 122.

## “INTEGRATED” KNOWLEDGE OF NATURE

735

IN a previous article,<sup>1</sup> I discussed the relationship of the philosophy of nature to natural science, considered from a Thomistic standpoint. In that article,<sup>2</sup> I suggested the possibility of an “integrated knowledge of nature,” a knowledge produced by the philosophy of nature in employing the natural sciences as instruments with which to prolong its penetration of the real.

The purpose of this article is to offer some general considerations concerning such “integration.” The remarks made below should be taken to apply primarily to modern physics in relation to the Thomistic philosophy.

Before any such integration can take place, it is necessary to reflect philosophically on natural science in order to see its intrinsic structure and its precise relation to the world of real being. This is the task of the *philosophy of science*.

It is necessary, therefore, to see, in at least a summary way, what the philosophy of science does: what are its problems? what are some of its general conclusions? But because we advance in knowledge, not by simply forgetting the old in the face of the new, but rather by a process of organic growth, of assimilation of the new into the solidly established whole of knowledge that we already possess, we shall attempt to view the philosophy of science in the framework of the traditional Thomistic logic and metaphysics, so far as this is possible.

### I. THE NATURE AND DIVISIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Let us first say that the philosophy of science is a philosophical analysis of *scientific knowledge*. By scientific knowl-

<sup>1</sup> “The Philosophy of Nature and Natural Science from a Thomist Viewpoint,” *The Thomist*, XX, 3 (July, 1957).

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 342-343.



edge we here mean the knowledge of modern natural science (physics, chemistry, astronomy, biology, etc.). As we have said above, we shall here confine our discussion to physics, which is the heart and model of modern natural science.

Now scientific knowledge presents two aspects for our study. Science is an ordered knowledge *in the intellect*. As such it is the subject of logical analysis. But science also refers *to reality*. As such it is the subject of metaphysical criticism. What is the structure of scientific concepts, of scientific laws, of scientific theory? How does reasoning proceed in science? These are questions of *logic*. What does this structure of knowledge actually reveal to us about reality? This is a question of *metaphysics*. The metaphysician, the wise man who knows the causes of all things, is alone qualified to order all the sciences, assigning to each its proper domain of being.<sup>3</sup>

But the metaphysical criticism of scientific knowledge is of necessity *reflective*. The first movement of the intellect is toward being itself. This intellectual movement is not one single deductive advance from the first principles of metaphysics to the last details of the physical universe. Rather, we make several—many—movements, none of which taken by itself is adequate to exhaust the intelligibility of being. We cannot deduce the laws of nature from metaphysics (but neither can we grasp metaphysical principles by the study of a particular kind of reality, as Mr. Gilson has shown in *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*).<sup>4</sup>

Metaphysics can only wait until other sciences of reality have already come into being before it can criticize them and assign to each its proper domain of study in the whole of things. Nor can we expect each science to perform a work of self-criticism. Each science sees reality only through its own aspect of reality. Physics has no vision of the human soul. Astronomy does not see ethical realities. It is necessary for the science

<sup>3</sup> But this task of the metaphysician can only be accomplished if he knows the science which he would order.

<sup>4</sup> New York: Scribner's Sons, 1954.

which studies being in itself, the being into which all reality is ultimately resolvable, to accomplish this work of criticism.

This task of metaphysics has been described by Alfred North Whitehead in the following terms:

Philosophy, in one of its functions, is the critic of cosmologies. It is its function to harmonize, refashion, and justify divergent intuitions as to the nature of things. It has to insist on the scrutiny of the ultimate ideas, and on the retention of the whole of the evidence in shaping our cosmological scheme.<sup>5</sup>

Just as metaphysical criticism is a work of *reflection* on already existing knowledge, logical analysis presupposes that we already have a knowledge to analyze. The logic of physical science is not imposed on this science in an *a priori* manner. Rather, it is discovered by a reflection on the actual movement of the intellect in physics toward the reality.

To summarize, sciences such as physics are taken up with the *things*, with *reality*. Reflection must come from elsewhere. It may be the same man who is a physicist and a philosopher of science, but we ought not to confuse his physics with his philosophy, even with this philosophy of physics. The philosophy of science itself is properly a special part of metaphysics and of logic, insofar as it is both a critique of scientific knowledge and a logical analysis of this knowledge.


## II. LOGICAL ANALYSIS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

There is a temporal priority of logical analysis over metaphysical criticism in the philosophy of science. For logical analysis concerns the intrinsic order of knowledge, while metaphysical criticism concerns the extrinsic order of knowledge with respect to reality. Since modern science exhibits two quite distinct levels of knowledge in itself, as we shall see, it is well to see first the intrinsic character of this knowledge before we proceed to criticize it. Here would seem to be a deficiency in what is undoubtedly one of the best treatments of modern

<sup>5</sup> *Science and the Modern World*. Mentor Books (New York, 1956), p. viii.

natural science in the scholastic tradition, namely, that of Jacques Maritain.<sup>6</sup> He is concerned chiefly with the metaphysical side of the philosophy of science, with, perhaps, insufficient attention to a preliminary logical analysis.

A reflection on the structure of scientific knowledge reveals, as I say, two distinct levels of knowledge. At the base there is always what we may call *phenomenal* insight. We have some observations, some data, some phenomena. But linking these phenomena into a unity of knowledge is the *theoretical* level of physics. We may exhibit the interrelations between these two levels in a diagram.



The  $p$  s here represent the various phenomena. Let the left hand group represent the phenomena of falling bodies (as observed by Galileo). Let the right hand group represent the phenomena of the motion of the planets (as known to Brahe and Kepler).  $h_1$  then is the set of laws of falling bodies laid down by Galileo.  $h_2$  is the set of laws of planetary motion laid down by Kepler. Both  $h_1$  and  $h_2$  are beyond the phenomena themselves. They represent a theoretical interpretation of the phenomena. The actual laws of the phenomena are not  $h_1$  and  $h_2$ ; these are only abstract idealizations and interpretations. Finally,  $L_1$  is the Newtonian law of gravitation which links  $h_1$  and  $h_2$  together. Again this is not itself an observable; it is only a construction of the mind.

Such is the structure of physical science. But this structure

<sup>6</sup> See *Les Degrés du Savoir* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1932); *La Philosophie de la Nature* (Paris: Téqui, 1937); *Quatre Essais sur L'Esprit* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1939); *Scholasticism and Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940); "Philosophy and the Unity of the Sciences," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XXVII (1953).



poses serious logical problems. If the *h* and *L* levels are constructions of the mind, then it is quite possible that other structures are equally suitable for unifying the facts. The Newtonian law of gravitation is then not a necessary inference from the data. While the theoretical constructions are so formulated as to imply the phenomena that we actually observe, the phenomena that we observe do not necessarily imply the theoretical constructions. Any attempt to reason from the phenomena to the truth of the theory as some kind of description of the nature of reality results in a fallacious reasoning of the following type:

If *T*, then *P*.  
But *P*.  
Therefore *T*.

Reasoning of this kind would allow us to argue: If this man has typhoid, then he has a fever. But he has a fever. Therefore he has typhoid. Nevertheless, in science our reasoning is basically of this form. Quite apparently, the meaning of "truth" as applied to a physical theory is not the ordinary meaning.

The problem of assigning rules for such reasoning is the central problem of the philosophy of science from the point of view of formal logic. From the viewpoint of material logic, we have many more problems. We may ask for the criteria for the relevancy of data to the science in question. We may examine the methods of concept formation—giving special attention to the operationalist view of concepts in science<sup>7</sup> and to the possible contributions of our own *a priori* attitudes<sup>8</sup> in the formation of such concepts. We may inquire concerning the methods of verification and the requirements of a good theory. We may examine the relative place of mathematical and physical models in relation to the deduction of phenomena. We may seek to determine, from a logical point of view, pre-

<sup>7</sup> P. W. Bridgman. *The Logic of Modern Physics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927).

<sup>8</sup> A. S. Eddington. *The Philosophy of Physical Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949).

cisely what a scientific law is and what its place is in the structure of scientific knowledge. Other questions may, perhaps, also be added.

But we cannot here discuss all these logical problems. In the light of our distinction between the two levels within scientific knowledge, we shall now move to the metaphysical criticism of science.

### III. METAPHYSICAL CRITICISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Before proceeding to a properly metaphysical criticism of physical science, we should say a few words concerning the inadequacy of the positivist critique. If, as we have said above, a critique can only be properly made by a science which has for its object *being* in itself, then the ignorance of this being precludes the very possibility of a critique. But to know being is to *see*, with the intellect, an intelligible depth of which the sensible is only an appearance or manifestation. However, it is precisely this intelligible depth which the positivist does not see. Jacques Maritain has said:


If positivism, old and new, and kantism do not understand that metaphysics is authentically a science, a knowledge of achieved and completed type, it means that they do not understand that the intellect *sees*. For them, sense alone is intuitive, the intellect having only a function of connexion and of unification.<sup>9</sup>

Because positivism does not see this intelligible depth of reality, its "critique" must end by simply distinguishing between the phenomena and the intellectual constructions which unify the phenomena. Phenomena represent the ultimate term of our scientific knowledge and, indeed, of all our knowledge, for the positivist. Theoretical constructions are thus only our own arbitrary devices for what Mach called an "economy of thought."

But for the Thomist metaphysician the case is far different. He sees that various levels must be distinguished from each

<sup>9</sup> *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 50-51.

other in reality as well as in our scientific knowledge of reality. The diagram that we saw above concerning the structure of scientific knowledge must be supplemented in order to see the complete picture.



The phenomena which are at the base of scientific knowledge are also the ultimate actuality of *things*. But these things contain a depth of intelligibility which itself can be seen through philosophical insight. The phenomena are manifestations of substantial natures, which in turn depend for their very existence on the Supreme Cause. The ontological dimensions of essence and existence lie beyond the dimension of appearance, and await the gaze of the philosopher.

Thus, what modern natural science studies is seen to be only an *aspect* of reality, the sensible manifestation of reality in the sphere of operation. Its concern is to construct theoretical unities to link together the phenomena. It does not seek to penetrate beyond the observable phenomena in the formation of its concepts. Maritain calls this kind of knowledge, which in the last analysis is restricted to what is observable, *perinoetic*.<sup>10</sup> The scientist as a man may be interested in knowledge which is not so limited, but science itself is only interested in reality

<sup>10</sup> This "perinoetic knowledge" is what I called "phenomenal knowledge of nature" in the preceding article cited above (*The Thomist*, July, 1957, XX, 3, p. 341). In the present article, I have restricted the term "phenomenal" to apply only to that level of perinoetic knowledge which is intuitive with respect to the phenomena, as opposed to the non-intuitive theoretical level.



as observable. The theoretical structures of science do not constitute the essence of reality; in their construction we are not looking into the ontological dimensions of the real.

But while both the phenomenal and theoretical knowledges of modern science are *perinoetic*, they are so in entirely different senses. Our phenomenal knowledge is an *intuitive* grasp of reality—not in its intelligible depth but in its sensible appearance. But our theoretical knowledge is a *construction* of the mind, and this construction is in itself non-intuitive with respect to reality.

But when we consider this reality, the appearance of which is being studied in modern science, from a philosophical point of view, we may proceed in either of two directions. Either we may concern ourselves with its *existence* and seek to discover the principles of existence—here we are in metaphysics;<sup>11</sup> or we may concern ourselves with its *motion*, its constant becoming, and seek to discover the principles of motion—this is the philosophy of nature.

#### IV. SCIENCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

Now if it is true that the philosophy of nature studies the principles of motion, of operation in the mobile universe, while these modern sciences study the manifestations of mobile being in the sphere of operation, then it is clear that metaphysics will judge these modern sciences to be employable as *instruments* of the philosophy of nature in its penetration of mobile being. Not that the philosophy of nature requires these sciences in order to achieve its central core of knowledge about the general principles of motion. This may be gained in complete ignorance of the special sciences—all we need to have is some evidence of motion, preferably some simple cases. See Aristotle's *Physics*, Book One, chapter seven, where matter, form, and privation are explained with an analysis of some simple cases of motion.

<sup>11</sup> It is not the concern of this article to discuss in detail this highly controversial question of the object of metaphysics.

But the philosophy of nature will *use* these sciences in different ways, depending on whether we think of the theoretical or the phenomenal level of science. Clearly, the manifestations of mobile being in the sphere of operation can tell us more about the principles of mobile being when these manifestations are studied in a detailed way. But the corresponding theoretical constructions represent nothing real in themselves and can only “suggest” philosophical constructions, “myths” about the detail of the nature of things.<sup>12</sup> I say “myths,” not in any derogatory sense, but rather in the sense of “likely stories.” An historical example of such myth is the *Timaeus* of Plato—who unfortunately resorted to myths without even attaining to the unshakeable philosophical knowledge of the nature of the physical universe which *was* possible and which Aristotle reached soon afterwards. Another example of such philosophical myth is the treatise of Aristotle *On the Heavens*. Aristotle unfortunately did not realize the mythical character of his constructions here. He thought he was describing in detail the nature of the physical universe. Today this book is regarded as outmoded physics. It would be more proper to regard it as an outmoded philosophical myth.

Thus there are two levels in the philosophy of nature. We obtain unshakeably certain knowledge about the principles of mobile being up to a point, and then we construct “philosophical myths.” This second level of the philosophy of nature is most precarious. It inevitably becomes necessary for us to rethink our philosophical myths.<sup>13</sup> The philosophical myths

<sup>12</sup> Such philosophical myths, expressing what the *real nature* of things *might be like*, must be carefully distinguished from the theoretical perinoetic constructions of modern science, which have as their aim the *unification and prediction of phenomena* without direct concern with the nature which produces these phenomena. This is not to deny, however, that philosophical myth and scientific construction may be and often are commingled in the concrete discussions of the scientist; for the scientist is also a man, and to that extent also a philosopher. The distinction, nevertheless, remains a key point in any philosophy of science which desires to preserve the distinctive originality of modern science in its approach to the physical world.

<sup>13</sup> See Maritain, *La Philosophie de la Nature*, p. 141.

appropriate to Newtonian physics are not appropriate to Einsteinian physics or to the physics of Heisenberg. Thus the philosophy of nature is permanent in its essence, but it constantly elaborates itself in new mythical extensions.

Can we give some examples of the extension of the philosophy of nature in and through modern science? First, we may point out some permanent acquisitions, some additions which transcend the level of myth. We have become aware, through the work of science, of an exceedingly fine microstructure in the physical universe. The facts accounted for by the modern atomic theories and by modern quantum theory also, when viewed philosophically, point out that things in the universe do not at all have the crude continuity ascribed to them in the earlier period of the philosophy of nature.

Similarly, we have become aware of the presence of life on a much smaller and varied scale than the ancients had dreamed of.

Then too, the telescope has revealed to us the fine structure of the heavens. No more do we think in terms of some seventy or so crystalline spheres. Now we see a diversity of galactic and extra-galactic nebulae, of galactic and globular clusters, of multiple stars, such as would astound our ancestors. Not that we are at all certain as to *what* this diversity really is (we often attribute far more certitude to astronomy than it really possesses); but at least we know that it is there.

We have also come to see the dominant character of the *relative* in the physical universe, the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of finding absolute standards with which to quantitatively measure physical reality.

Philosophical myths about the physical universe are becoming more and more difficult to construct, with the evolution of more and more complex scientific theories. Where, not too long ago, it was not too difficult to construct such myths on the basis of mechanistic philosophy, it is extremely difficult to do so now. On the other hand, Whitehead's suggestion that now we need an interpretation of science in terms of a "phi-



losophy of organism”<sup>14</sup> is full of meaning for Thomism. For Thomism is a philosophy which recognizes the organicity of matter on the level of living things as coming from a unitary form from which will flow many activities. It is equally able to account for an organicity on the level of non-living things if we ascertain the presence of such organicity.

The modern physical models of the atom readily suggest an application of the concept of organism. It is possible for the Thomist to construct an ideal essence from which would flow just such an organic structure. This ideal essence would itself, of course, be only mythical.

The diversity of parts of an organism is due to the naturally diverse accidental dispositions of matter in the diverse parts of the extended being. We may, perhaps, apply this notion of organism even to the entire space-time continuum as visualized in Einsteinian general relativity, a continuum which is constantly changing in the states of its diverse parts in space and time. Indeed, matter itself might even be metaphysically assimilated to this philosophically interpreted space-time continuum, in a way not yet explained, on the lower levels of material existence. Once again, we are speaking of a mythical essence.

## V. THE CONVERTIBILITY OF MASS AND ENERGY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

Energy and mass are, of course, terms designating only certain operational manifestations of mobile being. In themselves they say nothing about substance. The philosophical difficulties which have arisen concerning the transmutation of mass into energy and vice versa are due to a faulty mythical interpretation of mass as corresponding to the substantial being of things. This faulty mythical interpretation was made in a background of mechanistic philosophy. We may leave it to the mechanists to worry over the change of a substance into an accident while we make our own new philosophical myth

<sup>14</sup> *Science and the Modern World*, p. 65.

in which the ontological counterparts of the scientific "energy" and "mass" will be peculiar properties of matter, which are more or less correlative; that is to say, matter will possess one or both, but never neither. Mass will designate a passive potency and a resistance to change; energy will designate an actuation of this passive potency, which tends to continue receiving this actuation.

This latter is more properly termed *kinetic* energy. Potential energy may be thought to be the operational manifestation of a passive potency surrounded by actuating factors which are not yet, however, fully actuated themselves. Since these factors have not yet been fully actuated, they too will to this extent pertain to the level of passive potency. Thus, this whole context of unactuated potentialities will manifest itself as potential energy. As we have indicated, the resistance to change inherent in this passive potency will manifest itself as inertia on mass. The actuation once received and tending to continue will manifest itself as kinetic energy.

Such philosophical interpretations of mass, potential energy, and kinetic energy would allow us to account readily for the operational transmutation of mass into kinetic energy, since mass is here seen to be intimately related to potential energy. Each is but one face of the same passive potency, potential energy corresponding to the order of this potency toward act, and mass to the resistance which this potency offers to actuation, because of the act that it already has.

But what are we to say of the *nature* of these actualities and potentialities? It would seem that the philosophical cause of mass is some kind of passive quality, more or less receptive in diverse things. The actuality which is operationally manifested as kinetic energy may be regarded as a quality inhering in the moving subject, or it may be regarded as the continuous reception of actuality from some other physical reality—a reality operationally manifested, perhaps, as our space-time continuum, but which would really be what underlies the real successive and extended flux to which the concept of space-time continuum

is to be applied. The former interpretation of kinetic energy seemed more consonant with Newtonian physics, the latter with Einsteinian physics, the former again with quantum physics. Perhaps, both interpretations may be employed, to account for different physical processes.

But let us repeat that what we have said here concerning the philosophical interpretation of mass and energy and their equivalence should be ranked on the mythical level of the philosophy of nature.

## VI. CAUTIONS IN THE USE OF MODERN SCIENCE BY PHILOSOPHY

As we have indicated above, modern science of itself is not concerned with the real causes of phenomena. Thus in itself it does not speak of the nature of things. Before it can be used as an instrument to deepen our penetration of the nature of the physical real, we must first possess that which will sharpen and use it—we must first understand something of metaphysics, of logic, of the philosophy of nature.

It is possible, but dangerous, to attempt this use of science without deep philosophical insight prior to the work. This would really mean the use of science as an instrument of our spontaneous, unreflective, imperfect knowledge of common sense. This would be to invite serious mistakes in the elaborated ontology which we would evolve. Common sense is not cognizant of all the necessary fine distinctions between reality and beings of the reason which are founded in the real, nor is it clear about even the general nature of things. The proper use of scientific knowledge for further speculation concerning the nature of physical reality, even on the mythical level, requires careful logical analysis and metaphysical criticism and a firm grasp on at least the general nature of physical reality—the meaning of matter, form, and privation, the meaning of motion, of time, of place, etc.

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## GRAVITY AND LOVE AS UNIFYING PRINCIPLES

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If we were stones, or waves or wind or anything of that kind, we should want, indeed, both sensations and life, yet should possess a kind of attraction toward our own proper position and natural order. For the specific gravity of bodies is, as it were, their love, whether they are carried downward by their weight or upward by their levity, for the body is borne by its gravity, as the spirit by love, whithersoever it is borne.<sup>1</sup>

IN contemporary science, and in popular conceptions, gravitational force accounts for a mutual attraction between all bodies. It accounts for their natural movement towards each other. However, it required the brilliance of Isaac Newton to perceive that the same type force which accounts for a falling leaf or a crashing waterfall also explains why the planets remain in their proper heavenly orbits.<sup>2</sup> This latter problem is not our concern here. On the other hand, in the contemporary world love, as applied to the area of human relationships, to the area of man's relation to the world and to God, accounts for the attraction between things and for their coming together. It does this in a very fundamental way, for it is the most basic of all the emotions and it is more than an emotion. Attraction toward an object and desire for unity result wherever there is love. This is not disputed by modern science. Nevertheless, to the modern mind love and gravity are basically different concepts about completely distinct characteristics of objects.

Saint Augustine in the succinct passage I have quoted has perceived the similar role the two ideas have in our explana-

<sup>1</sup> Saint Augustine, *The City of God*, Bk. xi, 28, Translation by Marcus Dods (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 373.

<sup>2</sup> Explaining the motion of the planets requires use of a) Newton's universal law of gravitation and b) Newton's first law of motion.



tions. In short, each explains the existence of attraction. They cause diverse things to tend toward union with each other. This is why the law of love, beginning with the early Greek philosopher, Empedocles, and developing through Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, was the universal law controlling tendency toward union. It could apply as well to the inorganic world, the plant kingdom, the animal kingdom, to man and to God. At the same time they were clearly aware that the loves in all cases were not completely the same. Saint Thomas summarizes the question in this manner:

Now in each of these appetites the name "love" is given to the principle of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called natural love: thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the center is by reason of its weight and may be called natural love: in like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called sensitive love or intellectual love.<sup>3</sup>

Again, Aquinas says:

Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts of the body, *and universally in all things* because as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* IV) : Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things; since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it.<sup>4</sup>

These passages occurring in the Thomistic treatment of the emotions are deeply significant because they proclaim the reality of unconscious love. This unconscious love exists not only in the inorganic world and in the plant kingdom where the beings in question have no consciousness but also this unconscious love accounts for some of the activities of brutes and men. Natural unconscious love accounts for a man's actions at times when he is not exercising his highest powers and is therefore not conscious of the motives for his actions.

<sup>3</sup> *Summa Theologica*, I-II, q. 26, a. 1. English Dominican translation (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 3, emphasis mine.

Let us now consider briefly why Galileo, Newton and their ardent followers of the seventeenth and succeeding centuries, developed concepts of the reasons for motion which were so radically different from those just cited. The reasons are numerous and complex and no exhaustive historical explanation will be attempted here. Suffice it to mention a few significant points. First, we may say that the mathematical method of Galileo and Newton enabled them to say things about motion which the preceeding analysis could not reveal. Newton could say that the force of attraction between two bodies increased in direct proportion to the masses of the bodies. He could say that it decreased in inverse proportion as the distance squared between the bodies increased. What is more, he could measure the forces and assign numerical values to them. This ability was indeed significant, for it enabled classical and contemporary physics to make predictions about the movements of bodies. It also was a significant starting-point for acquiring knowledge of nature not merely for its own sake but also for controlling natural forces.

Isaac Newton saw this, but he was also wise enough to realize that his explanation of the forces in nature was leaving something out. In fact, he realized that nothing was being said about the very causes of his principles. Thus, Newton, himself, says:

... to derive two or three general principles of motion from phenomena and afterward to tell us how the properties and actions of all corporeal things follow from the manifest principles would be a very great step in philosophy, though the causes of these principles were not yet discovered. And, therefore, I scruple not to propose the Principles of motion above mentioned, they being of very general extent, and leave their causes to be found out.<sup>5</sup>

Newton was keenly aware that he was not revealing the root causes of the motions or tendencies he was studying. It is very unfortunate that most of his followers in classical physics

<sup>5</sup> Isaac Newton, *Optics*, as quoted by Dampier, *History of Science* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1949), p. 170.

overlooked this defect which Newton perceived. The success of their method in enabling man to predict future events and control the forces of nature blinded them to the possibility that the method was not as deeply rooted in reality as its success might indicate. Newton knew he was leaving something out of his explanations, but, at the same time, his limited knowledge of Greek and medieval philosophy did not lead him to believe these systems contained what he needed. To quote him again, "To tell us that each species of thing is endowed with an occult specific quality by which it acts and produces manifest effects is to tell us nothing."<sup>6</sup> It is one of the objectives here to show what was missing from Newton's explanation, and how this missing element was present in Augustine and Aquinas.

It is necessary to realize that these occult qualities which Newton is blithely dismissing are precisely the appetites or natural tendencies which Augustine and Aquinas relate so intimately to love. They are what make natural movements possible and intelligible. The fact that these tendencies are directed toward natural good ends which are loved is the only thing which makes any action or movement intelligible in traditional philosophy. This insight tells one nothing of the numerical magnitude of love, but without this insight motion is not intelligible.

Probably the greatest stumbling block for the classical physicist is the fact that one cannot always, or even often, point out in a precise manner where or what the ends of particular things in the physical world are. The traditional philosophy, despite this difficulty, still holds to its position firmly and with justification. The alternative is to despair of the fundamental rationality of motions in the external world. This is precisely the despair of some modern scientists who examine the foundations of Newtonian physics. There are several reasons, however, why these difficulties are not felt by a greater number of competent scientists. Perhaps the most significant one is the

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

ease with which an equation describing a motion can be confused with an explanation of why the motion is taking place. Again, the complexity and difficulty of the equations themselves naturally diverts even the competent mind from the other type of question. Also, many a scientist has *faith* that the leaders in his field understand things which he does not comprehend himself. Lastly, the practicing scientist often has hope that things not fundamentally intelligible to him can be made intelligible in the future by fellow workers in his science using the same methods.

What Newton had lost, then, was more than he realized. He had rejected the notion of intrinsic tendencies in things causing those things to move toward natural ends which are good and which are therefore loved either consciously or unconsciously. This cannot be emphasized too much, because it is also a pivotal point in our justification of natural law so important in ethics. In fact it is the natural law. For the natural law is a law of natural love for objects which are good and to which one has a natural right.

A prime source of Newton's failure to realize that love could explain tendencies and motions in the physical world was his failure to realize the deep and extensive implications of the metaphysical position which affirms that everything which exists in the universe—every atom, every element, every compound—possesses goodness. It is the possession of goodness which makes each object desirable in some measure to other objects. It is this goodness of any object which makes the tendency of other objects toward it intelligible. Though Newton could forget that everything in the universe possessed some goodness, Augustine, having once perceived it, would never forget it. This was the very point which was the source of his battle with the Manichean heresy, for the Manicheans had proclaimed the reality of truly evil beings in the world. Saint Thomas succinctly says: "The essence of goodness consists in this that it is in some way desirable."<sup>7</sup> What Newton eventu-

<sup>7</sup> St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I, q. 5, a. 1.



ally said was that the strength of attraction between two bodies is measured by the distance between them. What Augustine and Aquinas affirmed was something quite different. The nearness or closeness of two bodies—say two people—is measured by their attraction or love for each other. Two people could be close whether they were in physical proximity or not. The difference between the two positions can be humorously but validly exemplified by comparing two popular maxims. For the Newtonian thinker the phrase “out of sight out of mind” indicates that the attractive force between bodies is inexorably diminished as they are separated. For the Thomist the opposing phrase “absence makes the heart grow fonder” can be proper where there is true love.

Too often the traditional philosophers of the present day have failed to apply the full power of explanation in their system to the realm of the physical world. This is often because of either limited knowledge of the significance of what the physicists are saying, or fear of criticizing the pronouncements of the physicist whose success was so manifested by a tremendously expanding technology. Today, many outstanding physicists themselves have seen the weaknesses of Newton’s explanation of gravity and motion. The relativity theory of Einstein and the quantum theory of atomic physics depart radically from many of Newton’s conceptions. This means that Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophers may now criticize the conceptions of classical physics without opening themselves to the charge of being reactionary. One can say this without arguing that the relativity theory and quantum mechanics are completely compatible with medieval philosophy. There are, however, many interesting points of similarity.

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Let us turn to another very interesting aspect of our problem. The influence of Galileo and Newton on the seventeenth century physicists was great. Their influence on philosophers such as Locke and Hume was also enormous. Furthermore, their influence has continued to a considerable extent to the present

day both in the scientific fields and among certain groups of philosophers. The influence of Galileo and Newton, however, did not stop here. When they stripped from their explanations of the physical world—from atoms to men—the notions of natural appetite, tendency, love, end and good in the traditional sense, the effect was enormous. Their ideas permeated to a great extent the fundamental thinkers in economics, sociology and experimental psychology, and to a lesser extent the fields of political science and history. An example of this would be the tendency in classical economic theory to minimize the importance of discussing the ends or purposes of economic actions. Finally, the Newtonian method of explaining motions or changes of any kind has permeated to the level of the day-to-day vocabulary of the average man. This would account, in part, for a naturally quizzical reaction to the juxtaposition of the words *gravity* and *love* in any discussion. Such reaction, I venture to say, would not be likely for Augustine or Aquinas. The average man's thinking no more escapes the categories of thought ground out by the deep scientific and philosophic thinkers of the past, than his speech escapes the roots it has in the early history of his language. This is true even though he may lack consciousness of either influence.

Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of Augustinian and Thomistic notions on natural appetites, love and good ends occurs when these ideas are related, first, to problems pertaining to the development of perfections in individual things and, secondly, to the development of new and more perfect types of things—in short, to their bearing on problems related to development and evolution.

For Saint Augustine the problem of the development of a particular type of thing, say a tree or a brute animal, toward its full perfection is crystallized in terms of his views on the so-called *rationes seminales*. These are the seeds or seminal reasons or tendencies which cause things to develop according to definite patterns and to perfect themselves. These seminal reasons are essentially the natural appetites we have referred to. Augus-

tine points out: "Of all the things which are generated and corrupted in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of the world."<sup>8</sup>

To affirm the existence of these seminal reasons or seeds and to give them natural tendencies to develop toward an end or goal is, in simplest terms, to affirm a kind of love in them. Thus, the plant has an unconscious love for water. It seeks union with water and such union leads to the perfection of the plant. Likewise, when the brute animal seeks to be united with food it smells, or with any sensible good, love, but without consciousness of motive present, again operates as a unifying force.

In regard to this aspect of the problem and in regard to the development of new and more perfect species it is, of course, the law of evolution, rather than the law of gravity, which is of primary concern. The important point in this case is that evolutionary forces, too, are to be properly considered as unifying forces. They unify in several ways. Thus, in a higher species, such as man, vegetative powers of lower organisms are unified harmoniously with the distinct new powers. In the overall cosmic view of Augustine and Aquinas these natural tendencies which are the stimulus for evolution are indications that the things in the universe are naturally tending back towards union with God from whom they came. Needless to say, the process does not occur without divine concurrence, for the less perfect cannot become more perfect without outside help. But just as important, and perhaps more important for our purposes here, this concurrence of God does not preclude the truly active unifying force of love in the developing things for, in the view of Aquinas, if the things in the universe were inert, there could be no intrinsic purpose for God to create them. The existence of love intrinsic in things is, in fact, an important basis for affirming that the universe in some measure reflects the perfections of God.

The technical philosophical vocabulary for the discussion of

<sup>8</sup> Augustine, *De Trinitate*, III as quoted in St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I, q. 115, a. 2.

the problem of love and how it exists at various levels in nature is essentially the doctrine of the analogical nature of the concepts of goodness and love. It is a viewpoint which can satisfactorily, I believe, protect the position from what is perhaps the greatest and most prevalent charge which is made by the modern world. This is the charge that we have read into the physical world concepts which are proper only to human relationships. To use the term of modern psychiatry, we have "projected" ideas applicable to ourselves into the realms of physics, chemistry and biology. Nevertheless, the doctrine that all things in the universe have goodness in a way which is commensurate with their own nature and that each thing loves in a way determined by its own nature is not a way of making the atom and God completely like ourselves. It represents the discovery that they are in some way similar to us.

It is important to realize that in this presentation there has been no contention that for Augustine and Aquinas love is the only force in the universe. The presence of strife between men, the presence of conflict between man and his physical environment in the struggle for life, the struggles for existence which are going on in the plant and animal kingdoms, and finally the conflicts going on within each individual human all preclude such an easy oversimplification. Strife was too evident to be ignored then as it is too evident to be ignored today. Even Empedocles, who proclaimed the law of love, also proclaimed the law of strife.

Nor has this article claimed that the physicists have tried to explain everything in terms of gravitational force alone. The role of electrical and magnetic forces in explaining many things is all too evident and presents interesting and important problems. The attraction of positive and negative charges towards each other is a unifying force, but the repulsion of like charges is a diversifying force. Yet, since even electrical charges have mass, gravitational forces are always present.

Nevertheless, Augustine and Aquinas regarded love as a more fundamental force than strife or hatred. This is evident in



Augustine's work *The City of God*, where he analyses the differences between the city of God and the city of man. Thomas Merton sums it up concisely in his introduction to a translation of *The City of God*:

The difference between the two cities is the difference between two loves. Those who are united in the city of God are united by the love of God and of one another in God. Those who belong to the other city are indeed not united in any real sense: but it can be said that they have one thing in common besides their opposition to God: each one of them is intent in the love of self above all else. In Saint Augustine's classical expression: these two cities were made by two loves: the earthly city by the love of self unto the contempt of God, and the heavenly city by the love of God unto the contempt of self.<sup>9</sup>

This passage has a double interest for us here. First, we see Augustine attributing much strife in the world to the more fundamental notion of love. But it is a special type of love. It is self-love, selfishness or pride. Secondly, here we see Augustine's insight into the spiritual nature of the deepest strife. For it is the intellectual appetite or tendency which we call the will which makes the choice between the love of God and the love of self, and which, therefore, generates either strife and separation or love and union.

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<sup>9</sup> Merton, introduction to Augustine, *The City of God*, *op. cit.*, xiii.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*The Freedom to Read.* By R. McKEON, R. K. MERTON, W. GELHORN.  
New York: R. R. Bowker, 1957. Pp. 105 with index. \$2.50.

If a reviewer for *The Thomist* could use the approach and vocabulary of *The Freedom to Read*, this is how he might begin:

An extra-legal pressure group, the National Book Committee, has sponsored this attack on censorship. It was written with the help of a grant from the Fund for the Republic, well known for its support of this type of agitation. This deliberate attempt to influence legislation and government agencies, and public opinion as well, poses an obvious threat to our democratic way of life. To expose the alleged "errors" of those who defend censorship, this book builds upon basic assumptions which are accepted *a priori* and not admitted to debate. We are convinced that these censorious critics, representing private organizations, have exaggerated the alleged dangers of censorship to our democratic institutions, and have here supported their stand by fallacious argument.

The above is a sample in reverse of the whole tone of this book. The National Book Committee describes itself as "a society of citizens devoted to the use of books." It seeks as one of its objectives "to foster the conditions in which diverse ideas and manners of expression can find both publication and readers." In explaining the origin of this book the Committee says: "Recognizing that abridgments of the freedom to read pose a serious threat to a democratic society, the Committee engaged Professors McKeon, Merton and Gellhorn (distinguished philosopher, sociologist, and professor of law respectively) as a special Commission to explore the motivations and objectives of the censors and the implications of censorship in America. *The Freedom to Read* is the report of that Commission." These statements contain no warning that here the professors have turned into pamphleteers.

One of the authors, Dr. Richard McKeon, is from the University of Chicago, and the other two, Dr. Robert K. Merton and Dr. Walter Gellhorn, teach at Columbia University. We have learned from *The Hidden Persuaders* how in recent years the advertising agencies have been holding consultations with psychologists and social scientists in planning campaigns. Now it would appear that the teachers are taking lessons from the admen. To put it another way, this book looks as though it went to the publishers from Morningside Heights by way of Madison Avenue. All the standard techniques used to sell soap and cigarettes are here in abundance: testimonials from experts (here they wear the black gowns of pro-

fessors, not the white coats of physicians), repetition of slogans, unproved assumptions, appeals to prejudice and fear, and so on. In short, to revise one well-worn gem of huckster genius, if you want a tract instead of a treatise, read this book.

Though this purports to be an objective and scholarly study of an important and complex problem, bias is evident from the outset. The slanted language of the propagandist is found in this sample from the second page of the Preface, signed by the Freedom to Read Subcommittee, where the study is described in part in this way: "An investigation into the two broad views of freedom generally held by Americans today: on the one hand, freedom as meaning complete liberalism (e.g., Holmes); on the other, freedom as involving a commitment to certain values and fixed beliefs (e.g., some church groups). Put another way: no limitation on thought or expression, as against *a priori* acceptance of certain underlying principles, which are not admitted to debate." (p. vi)

The "complete liberalism" espoused by the authors, of course, is far from being based on undebatable *a priori* principles. Nor do they have any "commitment to certain values and fixed beliefs," except, possibly, a commitment to non-commitment. And in case anyone missed the point, these two definitions of freedom are repeated later with the same slant. For example, "Freedom, conceived as acting as one should, is developed in moralities inculcated by precept and imperative. Freedom, conceived as acting as one pleases, is developed in moralities of achievement and advancement in knowledge and values. The two moralities are fundamentally opposed . . . a morality of tradition and a morality of progress." (pp. 9-10) It is just as easy to tell whom to hiss and whom to cheer as in any old-fashioned Western.

One loaded key word is "extra-legal," constantly used to describe any private or non-official protest against dangerous literature. It sounds very much like "illegal" when used to characterize so-called "pressure groups." And if casual readers draw that inference from it, surely the writers are not at fault, since they are learned men who choose their words carefully. "Agitation" is the kind of activity pro-censorship people engage in, and who can blame the authors if some of their audience find evil connotations in this term. We might call the whole book a long display of "semantricks."

This report is divided into three parts: (I) "Censorship and the Freedom to Read"; (II) "Some Needed Knowledge"; (III) "Some Immediate Steps." Part I considers philosophical, political, social, legal, and moral arguments for and against censorship, and the incidence and mechanisms of censorship. In Part II there are recommendations for studies of the psychological effects of reading, the social psychology and economics of reading, and the sociology of censorship. The last part contains seven recommendations for action now against censorship. A thirteen-page summary is appended.



The heart of the book is in the first part, "Censorship and the Freedom to Read," so we shall concentrate our attention largely upon this section. We first consider several major issues: (1) the authors' definition of censorship; (2) their concept of freedom; (3) their arguments against censorship; and (4) some of their suggestions for fighting censorship. Then we will touch briefly upon some minor points, their use of the testimony of John Milton, for example.

(1) The authors catapult themselves into a flying start by this description of censorship: "The term 'censorship' has *generally* been used in two *closely related* senses. In its original and strict sense, censorship is the *prohibition and prevention* of statement, expression and communication. . . . 'Censorship' is also used, in a large and popular sense, to include exercise of police power and agitation of private groups to ban the circulation of particular works or works of a particular kind, or to limit their accessibility, or to expunge portions of them. . . . Censorship, in the strict sense, is a function exercised by an official. . . . Censorship, in the broad sense, is a function assumed by an official or by a private citizen, usually at the instance or with the encouragement of private groups, which use extra-legal means to serve or support that action." (pp. xi-xiii, italics added) This devious beginning needs close study.

Since one of the authors is a distinguished law professor and an author of several books on legal problems, and since legal aspects of the censorship are studied in later pages, we might have expected some attempt at a legal definition here. The writers seem to have adapted their definition from Webster instead. This might be acceptable if we did not note two significant variations. Webster tells us (as do other authorities) the censor's function is "to examine." The definition here restricts his work to "prohibition and prevention." A censor is not a censor when he approves, it would seem, but only when he prohibits. This narrowing of the term is underscored by the authors when they add, "The mark of censorship, in this strict sense, is a negation—a book not printed, a play not produced, a blank space in a news dispatch." (p. xii) A like definition of a teacher would be "one who fails his students"; a judge would be "one who jails people."

There are some who might construe this as a censoring of Webster. But this would be unfair, because we all know that publishers and writers never censor. They edit.

The second departure from Webster is one of omission, for nothing is said of the wartime censor, "an official or a military officer charged in time of war with examining letters, printed matter, etc., in order to delete or suppress anything that might aid the enemy, injure discipline or morale, etc." Perhaps the writers did not want to cloud the issue by suggesting that the devil of censorship can cloak itself in a patriotic guise, and for the sake of complete objectivity abandoned the useful dictionary at this

point. Besides, it would be of no help whatsoever in their all-out war on censorship, and they may have thought it good strategy for their camp "to delete or suppress anything that might aid the enemy, injure discipline or morale, etc." In this book there is only one allusion, in passing, to military censorship. (p. 34) If they do not openly attack it, they say nothing to support it. In view of their principles, as we shall see, they would be hard put to defend it, without inconsistency. But inconsistency seldom worries liberals of this type, and we can be sure they would back up the government censor in hot wars, if not in cold. They are not committed, you must understand, and their absolutes are all relative. Absolutely.

As for censorship in the broad sense, the "large and popular" sense, the dictionary does not give it, possibly because it does not exist outside the vocabulary of such propagandists and those who allow themselves to be taken in by this ruse. There is a recognized legal distinction between *preventive* or *prior* censorship (before publication) by government officials, and *punitive* censorship (after publication) by government officials. If these writers want to call the first, censorship in the *strict* sense, and the second, censorship in the *broad* sense, perhaps they can justify the additional (and unnecessary) distinction they have invented. (This will create for them the verbal inconvenience of calling the Church's *Index* censorship in the broad sense only.) What they *cannot* justify is labelling the protests of private individuals or groups as censorship, even in the broad sense. To favor censorship laws does not make one a censor any more than to favor the New York Yankees makes one an American Leaguer.

So when we analyze their explanation of censorship we find these writers first subtracting from the accepted meaning of the term, and then adding to it, tailoring the concept to suit their thesis. We need more than their mere assertion to accept their statement that the word has been used "generally" in the "closely related" broad sense. They cite no authority but their own. Since this semantic stratagem is especially aimed at pinning the tag "censorship" on organizations like the National Legion of Decency and the National Office for Decent Literature, we quote the following concerning these two agencies from the timely statement of the Administrative Board, National Catholic Welfare Conference, in the name of the Bishops of the United States, November 15, 1957: "The function of these agencies is related in character. Each evaluates and offers the evaluation to those interested. Each seeks to enlist in a proper and lawful manner the cooperation of those who can curb the evil. Each invites the help of all people in the support of its objectives. Each endeavors through positive action to form habits of artistic taste which will move people to seek out and patronize the good. In their work they reflect the moral teaching of the Church. *Neither agency exercises censorship in any true sense of the word.* . . . Through these agencies we voice our concern over conditions which, tolerated, merit expression of public indignation. But we assert

that *our activities as carried out by these organizations cannot justly be termed an attempt to exercise censorship.*" (Italics added) The Bishops have Webster on their side. Even those who disagree with their stand must admit that the Bishops state their case without torturing the English language.

It should be obvious that this is not a mere dispute about words, a clash of arbitrary definitions. The authors' case rests heavily upon attaching an unpopular label to a legitimate activity and drawing down upon it all the odium the label invites. As the Bishops have noted: "The right to speak out in favor of good morals can hardly be challenged in a democracy such as ours. It is a long-standing tradition of this country that groups large and small have given expression of their concern over injustice, political, social and economic. . . . It is in full accord with this tradition that the work of the Legion of Decency and the National Office for Decent Literature is carried on." Calling the exercise of this right by the name of censorship (and also calling these groups "pressure groups") is rhetoric pure and simple, and an appeal to prejudice and passion. If this trick works, then the labor of the liberals is simplified because legal censorship and private protest can then be attacked together. Considered separately, these activities are harder to deal with, and two different briefs must be filed against them. For one is a legitimate exercise of governmental authority, and the other a legitimate exercise of civil freedom.

In other words, even if their case against governmental censorship were valid, the case for the private citizens' right and freedom to object would still be intact.

(2) In their exposition of the meaning of freedom, these writers are as misleading as in their description of censorship. For one thing, they reduce a complex philosophical and legal term to an oversimplification. We are told again and again that "freedom is conceived by some to consist in the ability to do as one pleases . . . ; by others . . . in the ability to do as one ought." (pp. 2-3) For each of these conflicting concepts half a dozen philosophers are cited as authorities. We are expected to take the authors' word for the accuracy of the listings since no sources are provided. We are especially curious to know in what work and on what page Aristotle and Jacques Maritain became advocates of freedom to do as one pleases. Support from such authorities as these two would give "the ability to do as one pleases" a totally undeserved respectability, even in some secularistic circles. It is not difficult, however, to detach them from the strange company into which they are forced by these writers.

Dr. McKeon must have forgotten to tell his colleagues of lines like these from *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (N. Y., 1941), which he edited: "And in democracies of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the state. . . . Men think . . . that freedom means the doing what a man likes. In such

democracies every one lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, 'according to his fancy.' But this is all wrong; men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is their salvation." (*Politics*, V, 9 1310a 25-36)

M. Maritain would not be shocked to find himself cited with Aristotle, but for both to be teamed with thinkers like Mill and Dewey is something far different. Maritain's writings contain repeated insistence on the distinction between *initial* freedom and *terminal* freedom (or freedom of autonomy, as he often calls it). The former is freedom of choice in the human will; the latter is the will's development and perfection in the possession of good, as a result of the right use of freedom of choice. But this book does not go in for necessary distinctions any more than it does for enlightening footnotes.

To set the record straight, here are a few lines from an essay on "The Conquest of Freedom," which clarify Maritain's position: "It is not true that the autonomy of an intelligent creature consists in not receiving any rule or objective measure from a being other than itself. It consists in conforming to such rules and measures voluntarily because they are known to be just and true, and because of a love for truth and justice. Such is human freedom, properly speaking, to which the person tends as towards a con-natural perfection. . . . Man is not born free unless in the basic potencies of his being: he becomes free, by warring upon himself and thanks to many sorrows; by the struggle of the spirit and virtue; by exercising his freedom he wins his freedom. . . . From the beginning to the end it is truth that liberates him." (*Freedom: Its Meaning*, edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen, N. Y., 1940, p. 639.)

At the risk of overdoing the exploration of sources, we must call attention also to the way Aristotle is forced to testify against censorship. It is another prize illustration of the Commission's methods. Aristotle, we are told, "stated the principle of democracy as the conviction that the many are better judges than the individual expert in the arts and they have, *a fortiori*, more virtue and prudence collectively than any individual; it follows that freedom is both the end of society and the chief means of achieving individual and common interests." (p. 4) Let us point out at once that the inference is drawn by the professors; Aristotle stepped off at the semi-colon. The professors have summarized a few lines from the *Politics*. (cf. McKeon, *op. cit.*, *Politics*, III, 11 1281a 40-b15) How they derived their conclusion is their secret. We will not pry. Perhaps the semi-colon is the symbol for a profound sorites they will divulge in their next book.

The authors provide no reference, but if one seeks out the passage in Aristotle and reads on, he will discover this: "Whether this principle can apply to every democracy, and to all bodies of men, is not clear. Or rather, by heaven, in some cases it is impossible of application; for the argument



would equally hold about brutes; and wherein, it will be asked, do some men differ from brutes? But there may be bodies of men about whom our statement is nevertheless true." (*loc. cit.*, 1281b 16-21)

We confine ourselves to three comments on this additional maltreatment of Aristotle. (a) Aristotle is not discussing censorship, and the passage summarized by the professors is not *ad rem*. (b) Aristotle is misrepresented, since his carefully qualified assertion is reproduced without the qualifications. (c) Aristotle actually favors censorship in a later chapter of the very same work, where he speaks of the ideal education of young children in the ideal state: "Indeed, there is nothing which the legislator should be more careful to drive away than indecency of speech; for the light utterance of shameful words leads soon to shameful actions. The young especially should never be allowed to repeat or hear anything of the sort. . . . And since we do not allow improper language, clearly we should also banish pictures or speeches from the stage which are indecent." (McKeon, *op. cit.*, *Politics*, VII, 17 1336b 3-15)

The question here is not whether Aristotle speaks correctly. The question is whether the professors cite him correctly. And there are other questions. Does their freedom to read include the right to take liberties with their sources? Should they do as they ought when they use sources, or may they do as they please? Is this review a form of censorship (in the wide sense, of course, and extra-legal) because we protest? May we do as *we* please, and quote *The Freedom to Read* as favoring censorship? Take this statement: "If virtue and truth are known, whatever contributes to error and vice can be detected and should be prohibited." (p. 3) Are we under obligation to say that in the context that sentence describes a position the authors reject? And if we are, why?

There must be some significance in the fact that none of the Founding Fathers are named as partisans of freedom to do as one pleases. We might inquire, too, where in these listings they would locate Jesus Christ, a Teacher still regarded by many as an authority on questions like freedom. He is not placed on either side, and never quoted anywhere in this book.

This is an appropriate place to register a general complaint about the documentation of this study. There are hardly more than a dozen footnotes altogether, plus an occasional reference in the text. The citations are chiefly for material favoring the authors' slant, especially legal writings opposed to censorship and some investigations of the psychological effects of reading. In a work which makes such a great show of scholarship, this is hard to understand. The passages above from Aristotle and Maritain may suggest to alert readers a possible explanation.

The two definitions of freedom ("to do as one ought" and "to do as one pleases") lead to a discussion of the philosophic arguments pro and contra censorship, arguments based on both conceptions of freedom. This is a very muddy stretch for the reader, as are the pages which follow

wherein we find a summary of the political and social arguments pro and con, and the legal and moral arguments. It would require another book two or three times the size of *The Freedom to Read* to expose the half truths and distortions, the unsupported assertions, the misleading hop-skip-and-jump sketches of philosophical opinions and of political and social history. Their major premise controls and colors every remaining page of this book. Censorship, as they define it, is contradictory to freedom, as they define it. We must concede that the professors get as much out of this premise as they put into it.

One thing stands out clearly in this section: the concept of freedom as "the ability to do as one *ought*" is equated with "the ability to do as one *must*." These champions of freedom "to do as one *pleases*" always paint "freedom to do as one *ought*" (sometimes justly described, but not in this book, as "liberty under law" or "freedom under God") as if it were slavery. They defame it through the device of "guilt by association." The reason they have made this error is that in their simplification they have stated only two philosophical positions instead of three.

There are three kinds of political freedom: the freedom to do as one *pleases*; the freedom to do as one *ought*; the freedom to do as one *must*. The first is liberalism; the third is totalitarianism; the second is the true freedom of men, the kind which should be found in a genuine democracy. (Maritain explains these three positions in *Freedom in the Modern World*, N. Y., 1936, pp. 39 ff.)

This set of opposites is expressed in other ways, too: on the part of the citizen we may have license or slavery as the extremes, true liberty in between; on the part of the state we may have anarchy or tyranny as extremes, a just government in the middle. We can also describe the extremes as freedom without law or law without freedom, while freedom with, and under, law is the golden mean.

Why have these writers, who are candidly ultra-liberal, equated "ought" with "must?" A clue is found in this observation of St. Thomas: "The medium compared to one extreme appears to be the other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold." (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 50, a. 1, ad 1) From the faraway point where they stand the golden mean looks brazen.

The liberalism of this book is so excessive that any temperate position on censorship seems like pure totalitarianism. It works the other way, too, for a totalitarian writer would surely regard the American Bishop's statement, quoted earlier, as an ultra-liberal document. For the same reason the temperate drinker looks like a sot to a prohibitionist and like a prohibitionist to a drunkard; the generous man seems miserly to a spendthrift, and prodigal to a miser; the courageous man looks foolhardy to a coward, and cowardly to a rash man.

Dr. McKeon will recall that Aristotle, whose political wisdom the Com-

mission prizes so highly, expressed the same thought: "... The extreme states are contrary to the intermediate state and to each other, and the intermediate to the extremes; ... the middle states are excessive relatively to the deficiencies, deficient relatively to the excesses. ... Hence also the people at the extremes push the intermediate man over to each other." (McKeon, *op. cit.*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 8 1108b 13-24) This explains why the happy medium, freedom under law to do as one ought, makes them so unhappy.

(3) One more question: How would the professors define "license?" There is at least one sentence in this book we can wholly agree with: "We have confidence in logic, but we are suspicious of sophistic applications." (p. 63) The chief argument the professors offer against censorship lies in their definitions of censorship and of freedom. Censorship, as they define it, contradicts freedom, as they define it. By setting up this false opposition between censorship and freedom they establish the major premise on which their whole case is built. Anyone who goes this far with the Commission must go the rest of the distance. But if either "censorship" or "freedom" is not precisely what they say it is, or if both "censorship" and "freedom" are not what the professors say they are, their major premise is inadmissible, and their whole case collapses.

We have already shown how they misconceive and misrepresent both censorship and freedom, and this suffices for rebuttal. By combining punitive censorship with something different, i. e., private protest, and by combining "freedom to do as one ought" with something different, i. e., the totalitarian *must*, or slavery, they have concocted a principle which labors under a manifold ambiguity.

We have to admit that the professors warn us against this, *after* they have done it. This would serve to guard the reader against *other* books. "All the fundamental terms of political discussion—'democracy,' 'law,' 'freedom,' and 'censorship' among others—are involved in equivocations." (p. 13) We can agree that this is sometimes true (and the Commission has capitalized upon it), but it need not always be so, since accurate definition is possible. When the authors add, however, that the equivocations "disappear when the arguments are restated in terms of the concrete meanings they take on in the institutions by which they operate," (*ibid.*) we must disagree vigorously. Definitions are not of concrete singulars, but of universals only. Dr. McKeon can explain to his colleagues why their approach to the problem of defining is highly un-Aristotelian. But on the other hand, the logic in which they have confidence may not be the traditional logic.

It is a clear sign of the weakness of their thesis, *prima facie* evidence of its falsity, that they must resort to such distortions at the very start to defend it. The writers tell us that their purpose is to promote a reformulation of the question of censorship and a reconciliation of opposed positions.

In view of the way they operate, to agree to these things on their terms would be folly. As they tell us themselves, the reconciliation of positions "cannot advance if suspicion and fear preclude the possibility of discussion." (p. 64) What single step have they taken in this book to dispel suspicion and fear?

The weakness of their case is clearer still when we examine the other pretexts for attacking all restraints. This argument, for example, is an obvious sophism: ". . . there is no practical way to distinguish the considered judgment of officials who are wise and good from arbitrary judgment of officials who are unwise and bad. Power tends to corrupt, in censorship as in other modes of its exercise." (p. 8) We can presume that this applies also to the unmentionable military censors in war time.

This amounts to the following syllogism: Whatever tends to corrupt, should be eliminated; but the power of censorship tends to corrupt; therefore, the power of censorship should be eliminated. Here we have what Aristotle termed the fallacy of accident. The error involves the confusion of the abuse of power with the use of power. It is accidental to power that it be misused. If the argument favored regulation, rather than elimination, of corruptible power, no one could justly disagree. But it is fallacious as it stands, and opposed to the axiom: *Abusus non tollit usum*, "Abuse does not take away use." The evidence establishes need for careful control of censorship, and nothing more.

If this argument proves anything, it proves too much. Why stop at censorship? The state's power to tax can be abused too. Should it be destroyed? Other forms of power (extra-legal forms?), the Fund for the Republic's financial power, for instance, and the National Book Committee's propagandizing power, are subject to abuse, and should be eradicated if this proof were valid.

We are trying to give an exact account of the arguments, but this is not always an easy book to follow. Here, for example, are two adjoining sentences about problems relating to the incidence of censorship: "They cannot be treated wisely or effectively by *bandying large undefined terms like 'responsibility' and 'freedom,' or 'public morals,' 'public order,' and 'the security of the State.'* It seems to be clearly the case that some publishers of newspapers, today as in the past, have shown *irresponsibility. . .*" (pp. 45-46) (Italics added)

Pronouncements like these tend to slow the reader down just a little and make him think. He might even be provoked into thinking that, while bandying may be unwise and ineffective, yet when it is called for, these professors can bandy with the best. This suggests the difficulty of determining when they are bandying and when they are not. We dare not challenge their freedom to bandy or not, as they please. Yet this makes for confusion when they do it without warning. They could have told us about this earlier instead of half-way through the book. But we are grateful



for the overdue admission that as far as they are concerned "freedom" is a "large undefined term." That is the impression we had too.

Unsupported assertions, sometimes guaranteed solely by "We are convinced" or "We are persuaded," are frequent. They tell us, for example, that they are averse to pornography and other trash, and then add: "we are convinced that efforts to cut off access to such material stimulate curiosity and have no other clearly marked effects on interest in obscenity or immoral behavior." (p. 49) Why they are so convinced, they do not say. We are also told several times that "One of the effects of arguments for censorship in defense of morality, religion, society, and truth is to throw suspicion on art and thought as such." (p. 48) If there is evidence for this assumption, the Commission has suppressed it.

Yet the professors have doubts as well as convictions. They are convinced that censorship merely stimulates curiosity and often leads to a suspicion of reason and the arts. But they doubt that evil books encourage immorality. They provide no proof for what they are convinced of, but demand proof for what they choose to doubt. They say "the basic assumptions of censorship . . . have seldom been examined." (p. xvii) (If we have decoded the Commission's message correctly, it runs something like this: "Our democratic, uncommitted, responsible group acts upon convictions; that other group, an authoritarian, committed, pressure group, acts upon assumptions. Our convictions are self-evident; their assumptions should be examined and proved.") Empirical investigation is needed, therefore, because the professors "are dubious about the causal line which allegedly leads from bad books to immorality." (p. 52) "We are not persuaded . . . that the suppression of books alleged to promote immorality, violence, or subversion of the government is justified by existing knowledge of the consequences of reading." (p. 35)

When the professors then assured us that the evidence that books can be harmful "is at best thin and questionable," and that "more characteristically, it is entirely absent," (p. 67) the reader should remind himself that others find the evidence far more impressive. As the Bishops' statement noted: "When a Select Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives calls pornography big business, a national disgrace and a menace to our civic welfare; when the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges attacks vicious and evil publications as a major cause of the change of juvenile delinquency from the thoughtless and mischievous acts of children into crimes of violence, armed robbery, rape, torture and even homicide; when the New York State Joint Legislative Committee at the end of its five-year survey assures us that by actual count trash and smut on the newsstands have the advantage of numbers and that those same stands reflect an acceptance of and growing concentration on lewdness—in the face of all this we can only say that we are confronted with conditions which are fraught with peril."

But the authors of this book are professed liberals, and consequently could not be expected to think highly of the opinions of legislative committees. They reveal their attitude in such statements as: "In recent years Congressional Committees have conducted investigations whose bearing on legislation has been tenuous." (p. 58) The judgment of legislators, even in teams, is always suspect; the judgment of professors, especially in teams, is always preferable.

(4) This brings us to some of their suggestions for further study in the fight against censorship. The authors ask for "objective studies of the psychological and social effects of various types of books." (p. 68) This call for research contains the implication that we cannot be really sure of anything until a team of social scientists has conducted extensive surveys and reported with statistics and charts. In the meantime, we are expected to suspend judgment as to whether bad books do any harm. Should we doubt, too, whether good books do any good?

Another interesting research project is proposed this way: "It would be useful, we believe, to conduct a study of censorship groups. . . . What is the social composition of these groups? Who are most deeply engaged in these activities, what are their motivations, the nature of their organization, the bases of their support?" (pp. 102-3) (The professors really mean "pro-censorship" groups.)

Can we expect the Commission, in its concern for a square deal and the American tradition of fair play, to suggest a similar study of anti-censorship groups, their motivations, resources, and so on? We would welcome information, for example, about the social composition of the National Book Committee as well as the National Office for Decent Literature. Perhaps together with background material on Msgr. Thomas J. Fitzgerald, executive secretary of N. O. D. L., we would receive a report also on Charles G. Bolté, former executive director of the National Book Committee, who served as secretary to the Commission and edited this report for the press.

A study of the kind we suggest might also serve to dissipate the suspicion of some that publishers are at times motivated by financial as well as patriotic reasons when they attack censorship. Or would it confirm the suspicion? J. Donald Adams, in a recent issue of the *New York Times* Book Review (January 26, 1958) stated that the responsibility of book publishers "is less heeded among us than in any other nation with pretensions to a place in the literary sun. . . . English book publishing, however uninspired, rarely sinks to the level frequently occupied by some of ours. . . . unless a greater concern and watchfulness becomes apparent, that level may well become a crowded thoroughfare. Book publishing in this country—indeed, any kind of publishing—has become an exceedingly difficult business in which to make a fair return on the investment, and it is not surprising, and quite understandable, that, subject to the pressures and problems which confront them in today's market, not a few houses

occasionally lend their imprint to books of which they are secretly ashamed, but which offer a reasonable certainty of financial reward. I submit this is not a healthy condition or a happy augury for the immediate future of . . . literature." An investigation which would clear publishers of unworthy suspicions is one we would expect them to welcome, especially if it were conducted under the direction of impartial, objective, competent observers like Professors McKeon, Merton, and Gellhorn.

If anyone expected to find in this book a suggestion for self-regulation within the publishing industry as an alternative to other restrictions, he has underrated the vehemence of the authors' opposition to control. There is nothing half-hearted about their hostility to every restraint upon books. So sweeping is their condemnation of all regulation, they unhesitatingly attack any self-discipline by publishers themselves. "Governmental and private pressures, finally, sometimes lead to recommendations of self-censorship as an alternative to legislation. We are persuaded by the example of self-censorship in other media of communication that this is a paralyzing form of censorship and one which, if applied to publishing, would go far to restrict and negate the freedom of expression." (p. 66)

It would not be just as bad, they say; it would be worse. "The dangers of police censorship are obvious; we are convinced that the dangers of a code of self-censorship are even greater." (p. 62)

According to a Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency in 1954, pornography is a half-billion-dollar-a-year racket. According to J. Edgar Hoover, "Law-enforcement agencies of this country, both federal and local, are in serious need of help on this problem." (*This Week Magazine*, "Let's Wipe Out the Schoolyard Sex Racket!" Aug. 25, 1957) According to Professors McKeon, Merton, and Gellhorn, the publishing industry must *not* help. It must hinder instead, in the name of freedom to do as one pleases. Steps should be taken immediately, they say, to test in court "the debatable validity of state and local censorship laws" or at least to amend them "in the public interest" by "the recasting of present statutes." (pp. 84-85) Federal censorship through postal and customs administration should be evaluated, with the intention of diminishing its scope. (pp. 85-86) Law-makers and law-enforcement officials can expect absolutely no assistance from this quarter, but rather the strongest possible resistance at every turn.

We turn now to points of lesser importance. First, there is the question of John Milton's classic testimony in favor of freedom of the press and against censorship. In the mythology of the liberals Milton is at least a demigod, so no essay of this kind would dare omit a reference to *Areopagitica* and a few quotations about "a fugitive and cloistered virtue," and so on. (It is sheer pedantry to call attention to the error, but *Areopagitica*

was not "a speech delivered," as the professors say. (p 43) It was a pamphlet written in oratorical form).

Written in 1644 against the Licensing Act of Parliament, *Areopagitica* is rather long-winded for modern tastes, and many readers never see more than a few eloquent paragraphs. There is one passage we must quote now for those who never found it in the anthologies they studied in high school or college: "Yet if all cannot be of one mind . . . this doubtless is more wholesome, more prudent, and more Christian than many be tolerated, rather than all compelled. *I mean not tolerated popery, and open superstition, which, as it extirpates all religions and civil supremacies, so itself should be extirpate. . .*" (Italics added) (*Great Books of the Western World, Chicago, 1948, vol. 32, Milton, p. 410*)

Someone has been "censoring" Milton, or editing, if you prefer, in the anthologies, extra-legally. It was not the N O D L. We may reasonably ask the authors whether they agree with the undoctored Milton, or the doctored. And if the latter, how can they cite him as a supporter of unlimited freedom of the press. One of their proposals is the preparation of "a single volume compilation that would reflect the theoretical background of the freedom to read, its social and intellectual foundations. . . ." (p. 90) Milton belongs in such a book. Which Milton will they present? Will they be just to the memory of this genius who never made a secret of his anti-Popery and give us the man, or will they help to perpetuate the myth? And will they include, in the biographical sketch, the fact that his liberal principles were flexible enough to permit him later on to become an official censor under the Licensing Act he attacked so vigorously and unsuccessfully? This acrobatic flexibility is no reflection on his liberalism, of course, since liberals are expected to be uncommitted. But it has some bearing on his credibility as a witness.

As another illustration of the hit-and-run, slapdash history characteristic of this book, we offer these two sentences: "The historical origin of the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* is not known. St. Paul approved the burning of bad books by the Christians of Ephesus (Acts 19:19)." (p. 41) Why the origin of the *Index* has to be so mysterious when the standard reference works give its history in some detail, we can only guess. And anyone who compares the second sentence with the text indicated in the Acts of the Apostles can learn that these Ephesians, in their enthusiasm for the faith to which they were recent converts, *voluntarily* burned *their own* superstitious books. Why could the authors not tell us that this early "pressure group" was applying "pressure" to itself? But for propagandists the important thing is that Catholics have been "book-burners" from the beginning. Fuller explanation might spoil the effect. (Incidentally, we are told that the books were valued at "fifty thousand pieces of silver." Obviously these early Christians cared more for morals than money. Liberals in the publishing field may prefer to imitate a pagan "pressure



group," another set of Ephesians described in the same chapter, the prosperous manufactures of idols who started an uproar because Paul's preaching of Christianity would be bad for business. (Cf. Acts 19:23-40) And let those who look for symbolisms see what they can do with the fact that the idols in question were images of Artemis, the fertility goddess.)

It would be pleasant to imagine that educated readers will easily discern the slantedness of this work. But if the review in the *Library Journal* (July, 1957, pp. 1767-1769) is a typical reaction, the writers need not worry at all about palming this off as a splendid contribution to learning. The reviewer, Librarian for one of America's oldest universities, tells us that it is "above all a thoughtful, unemotional study. The reader who wishes to feel himself stirred by a passionate, rhetorical defense of liberty in communication had better return to his Milton. Yet in a curious way the authors . . . by laying aside the rhetorical tricks of persuasion have been more persuasive." The propaganda might as well have been subliminal for all the notice it received. The same reviewer says that the book creates "an effect of first rate minds dealing honestly with a serious and sometimes baffling problem," and he finds an "absence of partisanship and passion" in "this really brilliant demonstration."

The Commission has taken the measure of our gullibility and neatly fitted this book to it. Without question it is a clever book, that is, done with great cunning. It rates A+ for salesmanship, and F for scholarship. Despite the appearances, it is about as scholarly as a singing commercial.

It is frightening to think, however, that the *Library Journal* reviewer might possibly be correct when he says: "This is the sort of formulation which find its way into the decisions of the higher courts and which leaves its mark ultimately upon the evaluation of public policy." There is some evidence already that the book's title is developing into a slogan, and "extra-legal" is coming into use as a smear term for groups opposed to the distribution of trash. It may do very great damage.

*The Freedom to Read* is no credit to anyone. It most certainly adds nothing to the reputation of the professors who produced it. It brings further suspicion upon the Fund for the Republic, already the target of heavy criticism for the kind of projects it habitually sponsors. It lessens confidence in the National Book Committee, whose worthy objectives could be promoted without going to these incredible extremes. Among the Committee's members are many respected men and women who should disown this parody of scholarship committed in their name. We suggest that they will find in the American Bishops' statement of last November a far sounder and more truly American basis for their program.

At one point in this book there is a warning about the efforts of organiza-

tions which defend censorship. "These activities," we are informed, "are dangerous because a small energetic group is able to impose the consequences of its judgments and prejudices on a community, frequently without the majority of the community becoming aware of what has happened." (p. 37) The Commission could not have described more accurately what it is doing.

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*Elements of Logic.* By VINCENT E. SMITH, PH.D. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1957. Pp. 298. \$3.50.

Dr. Vincent Smith of the University of Notre Dame Faculty has dared to be different in writing a rather novel type of Logic manual for college undergraduates. Well aware of the plethora of textbooks in Logic with an Aristotelian flavor and not unmindful of the popularity enjoyed by books on Symbolic Logic the past few decades on most college campuses in the United States and elsewhere, the author has sincerely and successfully incorporated some new features in this textbook that should prove very appealing to college instructors in, and college students of, Logic. Among the many distinctive purposes of this book the paramount one was to provide the college undergraduate with the ability "to form a fair off-hand judgment as to the goodness or badness of the method of anyone presenting an argument." (p. 20) This noble objective was to be accomplished by making the Art of Arts "come more alive for students by presenting it in terms of case histories of logical operations" and by moving "considerably beyond the purely formal treatment of the syllogism and to confront students with some modern applications of logic and the scientific method." (p. vii, Preface)

This book has a number of outstanding features. It is very evident that the author has spent many hours in the classroom teaching this subject, for he has a pleasant way of anticipating and appreciating many of the difficulties that usually arise in the minds of college students. He is not unaware, either, that very few college groups will be able in one semester to cover the thirty-five chapters in a perfect way. He is honest enough to suggest that certain compromises in emphasis be made by each instructor according to the needs and abilities of the groups being taught, so long as the primary objective is accomplished. "Case histories," based mostly on crucial questions in our Western culture, are found in each chapter. These quotations from some of the most famous savants of ancient, medieval, and modern times are an innovation worthy of great praise. His

choice of texts from such varied intellectual traditions is remarkable and should significantly enhance the student-appeal of this textbook. Yet, Dr. Smith urges instructors to make frequent use also of editorials in local newspapers and weekly national magazines. All this is in harmony with his main objective in authoring this textbook. His explanations of logical entities will prove to be, in the mind of this reviewer, as intelligible as they will be interesting to the ordinary collegian subjected to a course in the science of correct thinking. Any omissions of traditionally-taught subjects (e.g., obversion, moods of categorical syllogisms, reduction to the first figure, etc.) have been reluctantly made only on the grounds that they do not significantly contribute to gaining the primary objective of this book. Though it would be unfair for anyone to write a "scorching review" (p. 266) on this score, nevertheless, many Scholastic instructors will consider with not a little justification that such omissions represent an unhappy decision in light of the detailed treatment of other subjects that are strictly speaking non-logical, as found in Part VI. His uncanny manner of relating to Logic such a great number of realities in the humanities and sciences assures the student-reader of how practical Logic really can be in everyday life. Finally, one of the most worthwhile features of the book is the extensive treatment of Induction and the popular "scientific method."

Structurally, this textbook is conveniently divided into seven major parts, each of which is subdivided usually into three to nine chapters. There are also fifteen invaluable pages listing the References for Case Histories and a ten page Index. (pp. 287-298) The size of each chapter is prudently geared to the reading and studying ability of the ordinary collegian. At the end of most chapters there are many questions and problems proposed to provoke the student to think.

Part I (pp. 1-22) consists of three chapters and smoothly introduces the student to the intriguing world of *Logical Forms* with which one must be well acquainted if one is to proceed in an orderly and facile manner in any quest of truth. In the second chapter Dr. Smith shows that logic is a liberal art directive of mental artefacts, highlighting here the salient topics, operations of the mind and types of argumentation which will be treated in subsequent chapters.

Part II (pp. 23-92) is divided into nine chapters which more than adequately treat the first act of the mind, simple apprehension. After a more or less traditional consideration of ideas and words in the order of sign, the author in the fifth chapter provides the student with an explanation of the "universal" which is both scientific and satisfying. While he does not neglect to point out the dependence of our minds on extra-mental being, Dr. Smith gives noticeable emphasis to the truth that "universality is in thought and thought alone." (p. 31) He prudently warns the students, too, not to fall into the error of the Nominalists who are prone to identify

a collection with a universal. The "case histories" from Rousseau and Berkeley, who were overly concerned with the perinoetical elements in knowledge, are very well-chosen and show the reason for the Nominalist position. In chapter six he continues his analysis of the universal with a simple treatment of comprehension and extension. This reviewer is of the opinion that even a very brief reference to Porphyry and his Tree and to Euler and his Circles would have been more satisfying to most instructors, since very few texts in traditional logic omit the former and very few texts in symbolic logic fail to mention the latter. In the next two chapters he gives a more or less routine treatment of the predicables as they are related to the formation of a definition. Though he is a bit vague about the precise nature of the Logical Universal, his treatment of the predicables is adequate. There is something very distinctive in his scientific explanation and sober evaluation of the methods of defining so common to the natural sciences: morphological, genetic, and taxonomic. It is quite evident that he has a background in the natural sciences that is not often possessed by logicians. It seems to this reviewer that in his prolix explanation of "property," Dr. Smith, in his attempts to be more appreciative of the scientists' mode of defining, has compromised occasionally the pristine Aristotelian notion of this predicable. Perhaps here a "case history" from the famous works of Carl von Linné (Linnaeus), who applied Scholastic principles in his famous biological classifications, would have been enlightening. In chapter nine the author's discussion of the categories and especially their relation to the predicables (a problem curiously omitted or vaguely explained in most Scholastic texts) is excellent and its presentation is well-gearred to the collegiate undergraduate. After an interesting apologia for the treatment of "division" by a logician, Dr. Smith in chapter eleven exposes the essence of a genuine definition. Having emphasized the rigid demands that any worthwhile definition should fulfill, he still insists that a good definition is not an impossibility. He is also well aware that in the contemporary intellectual world there is a plentitude of *ersatz* definitions but also that "definitions are much easier to criticize than they are to construct." (p. 87) For a painstaking study of definition that has been done superbly, Dr. Smith is to be commended, especially since "good definitions are the foundations of good logic." (p. 88)

The noticeable brevity of Part III (pp. 93-116) which is concerned with the second act of the mind was determined principally by the modest aims the author had in writing the book. It contains only three chapters, but they are very well done. He purposely omits the term "judgment" in his descriptions of this mental operation of composing and dividing and is perhaps more Aristotelian in consistently insisting on the employment of the term "proposition." The clarity and simplicity with which Dr. Smith explains the nature of a proposition should prove very beneficial to the



student. But his treatment of the quality of categorical propositions is very much run-of-the-mill and very disappointing to this reviewer in light of the problems that can plague a student who is not able with ease to determine a negative proposition. His exposition of the two more important properties of propositions, namely, opposition and conversion, leaves little to be desired. Chapters fifteen and sixteen should be most appealing to students, though the one-sentence treatment of supposition on page 76 and the complete omission of anything on obversion might prove disconcerting to many instructors.

In Part IV (pp. 117-171) Dr. Smith enters into a splendid discussion of the third act of the mind with a consideration of the nature and division of argumentation (discourse). He does a superb job in chapter seventeen in explaining the five rules to which any valid categorical syllogism must conform. Nor is his exposition of the categorical and hypothetical syllogisms less excellent as to method and as to matter. In chapters twenty and twenty-one the author very objectively analyzes the Inductive Method and alleges that induction is not genuinely syllogistic because it "lacks a middle term." (p. 158) All readers will most likely be impressed by his impartial and penetrating treatment of "induction by incomplete enumeration." This study in chapter twenty-one is rather an uncommon but pleasing feature of a textbook in Logic that is so characteristically Aristotelian.

The author is extremely practical in Part V which is for the most part a detailed but interesting study of the various types of syllogistic argumentation. He makes it very clear throughout that the basis of this division is in terms of certitude and the nature of the middle term. Chapters twenty-two to twenty-five inclusive are well digested by the author himself on page 202: "This may be a convenient place to compare the literary syllogism with demonstration, dialectic, and rhetoric. In any *demonstration*, there is a necessity about the evidence involved so that the mind is compelled to accept the conclusion of the argument and thus acquire scientific knowledge. In *dialectic*, there is less necessity, so that reason can reach no more than a provable conclusion and must settle, not for science, but for opinion. In the *rhetorical* syllogism, the evidence is so weak that reason, in reaching truth, needs the assistance of the will with its tendency to the good. Finally, in the *literary* syllogism, the mind has almost run out of discourse. In literature, there is so little appeal to rational evidence usual in proof that the mind is led to accept a conclusion by the delightful or loathsome way in which an object is presented to it." Dr. Smith concludes this part by an informative tract on the precise nature of History in chapter twenty-six and an expository study of the hierarchy among the sciences in chapter twenty-seven.

Part VI especially stamps this text in traditional logic as distinctive and novel. He labels it *Special Questions* and it embraces seven illuminating

chapters mostly about the "scientific method." After tracing the rise of the experimental method to ancient Hellenist cosmologists, especially Thales, he exposes its potency and impotency as a method of knowing. He gives the student a sober evaluation of a body of knowledge that is exclusively experimental and gained mostly under "controlled conditions." In a practical way he shows the student how easily one can be duped into accepting as valid an hypothesis or scientific theory that is tainted by the fallacy of affirming the consequent. In chapter thirty he shows the fecundity of Analogy in any study, from Theology to Atomic Physics. But he is also conscious that this method can be and has been misleading, especially in the field of the natural sciences. Yet he blends these admonitions with a vigorous exhortation to scientists to make even more frequent use of this dialectical instrument for "reasoning by extrinsic analogy is one of the only ways open for us in penetrating the dim or distant recesses of our physical world." (p. 235) Then in the next chapter he states and explains the famous five canons of Induction as proposed by the nineteenth century logician, John Stuart Mill. His critique of Mill's principles is both mild and positive. In the following chapter he discusses the value of statistical reasoning in a way that should be intelligible to the undergraduates for whom it has been written. Finally, he concludes this Part by a rather sketchy treatment of Symbolic Logic in two chapters (33-34) which are entitled Truth Functions. Because of the omission of even a brief history of symbolic logic, and an evaluation of its alleged or real aims, and the nomenclature of the symbols used in the chapters (e.g., tilde, wedge, etc.), this reviewer was very dissatisfied. In the last Part (VII) the author provides the student with a wonderful treatment of fallacious types of speech and argumentation not previously considered in the book.

From a pedagogical point of view, this reviewer is of the opinion that all the chapters concerned with Induction should have been put in one Part and not scattered; that the chapters on the Nature of History, the Sciences, Analogy, and Truth Functions be placed in the Part entitled *Special Questions*; and that the chapter on Fallacies, now an orphaned chapter, be given a home in the Part entitled *Kinds of Argument*. We also think that in a textbook that has such an Aristotelian flavor, many more quotations from the Stagirite's logical treatises would be appropriate. In conclusion, the reading and reviewing of this textbook was a delightful and stimulating experience. This book with its deep regard for scholarship should occasion greater interest in the art and science of Logic amongst undergraduates in all types of colleges, Catholic and non-Catholic alike. This reviewer enthusiastically recommends the *Elements of Logic* as one of the best contemporary textbooks on the "art of arts."

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*St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics: The Aquinas Lecture, 1957.*

By JOSEPH OWENS, C.Ss.R., M.S.D. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1957. Pp. 97.

For many years now the leading figures of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, have, in a quasi-collective effort, sought to manifest the properly Thomistic insight into reality. Fr. Owens' Aquinas Lecture presents the latest phase of this continuing endeavor. The position he takes could well have been anticipated. Its model is found in his work on Aristotle's metaphysics (herein briefly sketched), principally with regard to the non-objective character of conceptual knowledge and the strict unity of common being. A suggestion of it was contained in his unavailing attempt to demonstrate the principle of causality (*The Modern Schoolman*, Vol. 32), where he revealed a novel understanding of existence as attained in the judgment. It was also foreshadowed by Etienne Gilson's assertion, in *Being And Some Philosophers*, that, for St. Thomas, God and being *qua* are one and the same. It is, moreover, a position openly stated and defended by Fr. Gerard Phelan in an address before the ACPA on the existence of creatures. However, in contrast to this candid approach, Fr. Owens' exposition is marked by reticence.

The purpose of his lecture is to establish the unique qualifications of Thomism for primacy among the varied metaphysical doctrines of past and present. Needless to say, the claims entered in its behalf are grounded in the primacy that it accords the act of existence. Thus the lecture is devoted to an analysis of the Thomistic teaching on this act. Many of his judgments here would find ready acceptance—those, for example, that posit the "accidentality" of the creature's existence, its distinction from essence and, what will prove to be most relevant, its finiteness. We read: "Being is other than essence. It is outside the essence, in the sense that it is not contained within the essential principles of finite things. . . . In this profound sense being is accidental to all things except in the unique though as yet hypothetical case of subsistent being." (p. 44) And: "The act or perfection of being is accordingly limited to and by the essence. . . . As a limited perfection in creatures it certainly owes its limitation to the finite essence which it actuates." (note 23)

Regrettably, other judgments of the author, viewed in their immediate context, possess too great an obscurity either to demand assent or to prompt meaningful dispute. For example, the statement that subsistent being, or God, exists is said to be a "tautology." In explanation, he offers an undoubted tautology: "To say that subsistent being is a real (*sic*) nature is to mean that it actually exists." But then he adds: "Both subject and predicate coincide in meaning in the statement: 'Subsistent being exists.'" (p. 46, note 48) This judgment is, of course, quite different

from the preceding one; but it, too, is apparently taken as self-evident *quoad nos*, which would imply that our knowledge of the divine existence is penetrating. This is significant in view of the fact that it is only of the creature's existence that we have proper knowledge. Are we then to assume that its existence and God's are seen as one? Equally puzzling is the following argument concerning the distinction between the finite being's essence and existence: "The Thomistic distinction . . . follows from considering the essence as of itself completely devoid of all being, real or intentional, and then reasoning to the reception of that being from something else and ultimately from subsistent being. Only then has being been established as a nature in reality, a nature that cannot coalesce *in reality* with any other nature, and so when participated is always other in reality than the nature which it makes be." (note 30) The difficulty here is that the distinction in question appears to be simply equated with that between the finite essence and subsistent existence. The proof begins with a very real distinction between the creature's essence and its existence: the essence is "completely devoid of all being." Yet this distinction is obviously seen as inadequate, because existence—presumably that with which the reasoning process begins, the creature's—is not yet known as a subsistent act of being and thus as other than any finite nature. This would imply that God is again taken as the proper existence of things. But, let it be conceded, another interpretation of the author's words, one consonant with the actual teaching of St. Thomas, is possible.

This is not the case with what is undoubtedly the most important section of his work. The discussion at this point centers upon St. Thomas' proofs of God's existence. These are seen as concrete illustrations of the singular contribution to human thought made by Thomistic existentialism. We are told that the "Thomistic metaphysical principles . . . give rise to a procedure that never has to make what critics of the demonstrations of God's existence call the 'awful leap' from the finite to the infinite." The reason for this is that the "Thomistic procedure does not start from a finite nature." Rather, it "starts from the being of the thing," and from this being "not as already submitted to the finitizing process of conceptualization, but as directly attained in the act of judgment." It then "establishes being as a nature and thereby has already reached the term of the demonstration." There is therefore "no question on the precisely metaphysical level of passing from a finite thing or a finite nature to an infinite one. The entire process is on the level of being, which as a nature or thing is infinite, though it is attained not as a nature or thing in the sensible world but as the act of a nature other than itself." And so, "St. Thomas fails to see any difficulty in the objection that there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite, as in any way militating against the possibility of demonstrating God's existence. He answers that from *any* effect the *being* of its cause can be *manifestly* demonstrated, just as though such an



objection had no place on the level of being." The procedure followed by St. Thomas is opposed to that in which "the demonstration of God's existence starts from the notion of being as already conceptualized after the manner of the original human concept of act, which is limited in its intrinsic character quite as it was in its Aristotelian equation with form." When this other approach is taken, "St. Thomas is just as insistent that no proof can be developed. The Anselmian argument is worthless in the Thomistic framework." (pp. 46-48)

Here there is no mistaking Fr. Owens' true meaning. The decisive element in his analysis of the Thomistic procedure is, of course, the distinction between the "two existences" attained by the human mind—that revealed in the concept and that seized in the judgment. The "conceptualized" existence is finite and non-real; it is existence as known in relation to the finite nature of which it is the act; it is actually the notion of existence rather than extra-mental, concrete existence. It can thus give rise only to the specious "ontological" demonstration of God's existence. In contrast, the existence seized in the judgment is seen as both real and non-finite—i. e., *infinite*. It is existence attained in all its purity, prior to the falsifying, "finitizing" concept, before what would doubtless be called the "essentializing" tendency of the mind comes into play. As such, it disposes of the "awful leap" objection and permits a valid proof of the divine existence.

The major difficulties in this account are closely related. One concerns the text of St. Thomas (I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3) to which the author refers in support of his view. In it St. Thomas is interpreted as implicitly affirming that the demonstration of God's existence starts from the *non-finitized* existential act of the sensible thing. However, his actual argument is to the opposite effect. He first notes that "from effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be attained." However, he adds, the existence of the cause can be known with certitude—"and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects." But, he concludes, "from them we cannot know God as He is in His essence." It is clear from this that all the effects—with existence chief among them—from which the arguments in question proceed are seen as finite (indeed, the objection itself and Fr. Owens' reference to it would have relevance only if this were the case). It would then follow, if the author's position be correct, that these arguments are as worthless as that constructed by St. Anselm. Far from showing the unique force of the Thomistic procedure, the author has so interpreted the "awful leap" objection (which actually applies only if the demonstration is held to give knowledge of God as He is in His essence) that the only possible proofs of God's existence must be viewed as inadequate.

A variation of this same difficulty strikes more immediately at the foundation of Fr. Owens' reasoning. Existence conceived as the actuality

of a finite essence, "represented after the manner of the original human concept of act," and thus "limited in its intrinsic character," is said to be incapable of leading to a sound proof of God's existence. Yet the existence on which the accepted demonstration is based, that seized in the judgment, is itself "attained not as a nature or thing in the sensible world but as the act of a nature other than itself." Accordingly, this existence as well will be finite, and will lead only to an inefficacious demonstration of God's existence. In point of fact, it need hardly be said, the very opposite is true: only if the existence of sensible things be the act of a nature other than itself, and thus finite, could it serve as the principle of a valid demonstration.

Aside from these weaknesses, there is the author's unaccountable failure to defend either the stated infinity of the sensible thing's act of existence or its most important implications—the unqualified unity of all existence and its corollary, the oneness of the creature's and God's existence. Indeed, he does not even make explicit these consequences. Their necessity, however, is evident, for there can be but one infinite existential act. But simply to assert that, through the deforming activity of conceptual knowledge, the creature's actually infinite existence is rendered finite, will not do. Without an argument establishing the posited infinity and a careful study of its implications, Fr. Owens' task is incomplete and his work radically defective.

The one approach he could take in the discharge of his obligations is evident. He would have to maintain that, though joined to a finite nature—though the very actualization of this nature—the existential act retains the purity proper to it as such, and this its infinity. The only finiteness acknowledged would be that of the actualized nature. Now, with but inconsequential variations, precisely this argument has been proposed by the author's Institute colleague, Fr. Gerard Phelan. In the interests of scholarship, this bold discourse should be considered.

Fr. Phelan proceeds from the principle: *Esse autem in quantum est esse non potest esse diversum; potest autem diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse*. (*II Cont. Gent.*, c. 52. Not quoted are the words immediately following these: *sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis*. The significance of this will be apparent.) Commenting on this, he states: "Diversity is a meaningless term when applied to *esse* as such. This, of course, does not imply that the *Esse* of God and the *esse* of creatures are identical, since 'identity' is as meaningless as 'diversity' where *esse* is involved. The clause—'*potest autem diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse*'—explicitly states that diversification proceeds from a principle that is not *esse*. The statement: *esse in quantum est esse non potest esse diversum* does imply, however, that the terms 'diverse' and 'identical' do not apply where *esse* as such is discussed. To say that the mode in which the Creator exercises *esse* is other than the modes in which creatures exercise *esse*, or

that each creature exercises *esse* in its own way, is not to assert either the identity or the diversity of *esse* as such, but to disclose the basis for the diversity between the *Ens*, which is God, and the *entia* which are creatures. Beings (*entia*) are diverse, but not *esse*; nor are beings diverse by reason of their *esse* but '*per aliquid quod est praeter esse.*'" (Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXXI, p. 122.)

If valid, this argument would most surely supply for the deficiency in Fr. Owens' work; we need merely substitute "finite" and "finitized" for "diverse" and "diversified." However, the words of St. Thomas that are employed to establish the non-diversity of the various existential acts fail of their imposed purpose. Granted that the *esse* of the creature is diversified by something beyond the *esse* itself, it remains that it is in fact *diversified* and is thus of necessity *diverse*. The diversification *per aliquid quod est praeter esse* is acknowledged by Fr. Phelan; when therefore he states that "Beings (*entia*) are diverse, but not *esse*," he simply contradicts himself. The contradiction embraced by Fr. Owens is, verbally, more immediate; for, on more than one occasion, he explicitly affirms the finiteness of the creature's existence.

No greater consistency is maintained by Fr. Phelan when he seeks to justify the implication of the position he shares with his colleague—the unity of the creature's and God's existential acts. He writes: "... God is the *esse* of all things. '*Deus est esse omnium*'—not '*esse essentiale*' but the '*esse causale*.' (I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, sol.) The *esse essentiale* of a creature is the *esse* which all creatures participate, exercised *aliquo modo*. The *esse causale* is the *esse* which all things participate, exercised *omnimodo* or *sine modo*. And that *esse* which all things participate is the divine *esse*. '*Nihil habet esse, nisi inquantum participat divinum esse.*' (*ibid.*) Creatures do not participate *esse* as, for instance, men participate humanity. There is no 'common' being in this sense at all. 'There is no being save the divine being, in which all creatures participate.' (Et. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas*, p. 360). He continues: "If one must talk the language of participation, I would say, also, 'There is no being, *esse*, save the divine being, *Esse*, and all beings participate it.' This sounds pantheistic only to the ears of those who still think of *esse* as something." (*ibid.*, p. 123)

The difficulties encountered here come to a head with the denial that *esse* is "something." For it is precisely that in the one instance that Fr. Phelan is willing to acknowledge, that of the divine being, the *esse causale*. Existence lacks this status only when it is the actualization of something other than itself, when it is the *esse essentiale* of the creature. However, the reality of this non-subsistent existence has been denied, for God, though the one *esse*, is held not to be the creature's *esse essentiale*, not to be "common" to all beings as humanity is to men. The result of this second inconsistency, which also has as its function to forestall the charge

of pantheism, is a clear nihilism with respect to creatures. On the other hand, the position that the *esse causale* is not "something" involves a total nihilism: without subsistent existence *nihil habet esse*.

These are the inevitable results of the attempt to soften the denial that there are diverse acts of existence, the infinite and the finite. That this denial should have been considered at all is incomprehensible. For it is destructive of the very Thomistic existentialism that these scholars would proclaim. Most immediately it is such in its perversion of this doctrine into a hitherto inconceivable pluralistic monism, but in other respects as well it wreaks havoc. For example, in the order of existence God could not be held to exercise true efficient causality; he must be seen as simply imposing Himself upon the finite nature, rather than as communicating to it a distinct existential act. In addition, the analogy of being, which involves a proportion between each essence and its existence, no longer holds when infinite existence is said to be the one act of all things. The accepted understanding of the distinction between essence and existence must also be abandoned; within this scheme of things it is clearly a distinction between the divine and the created nature. Finally, despite innumerable assertions to the contrary, the existential act of the creature has been "essentialized," for it is identified with that existence which is also an essence. All this, however, would surely have been avoided had a more careful textual analysis been undertaken. The teaching of St. Thomas is stated with clarity in the very text from the *Sentences* upon which Fr. Phelan drew for his argument. Its wording is particularly relevant to Fr. Owens' formulation of their common position. It runs: *Cum igitur modus cuiuslibet rei creatae sit finitus, quaelibet res creata recipit esse finitum et inferius divino esse quod est perfectissimum. Ergo constat quod esse creaturae, quo est formaliter, non est divinum esse.*

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*Thought and Truth. A critique of philosophy: its source and meaning.*

By M. MAISELS. New York: Bookman Associates, 1956. Pp. 359 with index. \$5.00.

In his foreword to *Thought and Truth* Mr. Maisels makes an interesting remark: most of the work, he says, "was written during years of wandering, travail and seclusion which prevented normal exposure to the trends of thought prevalent then and now as well. Any similarity, therefore, between this work and that regnant thought is perforce incidental." And Mr. Maisels explains that he records this fact because it may be "of



some importance, . . . for a meeting of minds, as it were, is perhaps valuable to the general appreciation of the thought of a given period and of the concepts which gained prominence in it." Mr. Maisels is quite right. Indeed, if one wanted to understand the meaning of contemporary philosophy, one could not do much better than to turn to *Thought and Truth*. For it presents, in isolation from the divisions of school and sect, a doctrine which distills what is essential to the philosophical spirit of the mid-century. That, as I see it, is the great value of this work.

The very first observation which is the occasion of Mr. Maisels' reflexions and from which arises the fundamental problem of *Thought and Truth* is the observation of a *phenomenon*: it is the observation of that human experience which is philosophical activity itself; it is the fact that "man seeks to evolve a world-picture which transcends the bounds of palpable relationships and circumstances and to fix man's own place in that world." Now according to the author, what is distinctive of philosophy is that, unlike other human activities, such as art, and even unlike other intellectual activities, such as "[experimental] science," philosophy seeks "to obtain that which is beyond the reach of sense-experience"; that is why some distinction between appearance and reality is common to all philosophy. This is not true of "science." Indeed, Mr. Maisels shows in detail that there is no "relation of continuity between the two disciplines." And this distinction is important, because the contempt for metaphysics that follows upon the breakdown of the modern philosophical experiment and the success of the modern experimental philosophy, is simply the logical result of the failure to recognize their distinction: philosophy may be found wanting only if it is measured by the same standards as experimental science. But why should they not both be asked to satisfy the same criteria? If both claim to be true knowledge, should they not both provide truth, equally, univocally and unequivocally? Perhaps; but if one so holds, says the author, one could not but agree that philosophy fails the test, for it is true that philosophy lacks the objectivity which is the pride of science; e. g., "philosophy never asks questions. *It begins by answering, without posing any prior questions.*" How can philosophy have any rational knowledge-value, asks Mr. Maisels, if it is true, as its history shows, that "no matter to what extent philosophy attempts to disguise itself with the trappings of logical reason, the uniqueness of any philosophic system lies in the assumptions it makes before it ever launches its arguments?"

The answer, he continues, is that the disjunction is false. Consider by way of analogy, he asks us, the criticism which explains away primitive religions. To attribute them to the fear of death, the uncertainty of life, the wonder of dreams, the force of hallucinations—or, I might add, to the cosmic inner magic of *Totem and Taboo*—would be fundamentally "erroneous and misleading," even though these explanations may have, and

sometimes do have, quite "factual truth." The fact remains that these religions are *human facts*. What needs to be noted, above all, is that man is such that he produces those religions. What is not to be obscured is that any religion is a manifestation of "*man creating for himself a world all his own in which to live.*" Moreover, note also that *once* this world is created it seems to claim a certain power over man: it claims to be true. Similarly with philosophy; indeed, identically so with philosophy, which according to the author differs from religion only according to the kind of "extra-natural beings" which are created thereby (e. g., causes rather than personified forces). Philosophy, too, creates a world transcending the senses, and once created that world comes to claim the power of truth. There is, therefore, a real critical problem in philosophy, but that problem is not how to bridge the gap between object and subject: that would be to pose the problem as if philosophy were an experimental science. There is a real critical problem concerning the relation between thought and truth, an epistemological question concerning the nature and validity of *philosophical* knowledge, but it should be posed in these terms: 'What is man's power enabling him to create a world, and what is the power of this created world giving it dominion over man? In other words: What source, what authoritative truth do the creations of thought possess?' This is the problem which gives its title to the work: these are the *source* and *meaning* to which the subtitle makes allusion.

To begin his solution, Mr. Maisels reminds us of the Cartesian discovery: the need for, and the possibility of, a point of departure for philosophy which is critically justified; and "this starting point was *man*—"I think." But Mr. Maisels also reminds us that Descartes makes use of this starting point precisely as a starting point, that is, in order to proceed thence outwards into "the world." It is Kant, taking advantage of Descartes, who is the real discoverer of the modern view, for "unlike Descartes, he did not spin his thread of thought from man outwards. *He began at the point of man and ended there.*" To be historically accurate one should add that, paradoxically enough, this was beyond the original intention of Kant, who, like Descartes, wanted to proceed outwards to the thing-in-itself. Indeed, he was sufficiently deceived to think that, if not by pure reason, at least by practical reason, it was possible therein to succeed: so that even in what is most original in Kant, namely, the discovery of "the fact of *personality* or *will*, [for] contained in the very proposition 'I think' or 'I perceive' is the fact of the *I*, . . . this fact is not presented for its own sake but for the sake of that which lies outside it." In any event, we are indebted to him for awakening us to the fact that "together with sense-impression, which is man's point of departure towards nature, there is another point of departure in man that leads to a world that is not of nature." It was Kant who, willy-nilly, made philosophy awake to the "self-sufficiency" of man. For the Cartesian dichotomy of man and nature,

the last stronghold and the acme of the scission between appearance and reality, is healed in the unity of the Kantian *phenomenon*: "Descartes' 'I think' was simply a fact of man wherefrom the universe might somehow be inferred; Kant's 'I perceive' is simultaneously a fact of man and a fact of nature. This is the fact of impression in man, which begins in sensation and ends in cognition and science. 'More' than this impression man does not possess; he cannot overstep his own bounds and break through to something beyond himself. But this impression constitutes his world, it is *the* world, and there is no other world, even as man has no other kind of cognition. This is man and this is his world." Which is, I think, a good statement, as succinct and clear as they come, of the root significance of the Kantian discovery upon which contemporary philosophy has seized: I mean, the phenomenological identity of subject and object, of knower and known, of mind and world; it is the merger of appearance and reality, of thought and being, and of being and becoming into the transobjective unity of the *phenomenon*. And as the divergence effected by abstraction is *transcended* by human experience, the phenomenon undercuts the problem of "man's self-differentiation from nature which occasioned the particular understanding of nature involved in the concept of science." This "differentiation" is useful: experimental science rests upon it. But we have tended to mistake its usefulness-power for its truth-power: hence we have set up its *objectivity* as the ideal measure of truth to which philosophy must conform. But if, as Mr. Maisels has just told us, the "differentiation" is practical, whereas it is the *identity* which is true, then it should follow that the truth of philosophy is the real truth, even though it is not the 'objective' truth of science. What, then, is the nature of the truth of philosophy?

Consider the outcome of the Kantian *cogito*. Does not philosophy, after Kant, in rejecting the thing-in-itself, reject the objective? And why? Because it is untenable? Not at all: perhaps it is untenable, but that is irrelevant. It is rejected because it is superfluous. And philosophy, as it rejects the in-itself, does not find itself compelled to revert to a Humean scepticism: indeed, it finds therein its true speculative value and its truth, for it asserts thereby the completeness, the absoluteness of the phenomenon, and the completeness, the absoluteness of the "self-sufficiency" of man. For in the Kantian *cogito* the *I* is as primordial as the *think*. The *ego* should not be and cannot be *concluded to*, reasoned out from prior knowledge: it is a fact; it is a brute, raw fact. In other words, the *cogito* is not essentially essential, it is essentially existential, and man's dignity is revealed to him by his self-consciousness: "man looks at himself and at the world, and at himself as placed in the world, but in all this he sees no existent-for-itself except himself." That is why "man's being for himself is not a 'thing,' not even a 'thing-in-itself.'" It is precisely in order to signify that the *ego* is not a *thing*, and perhaps also (but here I con-

jecture) to signify the bruteness, the rawness, indeed, the inexorable simplicity and the absolute gratuitousness of the *factuality* of the *I* who thinks, that Mr. Maisels chooses to prefer the term *will* to the terms *I* or *ego*. Is it necessary to add that in this context *will* does not mean the rational appetite? Mr. Maisels himself, perhaps a little clumsily, warns us that "we must distinguish between *wish* and *will*." Will, in his acceptance, is "the characteristic of man's being-for-himself." And again: "*the personal will, the pure will, is that which constitutes the identity of man's personality*." Will is the existential *ego*; once it is, it is then *given* in experience, and as given, as *datum*, it makes man a *something-for-himself*. That is why, Mr. Maisels astutely and quite consistently observes, the real problem of freedom, for one placed in this perspective, is not that of determinism *versus* indeterminism, or that of freedom *versus* "predestination." The mystery is, rather, that the observed fact of will seems to involve an antinomy of will against being, or of man's being against time. The difficulty is that man, as will, *transcends* the present, whereas existence or being is only in the present. The transcendence of will is plain for all to see, for will is incompatible with "a state in which everything shall have been attained and there shall be no more place for it, for will." In brief, will is not basically will-to-an-end, but will-to-be.

Note, however—and now we approach the crux of Mr. Maisels' argument—that if will is not will-to-an-end, but will-to-be, because "man's personality throughout his life, in the very fact of its being, wills itself even as it spins its own being, yearns and endeavors to be itself, to be *only itself*," then will is not relative to an-other (i. e., an end). And if not relative, then it is absolute. More specifically: if will does not relate man to the outward and to the extrinsic, then it only relates man to himself; but a self-relation, or a relation of self-identity (and phenomenon *is* identity) is, of course, a relation only logically: it is really a non-relation; it is an absolute. Hence, will-to-be is an absolute: "Will, the willer and the willed are identical in man's personality, which consists only of such identity." Now, on the absoluteness of will depends the solution to the antinomy of human being and time. For if we ask "How can will be, if it transcends time, whereas to be (as an in-itself) is only *in* time, in the present?" the answer is that the contradiction disappears as soon as we remember that man's being is not being-in-itself. The absoluteness of will means that we cannot measure human being by the standard of being-in-itself, for by this standard human being is not being. Nor could we measure the in-itself, or "nature," by the being of will, for by this standard it is nought. The contradiction of being and non-being depends upon an abstract (i. e., relative, unreal, non-absolute) distinction between man and nature: nature, to will, is non-being; will, to nature, is non-being. But nature is being; being, that is, as things can be. And will, though not as a thing can be, is being: so much so, indeed, that it is will-to-be. The



being of nature pales into nothingness besides the being of will, which is to-be. In Mr. Maisels' own words: "insofar as will wills itself it wills non-nature, it rebels against nature, sees the interference of nature as subjugation, as outside [i. e., external] compulsion, as *non-being* by comparison with itself, even as its own being is non-being by comparison with nature." And so, the being of nature is being (though as facing will it is becoming), whereas the being of will (which as facing nature is becoming), is being: "will is active by its very being. It wills, and, by willing, actualizes itself. It *becomes* through its own activities. And out of this self-willing issues the willing of non-nature, that is, of the will's struggle with nature." This, of course, is what makes man creative: artistically creative when it exerts itself against nature as the in-itself; intellectually creative, that is, issuing in knowledge (a "thought-creation") as it exerts itself against its own nature, the for-itself. And thus we may, therefore, definitely answer the problem of the *source* and *meaning* of philosophy: philosophy is a thought-creation; its origin is in the will-personality or *ego*, and its validity is based on its being willed or created: and what could be more true or absolute if the will is will-to-be, and therefore absolute? The *source* is the creativity or being of the will: its *meaning*, therefore, is true and (unlike our knowledge of the in-itself, i. e., experimental science) it is absolutely and not merely objectively true; it is so by the truth and the absoluteness of man as will, the being-for-itself.

That is, in outline, Mr. Maisels' solution to his *basic* problem, on which, for its being basic, I have chosen to concentrate. The problems which, in turn, come out of this doctrine on the nature and validity of philosophy depend for their solution, of course, on the foundations already laid: they are equally well handled, with perceptiveness, fairness, consistency and *clarity*; (if my account lacks the latter, may I assure the prospective reader of *Thought and Truth* that the fault is all mine). But all that I must, less than summarize or even sample, merely list. A second part of the work applies the doctrine to a re-interpretation of the history of man and his "thought-creations" from "the emergence of man" through "ancient cultures," the Greek world, Judaism, Christianity and "European Man" up to the nineteenth century. A third part deals with "Man in Time": not unexpectedly, if it is true that will is becoming and that therefore being-for-itself is time. A fourth part, on "Man with himself," crowns the work. It presents a doctrine—I hesitate to call it an *ethics*—of what man must become conscious of if he is to be true to his nature. A doctrine, let us say, of the fulfillment of man's authenticity. If I hesitate to say ethics it is because, quite consistently, this fulfillment is not to be superimposed on, or better, superexisted by, man's nature: the fulfillment *is* man's nature itself. And I say that this part crowns the work because it is plain from the outset that if the author tried to lay a critical foundation for philosophy, it is only with the intention of building thereon a practical

doctrine, for "no philosophic system seems to us worthy of the name if it does not *obligate* anyone to do anything."

But, however important these practical conclusions may be to Mr. Maisels, there would seem to be little point in reporting them in detail and in discussing them while the premises themselves remain open to criticism. As for that, it can be condensed in this: one's evaluation of *Thought and Truth* would depend on what one thought of the nature and validity of phenomenological analysis. For myself, as I have explained elsewhere [THE THOMIST, XIX (1956), 193-218], I think it would be erroneous to deny all legitimacy and validity to phenomenology; although, if it has any place in philosophy, it is neither as a substitute for metaphysics, nor even as a foundation for metaphysics, and certainly not as a prolegomenon to ethics. And if I confine these critical remarks to such generalities it is because, if originality means *novelty*, then Mr. Maisels' work is obviously anything but original. Mr. Maisels' insight leading to his doctrine of the absoluteness of will is forceful and deep, but it is not novel. If I understand him and contemporary philosophy correctly, then I do not think it would be in the least exaggerated to say that the creativity and absoluteness of his will-personality is not fundamentally different from the *élan vital* of Bergson, nor from the inexorableness of the being of Sartre's hairy hands with fat, ugly fingers, nor from the *Zeitlichkeit* of Heidegger's *Dasein*, nor, for that matter, from that Behaviour which, ranging from interaction to adjustment, is close to the heart of Dewey, nor, in the final analysis, from the dialectics of History from Marx-Engels to Lenin-Stalin. Yet, I do think that Mr. Maisels' work is of importance, but that is because originality need not be the same as novelty. For what is striking about *Thought and Truth* is precisely that, as Mr. Maisels has told us, it is an independent development which happens to coincide with "prevalent" and "regnant" trends of thought. And I must immediately add that I do not mean to identify those prevalent trends of thought with what is commonly known as existentialism, a term which I have studiously avoided until this moment. Nor, I believe, would Mr. Maisels do so himself: he uses the term, to my recollection, nowhere in the book.

The reason, if I can divine his mind, is that he would see that which is called existentialism only as a specific manifestation of a philosophical development which may well have other manifestations different in temper and detail. With that view I would agree. For there is, I think, something that binds together the threads and the wisps of contemporary thought. Above the petty detail of the specific byways which may be pursued, beyond the specific of the sometimes soporific issues controverted among the schools, outside the differences which can be blamed on the closeness of the climate, and the pervasiveness of one's culture and the concrete concern of individual philosophers, there is a common spirit: and, more than a spirit, a doctrine which commands consent, and this doctrine is the

absoluteness of man. If contemporary philosophy needs a name, its name is humanism. And not a mere humanism, lusty, arty, blushing and poetic, naïf, almost innocent in its blasphemy, as the humanism of the Renaissance. I mean a humanism which is cautious and calculating, pale and indrawn, self-conscious of its import, Promethean with a will and a vengeance, aggressive, militant and unrepenting in its determination to steal for man the very divinity of the Being of God. I mean a deifying humanism which is perhaps most evident among the varieties of existentialism, but which is also barely below the buff of pragmatism; it is present, I would say, though *secundum quid*, least sophisticated and self-conscious, even in the driest logicism and most logical positivism. Are there, then, no differences among contemporary schools? Of course there are. *Sein und Zeit*, to analytical philosophy, is "semantic salad." No one would confuse Dewey with Sartre; are they, for all that, less at one? Are not both philosophies built on and about the factualness of experience? Do they not both elaborate thereupon a moral—indeed, much less elaborate in Sartre than in Dewey—in which the absoluteness of man guarantees that the only way for him to work out his destiny (or, shall we say, his *salvation*), is out of his own resources and within a finality which *is* man himself? Mr. Maisels, too, conforms to the same doctrine. If there is any difference it is that Mr. Maisels', precisely because it avoids the detail of the small matter and because it was worked out in isolation, presents contemporary humanism in what appears to me as a rather purer and less controversial form. By comparison, Erich Fromm's *Man for Himself* is blemished with the dross of neo-Freudianism. Mr. Maisels is more erudite, much more philosophical, certainly less angry and perhaps incomparably more innocent: but if *Thought and Truth* had received its title not from its problem, but from its conclusion, then Fromm's work would have been its onomastic godparent. And Mr. Maisels' humanism is deeper and more urbane than many: to Corliss Lamont's rather wild-eyed preaching, Mr. Maisels' delicate vigour compares as the prophet Isaias does to a street-corner gospeleer.

There is, I think, a telling index signifying the essential unity of contemporary philosophy: underlying all the controversies of the times there is close to agreement in fact, and not only in words, though sometimes not in words, in the very concept of what philosophy is. Philosophy is, for the times, the absolutely ultimate "search for wisdom." And this wisdom, be it scientific or not, be it rational or artistic, be it discursive or intuitive, be it conceptual or connatural—for all those things may be debated—is in any event the kind of wisdom by which the hills are as wise as they are old, though man is wiser, and the wisdom by which lore is wise to the ways of nature, though philosophy is wiser. It is the apex of *know-how*, for it is the know-how of survival in being; it is the *Lifemanship* of a scholarly Potter who has lost his sense of humour. I mean, philosophy is practical wisdom, and if there are any human problems—and none more pressing—

the *only* and the *last* court of appeal is philosophy. Mr. Maisels, too, conforms to that conception of philosophy which would identify it, in the end, with the true, enlightened, natural, human, intelligent religion.

Is it necessary to defend the position that this is not a conception of philosophy which does justice to philosophy itself and to its speculative value? And would it be prudent to say that, therefore, *Thought and Truth* cannot in the end be a truly philosophical work? And could one give for a reason, therefore, that it is not a work of Christian philosophy without fear of one's being thought a bigot and a jingo? But consider that it is only in the Christian tradition—though even there, not always—that a distinction has been made between reason and revelation, and the conclusion follows. For, paradoxically, only he who looks to grace and Its Source for his salvation, rather than to reason and its work, is sufficiently liberated thereby to be potentially impartial, disinterested and *just* in his quest for knowledge, whereas he who pins his only remaining hopes for attaining his final end on what reason can discover, cannot, by definition, follow reason wherever and anywhere it may rightly lead: only wherever it is directed by one's prior orientation. If so, every problem will be a function of human problems: whether the soul is incorruptible is a problem because it matters to man; whether God exists is a problem because if He does He should be worshipped. In brief, philosophy thus conceived is reducible to the dogma from which morals and cult are to follow. My point is that this lands us in a contradiction. For philosophy, true enough, should not be dogmatic. But only that philosophy of him who has a dogma other than philosophy can be non-dogmatic: the philosophy of him who makes it into a dogma *must* be dogmatic, if only by making non-dogmatism into a dogma. Much of the impoverishment of contemporary philosophy—I mean, the fact that so many philosophical problems are neglected or not pursued to their end simply because the only thing that counts is the basic conclusion which might in turn be applied to other, ultimately moral, questions; a poverty which exists side by side with the wealth of radically new discoveries and developments, phenomenology for one, dialectical analysis for a second—may be accounted for by philosophy's vested, disordered, practical interest in its own outcome.

And yet, Mr. Maisels, I am sure, could easily defend this, his conception of philosophy, because he has history on his side. In his search for wisdom he is in good company: and thereby I mean not only some of the best philosophers of our time, and not only those ideologies which stand out among the best—and very good, indeed—that hold sway over our century. I mean, ultimately, Greek philosophy itself. For, typically with Socrates and Plato, but not any the less clearly with the late Classical period through Rome and up to Plotinus, perhaps much less so with Aristotle (is the difference in kind or in degree?), Greek philosophy identifies itself with the true religion. It is a way of life, the only way of life which avoids



errors and superstition while preserving the dimly discerned truth of mythology and temple and adding to it the certainty and depth of reason. The *Phaedo*, I think, would document this assertion: the condemnation of Socrates is proof that the Greek world itself correctly saw philosophy as a religious heresy. Thus Greek philosophy is a pagan philosophy. It is the same pagan philosophy which, continued during the Empire, caused St. Paul to write to the Colossians: "beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit." The philosophy which, *qua* philosophy, is neither Christian nor pagan, may find itself in the Christian state: in Greece it found itself in the pagan state.

If I conclude, then, that Mr. Maisels' doctrine is a *pagan humanism*, I would give neither scandal nor offence. For I do not mean thereby to detract from his obvious sincerity nor from his sufficiently clear resources of good will. I do not mean to deny the power of his intellect nor the depths of his insight. Nor do I mean to ignore the value of his work, either historically, as the most recent testimony to the fact that the Kantian revolution is reaching the apex of its success, or in itself, as a document which by reason of its completeness, thoroughness and lucidity stands as one of the best statements of a humanism that is neither simple-minded nor superficial. I mean simply that *Thought and Truth* is at once typically contemporary and Classical in spirit as it harks back to the proto-gnosticism of the best Greek tradition: a double compliment that many would be happy to own and which not all, as Mr. Maisels, so abundantly deserve.

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*Lay People in the Church.* By YVES M. J. CONGAR, O.P. Translated by Donald Attwater. Westminster: Newman Press, 1957. Pp. 483.

This work was originally published in French under the title *Jalons pour une théologie du laïcat*. It bears a sub-title, "A study for a theology of the laity," which sufficiently reveals its nature. It is a study of the laity in the light of theology, natural and sacred, in order to determine their position and function in the Church.

There is no question of the opportuneness of such an inquiry. Less than justice has been done to the laity by those who think of the Church exclusively in terms of the clergy and hierarchy. The laity in this view are let into the Church only on sufferance: they do not constitute the Church in any real sense of the term. This attitude is a reaction against the opposite extreme which flourished in the sixteenth and succeeding cen-

turies. The Reformers commonly looked upon the Church as the assembly of the faithful, to which its presiding officials, the clergy, are completely subordinate and secondary.

Father Congar attempts to establish the rightful position of the laity in the Church, avoiding both these extremes. He draws upon a wealth of learning and scholarly competence in Scripture, tradition, patristic and medieval literature, liturgy, the history of theology, especially its modern developments. That he has succeeded in rescuing the layman from "ecclesial" (a favorite word) outer darkness cannot be denied. We may question at times whether the author has gone too far in his rehabilitating of the layman in the Church, but we cannot question his good intentions or his ability in a difficult field.

Far from regarding the laity as in any sense outside the Church or merely an adjunct to it, it is necessary in the mind of the author for the Church to have laity for the full accomplishment of God's plan. It is just as essential to have some members who will do the work of the world as it is to have others who are dispensed from the world's work in order to dedicate themselves directly and exclusively to the work of God's kingdom, such as priests and monks. Some of the finest pages in the book occur in the last chapter where the problem of lay holiness is discussed. Those whose lot lies in the world are not exempt from the benefit of a divine vocation. Vocation belongs to all; in fact, everyone has at least two vocations; one in the order of creation (vocation in a wide sense) and another in the order of grace (vocation in the narrow and more special sense). Father Congar does not agree with those who would restrict vocation to the priesthood and religious state and refuse it to the lay life and states, such as marriage.

The world is an end in itself, though always subordinate to our last end. It is God's will that all who are in it should cooperate with the work of creation (vocation on the natural plane) as well as with the work of sanctification and salvation (vocation on the supernatural plane). Whatever may have been the reasons for a different attitude in the past, the Church today recognizes the fact of a secular world and an order of properly human and earthly values. She faces the task of developing a suitable program for a God-centered humanism and a "Christofinalised" human work on earth, a work which yet remains truly human and of this world. (cf. p. 393) We may add that the present Holy Father on many occasions has not hesitated to speak of purely earthly callings as divine vocations. Nursing, teaching, business, journalism, farming, all come under this term; and we find him speaking of the natural vocation of women, of parents, of industry, of the physician, of the lawyer, of the human being as such, of one engaged in political life, without any indication that he is speaking metaphorically. The call is God's will ordinarily manifested in the inclinations one has acquired from his temperament, education, circum-

stances of life, the invitations he receives, expressly or tacitly, from others, and in other similar ways. (cf. p. 407)

Another valid insight in this connection is what may be called the analogy of sanctity. In former times it was customary for a man to leave the world to be a saint. Today many remain in the lay state, from choice or necessity, and there endeavor to live a life of holiness. Every class and occupation, trade, and profession has its dedicated men and women who are bearing witness to Christ in the world. They cannot follow the old methods in seeking holiness, methods which were more suited to the cloister than to the world outside. Yet they too are called to be saints. The ways and means may differ but the net result aimed at is the same: spiritual union with God.

The greater part of Father Congar's book deals with the share the laity have in the Church's priestly, kingly, and prophetic functions, in her communal life, and in her apostolic functions. Here we meet what is evidently a basic postulate of the author: the distinction between structure and life in the Church. "By structure we understand the principles which, because they come from Christ, representing with him and in his name the generative causes of the Church, are the things in her, as her *pars formalis*, that constitute men as Christ's Church. These are essentially the deposit of faith, the deposits of the sacraments of faith and the apostolical powers whereby the one and the other are transmitted. Therein resides the Church's essence. By life we understand the activity which men, made Church by the said principles, exercise in order that the Church may fulfil her mission and attain her end, which is, throughout time and space, to make of men and a reconciled world the community-temple of God." (p. 249)

Christ builds his Church from above and from below. From above, through the hierarchy and their sacramental and official activities. The hierarchical, juridical mission given by Christ to the apostles and their successors gives the Church its framework, its structure. The contribution of the laity is on another plane altogether. They build the Church from below and form it into a community of believers living the life of Christ's Holy Spirit in the space between the Ascension and the Second Coming. The clergy and hierarchy also help to construct the Church on this level, the level of life; but they do so "according to their personal life and gifts and, in that sense, as lay men," and not as ministers exercising power and authority over the Body of Christ. (p. 312)

This distinction between structure and life basically accounts for the difference between the priesthood of the clergy and the priesthood of the laity (of which the author distinguishes ten different kinds). The one priesthood of Christ is shared sacramentally by all who receive the sacraments of baptism and confirmation, which enable them to join in the sacramental celebration of Christ's sacrifice. Only some share in his priest-

hood sacramentally and hierarchically through the sacrament of Orders, in order to carry out that celebration. Then, all are priests through their spiritual life in Christ; this priesthood is spiritual-real, not metaphorical; it is the only priesthood that will be exercised in heaven. (p. 164) The priestly qualification of the faithful is essential to the Church, but the exercise of acts of this priesthood does not properly belong to her structure; it does not constitute the Church as an institution but as a living reality, a holy community.

The same distinction between structure and life enables Father Congar to find a place for lay cooperation in the government of the Church. The Church is constructed hierarchically, it is true; but the life through which she fulfils her mission presupposes the cooperation of the faithful. The laity share in the Church's kingly function when there is a meeting and a harmonising between an hierarchical communication from above and a community's consent. (pp. 249, 250)

The prophetic or magisterial function of the Church likewise requires the cooperation of the laity; again on the level of life, not of structure. The hierarchy alone teach *ex officio*; the faithful consent and believe. Yet a greater degree of apostolic teaching activity (exhortation and apologetics) is open to the laity today, especially under the aegis of Catholic Action. The chapter on the laity and the Church's apostolic function contains a most enlightening account of Catholic Action in all its phases.

Turning now to a critical estimate of Father Congar's book, we must confess, after making due allowances for its many excellencies, to a few misgivings and difficulties. To come straight to the heart of the matter, is the distinction between structure and life, with the clergy and hierarchy on the side of structure and the faithful laity on the side of life, a valid distinction to help us understand what the Church really is? This is a theological question and in a question of this kind the proximate and universal criterion of truth is the living teaching authority of the Church. This is explicitly taught in *Humani generis* and repeated in the allocution of May 31, 1954 on the teaching authority of the Church. The question now becomes this: has the living voice of the magisterium said anything on the structure of the Church that will help us answer our question? We believe it has.

The Encyclical *Mystici Corporis* explains why the Church is called a body: it is formed not by any haphazard grouping of members but is constituted of organs, which are members arranged in due order but which have not the same function. The Church is called a body for this reason above all that it is constituted by the coalescence of structurally united parts and that it has a variety of members reciprocally dependent. The Encyclical then goes on to say:

One must not think, however, that this ordered or "organic" structure of the body



of the Church contains only hierarchical elements and with them is complete; or, as an opposite opinion holds, that it is composed only of those who enjoy charismatic gifts. . . . That those who exercise sacred power in this Body are its first and chief members must be maintained uncompromisingly. . . . At the same time, when the Fathers of the Church sing the praises of this Mystical Body of Christ, with its ministries, its variety of ranks, its offices, its conditions, its orders, its duties, they are thinking not only of those who have received Holy Orders, but of all those too who, following the evangelical counsels, pass their lives either actively among men, or hidden in the silence of the cloister, or who aim at combining the active and contemplative life according to their Institute; as also those who, though living in the world, consecrate themselves wholeheartedly to spiritual or corporal works of mercy, and of those who live in the state of holy matrimony. Indeed, let this be clearly understood, especially in these our days: fathers and mothers of families, those who are godparents through baptism, and in particular those members of the laity who collaborate with the ecclesiastical hierarchy in spreading the Kingdom of the Divine Redeemer occupy an honorable, if often a lowly, place in the Christian community. . . .<sup>1</sup>

The Church herself, then, does not exclude the laity from her structure, nor does she deny to the clergy or hierarchy the property of life except in their capacity as laymen. The root of the trouble seems to lie with the position Father Congar assigns the *magisterium* in listing his authorities. In his study of the priesthood of the faithful he tells us that "positive and definitive indications can be obtained from patristic and theological tradition, from liturgy and practice, and (last, but not least) from the actual *magisterium*." (p. 203) That "last, but not least" speaks better than volumes. He is also under the impression that the teaching authority is not one but three: "We have then to keep our theological exposition in line with the teaching of the *magisterium*, of the liturgy and of tradition." (p. 205) With all due respect to so eminent a scholar, ultimately we do not have to keep our theological exposition in line with any more than one authority, the living *magisterium* of the Church. Liturgy and tradition are sources and witnesses of revealed truth but the only authority that can definitively tell us what that truth is, is the living *magisterium* of the Church teaching either in her solemn or in her ordinary form.

A certain ambiguity at times makes it difficult to be sure of the author's meaning. *Mystici Corporis* clearly points out the difference between the mystical body of Christ and His physical body. The mystical body is a society whose head and ruler is Christ. His physical body is something different: it is the same body that was born of the Virgin Mary, that now sits at the right hand of the Father, and that is also hidden under the Eucharistic veils. (n. 60) It is disconcerting to read that "the eucharist or sacramental body . . . shares the name of Body of Christ with his fleshly body and his fellowship-body. This sacramental mystery . . . is the

<sup>1</sup> N. C. W. C. edition of the Encyclical, 1943, n. 17 (p. 9).

bond between the fleshly body of the incarnate Word and his fellowship-body. . . . (p. 155) Does the Eucharist share only the name of the body of Christ? Is it an entity midway between the fleshly body and the mystical body, related to these two and linking them together? Is there not a reminiscence here of Waterman's Eucharistic body and blood of Christ distinct from his natural body on the one hand and from his mystical body on the other?

By way of conclusion, in our opinion Father Congar's book will raise more questions than it answers. Perhaps this is a good thing. Time alone will tell. We regret that the work has not an index; it would greatly increase its usefulness. The best compliment we can pay to the translator is to say that it does not read like a translation at all.

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## BRIEF NOTICES

*Science Versus Philosophy*, by F. G. CONNOLLY. Philosophical Library:  
New York, 1957. Pp. 90. \$3.75.

After all that has been said about the relationship between science and philosophy, the interested student might still be looking for a brief summary of the different views and a convincing solution to the vexing problem. In this little book there is a good statement of the various positions, together with the generous offer of a compromise theory, but no attempt at demonstrating a conclusion. The author treats briefly of science in relation to all the other disciplines; to philosophy both speculative and moral, to mathematics, to the arts and the social sciences, to theology and even to the supernatural virtues and gifts. The correlations which he points out would be useful for the integration of knowledge if the various parts could be united in an organized whole. All depends upon the theory, and this is explained in the sixth chapter.

Here the author accepts the view that modern non-mathematical science is entirely different from the philosophy of nature, because the analysis typical of natural philosophy ascends toward intelligible being, whereas the analysis in science descends toward sensory reality. He admits that there is a limit to the analysis proper to natural philosophy, and that this discipline is distinct from metaphysics. Moreover, he acknowledges that we cannot differentiate between natural philosophy and science within the order of intellectual knowledge. Hence he proposes that science is substantially of the order of sensitive knowledge achieved by the deliberative imagination. This work of the imagination is called prophysical abstraction, and is the work of a sensory power, not of the intellect. In addition to prophysical abstraction the author admits also physical, mathematical and metaphysical abstraction, although in the last analysis he says that one and the same light is involved in mathematics and in the philosophy of nature.

While treating of these delicate matters, the author refers to various texts in the writings of St. Thomas, and he accommodates them to the requirements of his own theory. These Thomistic texts are taken entirely out of context, and there is no effort to follow the method, the principles, or the major conclusions of St. Thomas in regard to the distinction of the sciences. St. Thomas thought that the accidents and properties of natural things which can be known through experience manifest the essences or natures of these things sufficiently for the purposes of natural philosophy. With this the author does not agree, and so he does not think that the

data of modern science can be assimilated by the principles of natural philosophy. In place of the beautifully organized synthesis developed by St. Thomas, we are presented with a dismembered philosophy of nature, a non-rational science of the common sensibles, and with mathematics which share the light both of natural philosophy and of metaphysics. This theory may not satisfy very many readers, but the author's work does help to show where the difficulties lie and why there are different views of the matter.

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*Marriage and the Family.* By ALPHONSE H. CLEMENS. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957. Pp. 368. \$6.00.

At a time when so many reporters of the American Catholic scene profess to see only the inadequate and seamy sides of Catholic life in America, there are optimistic notes sounding in the realm of marriage and the family.

The optimism stems from many indications. Not the least of these is the fact that today, as never before, so many American Catholics have come to appreciate the wisdom of knowing about marriage in some scientific fashion in advance of plunging into the married state. More and more it is recognized that there is precious little wisdom in a lengthy, sometimes quite arduous, education for professional life while the more abiding thing—marriage and family life—is prepared for only incidentally and incompletely, if at all.

Catholics have always had an exalted view of marriage. That is not to say, however, that we Catholics have always organized our knowledge and coordinated the natural with the supernatural as an integrated study of what is to be an integrated married life. This splendid book by Dr. Alphonse Clemens, along with an increasing number of other worthwhile Catholic works on the subject, indicates that here American Catholics are making substantial and encouraging progress.

The author of this volume is the director of the Marriage Counseling Center at The Catholic University of America. He is a man trained in economics and sociology, a marriage counselor of long and wide experience, a married man himself and an optimist, this latter an item of no mean importance. At the same time he has an adequate knowledge of philosophy and theology, or at least is gifted with friends who have such competence.

From this background the author has produced a book of many virtues and few defects. The most obvious virtue is the degree to which Dr. Clemens has integrated the varied material on marriage. In his Preface



he says: "This book is *religious* in the sense that it is based on the Divine Plan; it is *scientific* in that this Plan encompasses the social sciences as well as the sacred sciences; it is *integral* in that it attempts to integrate the supernatural with the natural; the sacred with the secular, the philosophic with the scientific." (p. vi) In the main the author has achieved what he set out to achieve.

There is a "Catholic viewpoint" on marriage which is uniquely Catholic. But there is a vast area of knowledge which we share with others, which often enough has been developed as knowledge under other than Catholic auspices. We are wise to use it and the author of this work uses it wisely, recognizing that "every new scientific discovery about marriage is a further revelation of the Great Design for it." (p. 336)

It is this Divine Plan which constitutes the main theme of the book. Each chapter, no matter what the topic, ends with a relating of the material to the Divine Plan, e.g., "Family Economics and the Divine Plan," "Personality Building and the Divine Plan."

Throughout the work Dr. Clemens is positive in his emphasis. Less space is devoted to the problems of marriage, more to those positive elements which might head off the problems. For example, while clearly indicating conditions in marriage which might justify control of births, his chapter on "Physical Parenthood" (ch. 13) is distinguished for its positive approach to the dignity and advantages of parenthood and the desirability of large families.

In an array of nineteen chapters, several can be singled out for their particular merit, standing out as they do from the common run of treatment. Such are the chapters on "The Quality of Love," (ch. 4) "Selecting a Partner," (ch. 7) "Marital Love," (ch. 12) "Physical Parenthood," (ch. 13) "Educational Parenthood," (ch. 14) and "The Role of Recreation." (ch. 16) In all of this Dr. Clemens demonstrates the wisdom of linking marriage and the family. If marriage is for the sake of the family, the two should be linked; otherwise the treatment of marriage becomes a desiccated, unreal presentation.

Apart from content, it should be noted that the work is clearly written, remarkably easy to read, and printed with unusual clarity and eye-appeal.

In a book so generally excellent, there are still some noticeable deficiencies. Canon Law is an important reality for Catholic marriage and it receives quite incidental and inadequate treatment. Again, while there is a sufficient Index, there is no bibliography, only footnote references to books and articles from which the author quotes.

One wonders, too, why the fine last chapter on "Design for Successful Marriage," (ch. 19) which the author recommends should be read first by "the deeply serious reader," was not placed at the beginning of the book where it seems to belong, especially since it is a lucid justification of the integrated treatment which the book represents.

Ordinarily a writer tends to ride hardest the horse he knows best, and one is not surprised to find frequent use of statistical and evaluative material from the field of sociology in a book of this sort. Yet, in the Appendix, Dr. Clemens has written on "The Unscientific Aspects of Marriage Literature," casting generous cold water on the conclusiveness of much of this study. And, while he writes that "an attempt has consistently been made, however, to use them in such fashion that the reader would realise that they are not *conclusive* findings," (p. 343) it is certainly not evident throughout the book that he is taking such a cautious approach to everything he uses and quotes.

This volume deserves a wide use and suggests a wide variety of users. It certainly can be of profit to those who are keeping company, and to Catholics already married. Although not specifically claiming to be a text, it would seem to fulfill most of the needs of a marriage-course text for Catholic colleges. While claiming to be "for Catholics," it is the sort of work which one might profitably give to non-Catholics as well.

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*The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church.* Ed. by F. L. CROSS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. 1511. \$17.50.

This comprehensive and handy volume is a valuable addition to reference works on religion. Not only the educated public as a whole, but priests and ministers, theologians and historians will greet it with gratitude and be glad to have it available. Furthermore, because Christianity has been so intimately connected with more than nineteen centuries of secular history in Europe and elsewhere, the book will have a wide relevance not merely for students of Christianity, but for all serious readers interested in the history of civilization and in the literature of Christian countries.

The aim of the *Dictionary* is to provide factual information on every aspect of Christianity, especially in its historical development. It contains over 6,000 entries ranging from a few lines to about 2,500 words in length. Approximately 30 per cent of these are biographical, dealing not only with saints, popes, bishops, monastic leaders, theologians and other writers, but also with heretics and persecutors, secular rulers, philosophers, and many other persons. Other articles deal with bodies such as national churches, denominations, sects, religious orders, societies, and missions; others again with the great Christian doctrines and with religious tenets and schools of thought. Liturgical subjects, canon law, Christian institutions and customs,

asceticism and devotion are included, together with places having special Christian associations, councils, documents, and notable writings. There is a wide class of entries explaining miscellaneous points of Christian terminology and usage.

The volume is introduced by a preface explaining the scope, method, and procedure of the *Dictionary*, together with a list of contributors and a table of abbreviations. The contributors (a number of them scholars of high distinction) are responsible for roughly half the entries, including most of those of major importance; the others are the work of the Editor and his immediate assistants. The entries are anonymous and the Editor has exercised wide editorial powers in modifying and reconstructing the articles to achieve uniformity and consistency in the work. The articles are also interrelated through a system of cross-references, indicated by asterisks in the body of the entries to mark pertinent or related information elsewhere in the volume, thus sparing the reader the time and effort of searching to see if there is further material on subjects connected with his immediate interests.

Though the Editor and his associates have striven to give due and proportionate attention to all the parts and aspects of the vast field they have chosen to cover, of necessity, since history is a selective discipline, some readers will probably feel that undue attention has been paid to some subjects and not enough to others. Since the historical treatment predominates, the theologian, for example, may not always find in the entries the extended doctrinal development that he might have wished. The Editor points out that biblical subjects could not be handled, in the nature of the case, with the fulness that a biblical scholar might demand. Nevertheless, the doctrinal and biblical entries are adequate, considering the purpose and nature of the book, for the needs of the general reader. The Editor also calls attention to the fact that the *Dictionary* places greater emphasis on Western Christendom than on Eastern Christianity, more on Christianity in Great Britain than on that of the Continent of Europe or more distant countries, more on the events of modern centuries than on those of the early Middle Ages. This will explain why a Catholic reader might be disappointed at finding less space accorded a pope he considers important than to an archbishop of Canterbury he believes relatively obscure.

The entries are so written as to be immediately intelligible to the layman and avoid technicalities in presentation; nevertheless, the specialist will welcome them as up-to-date and reasonably comprehensive. He will be grateful for the concise bibliographies, printed in smaller type at the end of the articles, that give precise references to the historic literature of the subject, and standard sources of information. They record the principal works of primary and permanent interest and put the reader in possession of a larger body of bibliographic material on the subject than is usually available in works of similar compass. The bibliographies perform another

important service in indicating where original texts of important documents may be found, and as Napoleon's Organic Articles of 1801, papal bulls, etc.

The Editor and contributors have made a special effort to be objective and accurate. To judge from the necessarily limited perusal that the reviewer has been able to make of the volume, they appear to have succeeded to a high degree in realizing this aim. Considering that the work is the product largely (though not exclusively) of Protestant scholars, controversial subjects and matters touching the Catholic Church have been handled very well. It is probably the Protestant or "low-church" persuasion who will be more dissatisfied with some of the entries. For this reason it may appear ungracious for the reviewer to point out some discrepancies that have fallen under his eye. However, the Editor himself acknowledges that perfection, particularly in a first edition, "is an unattainable ideal" and he "appeals to the goodwill of his readers to inform him of points needing correction." It is in this spirit that we make the following observations.

The article on the "Edict of Nantes" is silent about the political privileges that made the Huguenots practically a state within a state. The notice, too, in recording Richelieu's occasional violations of the Edict might have noted that the Cardinal respected the religious provisions of the document even after he had stripped away the political privileges of the Huguenots. Probably an entry should have been devoted to the Penal Laws enforced against Catholics in England, Ireland, Scotland, and the American colonies from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. They had an important bearing on the history of the Church, retarding its growth, reducing its membership, nullifying its influence, and almost crushing it out of existence. There is a bare reference in the entry "Ireland, Christianity in" (p. 701) to "the repressive measures of the 17th and 18th centuries" that helped consolidate rather than destroy Catholicism in Ireland. The bibliography under "Christology" should probably have included more works from Catholic pens.

The "Reformation" entry should have mentioned Henry VIII's marital difficulties (p. 1145) in narrating the English break with Rome. Such mention is made under "Henry VIII" (p. 624) and is noted as the "occasion" of the English separation from Rome in the article "Church of England." (p. 288) The entry "Henry VIII" makes the questionable implication that Clement VII might have given more than a "conditional dispensation for a new marriage" with Anne Boleyn had he not been at the time prisoner of Charles V, nephew of Catherine of Aragon. Considering the Catholic position on marriage, Clement could not have gone any further than he did. Under the circumstances his reply was extremely favorable to Henry, who contested the validity of his marriage with Catherine precisely because he challenged the papal right to grant a



dispensation from the impediment of affinity that presumably existed between himself and his wife, owing to the fact that she had been previously married to his deceased brother Arthur. Now Henry was asking such a dispensation from the affinity that had arisen between himself and Anne Boleyn from his unlawful connections with Anne's elder sister.

The article on "Millenarianism" errs in stating (p. 901) that the opinion has "never been formally rejected by Orthodox Christianity." A decree of the Holy Office of the Catholic Church, issued July 21, 1944, stated that Millenarianism might not be safely taught. (*Acta apostolicae sedis*, XXXVI, 1944, p. 212) Regarding the Inquisition, it is more accurate to call the Inquisition in the Middle Ages the Medieval Inquisition rather than the Dominican Inquisition, (p. 31) since not only Dominicans but also Franciscans, Carmelites, secular priests, and others served as inquisitors. Likewise it is an over-simplification to attribute to Alexander VI the "prosecution and execution" of Savonarola. (p. 33) The trial and execution were conducted by the Florentine government. Though Alexander claimed the right to judge the accused, the government yielded only to the extent of admitting two papal judges to the court which would pronounce sentence. When the two judges arrived in Florence the trial was already far advanced and the Florentine judges had made up their minds. The article "Paul III" gives the impression (p. 1032) that Paul had his "three sons and a daughter" while pope, whereas these children were the issue of the extravagances of his earlier years. From the time of his ordination to the priesthood Paul's moral life was exemplary.

The *Dictionary* is a handsome volume, accurately printed (the reviewer has not found a single typographical error) on thin, strong paper and stoutly bound in blue buckram. It maintains the fine typographical traditions of the Oxford University Press.

WILLIAM A. HINNEBUSCH, O. P.

*Dominican House of Studies,  
Washington, D. C.*

*Sociology*. By JOSEPH H. FICHTER. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pp. 463 with indexes. \$5.00.

This volume by Father Fichter undoubtedly has much value as an introductory textbook in the field of sociology. It has value, particularly, because the author has struck upon a well-organized approach to his subject matter. His technique is to "conceptualize" social behavior, i. e., to recognize that social behavior occurs, evidently, in the concrete order and to abstract "... essential generalizations from the concrete occur-

rences," (p. 3) in order that one might look at this behavior more easily and understand it more readily. For example, generalizations or "concepts" are formed about patterns of social behavior, about roles, about institutions, about culture, etc. In each of the eighteen chapters of his work, Father Fichter concentrates upon and elaborates upon a different sociological conceptualization, analyzes it, defines it, shows its divisions and peculiar aspects. Also, as a special feature in each chapter, he shows how these conceptualizations pertain, in a practical way, to American social life. Specifically, as an example, one can turn to chapter twelve. There the author discusses what is involved in the concept of culture, what culture is not, how culture is related to environment, what is meant by culture "area," "lag," etc., and what the functions of culture are. After this analysis of the general notion of culture, Father Fichter points out, in the second part of the chapter, the distinctive features of American culture. From the points of view of orderliness, lucidity and interest, this technique should meet with the high approval of most sociologists.

Moreover, the general division of the text reflects a well-reasoned approach to the complex subject matter of a general introductory sociology course. The volume is divided into three major parts: the first, entitled "Person and Society," investigating the smallest unit of society, the person, and indicating, in six chapters, the factors involved in the socialization process; the second part, under the heading of "Patterns and Culture," studying, for the next six chapters, what people do in society and analyzing the culture pattern in itself and in combination with other social patterns to bring about the "total culture"; the third section, called "Culture and Society," bringing together the concepts of cultural habits and group life and showing, in the concluding chapters, such aspects of social living as values, social mobility, social control, deviations in society, and socio-cultural integration. Thus, the ordering of the parts of sociology is ably presented. It is noteworthy that in this detailed presentation of his subject matter, the writer does not use one footnote, since he feels that it would be ". . . pedantic to refer to sources of common elementary knowledge." (p. v) However, the advisability of this omission in what is proposed as an introductory textbook is certainly debatable. Moreover, the abstract nature of the "conceptual" approach here proposed may offer a "road-block" to the beginner in the study of the science of society—but surely not an insurmountable one. A valuable aspect of the book, for both teacher and student, is the inclusion of a list of discussion questions at the end of each chapter, plus pertinent references for outside reading. In general, therefore, by virtue of the subject matter chosen for treatment and by virtue of the approach stressed, this volume merits interested appraisal by those searching for an introductory text.

But one should not conclude this review without reference to a matter

of much concern to many teachers in the field of sociology, relating to a sense of values and to the general problem of the application of values in sociology. Father Fichter's position in this matter is expressed in a forthright way. He writes: "This book avoids also the various value slants that in a hidden or open way are lodged in most introductory sociology textbooks. Above all, it does not moralize from any particular ethical point of view." (p. v) Also, "From a scientific point of view, sociology is not aligned with any particular moral system. Social science in itself cannot be democratic or totalitarian; it cannot be Christian or Mohammedan. . . . If he (the sociologist) says that one system is as 'good' as another or that some are 'worse' than others, he is making a value judgment which emerges from his moral role rather than from his scientific role." (pp. 7-8) Thus, the tenor of the author's observations about values is, clearly, that he is to avoid judgments in these matters as much as is possible. In this conclusion, he must be prepared to answer many questions proposed by those who would not side with him in this fundamental sociological problem. For example, he must respond to those who, with some justification, say: Is a sociology "colored" by one's social philosophy necessarily an inferior one scientifically? In the observation, description and classification of sociological data can not one's social philosophy be a definite asset in making evaluations about the social nature of man? Will not the social scientist who brings into play objective and eternal truths in his study of society and of human behavior be in a better position than the social scientist who depends merely upon what has been described as the "laboratory technique?" Since sociology draws from and depends upon other subjects, such as economics, history and psychology, should it not also express its dependence upon and make use of principles from ethics and other phases of philosophy? Should not one attempt, in the hope of integration, to relate and to unify the data of sociology with one's philosophy and, ultimately, with one's theology? As noted in the opening sentence of this review, Father Fichter's book has, admittedly, much of value sociologically speaking; but his stand concerning "values" in sociology, will, undoubtedly, evoke a spirited response from those who see the study of human behavior in sociology as intimately linked and closely interrelated with the higher sciences of philosophy and theology.

MICHAEL MURPHY, O. P.

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*A History of Philosophy.* By CARMIN MASCIA, T.O.R. Paterson: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1957. Pp. 513 with indexes. \$5.00.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. *A History of Human Thought* would have expressed its scholarly contents more accurately. If the author had limited himself to recording the progress of truly philosophical thought over the past twenty-five centuries, he might have produced an excellent textbook on the history of philosophy. He might have, I say, because Fr. Mascia's concept of philosophy leaves much to be desired. And so it is doubtful that he would have excluded ideas which are more proper to a history of religion or theology, of art or the experimental sciences. This confusion of considering philosophy as *practically* co-extensive with human thought is especially unfortunate since the book is otherwise quite orderly. Before each chapter is a precise preview of its contents and after the chapters a summary and bibliography. As the author says, the light-face italics in the text are used "for the positive doctrines which each school has contributed toward the development of truth" and the bold-face italics are used "merely for general emphasis."

In the Introduction of the book, Fr. Mascia adopts the erroneous division of philosophy first proposed by Christian Wolff. "Accordingly, metaphysics is usually divided as follows: metaphysics properly so-called (the study of being as such), rational psychology (the study of man), cosmology (the study of the material world), and theodicy (the study of God)." This division is based upon the notion that metaphysics is all of philosophy and not just a part of it. Such a *metaphysicism* would really destroy natural philosophy (cosmology and psychology). And to treat so-called theodicy as a discipline distinct from metaphysics "properly so-called" is to cut off the principles from which we can draw our natural knowledge of God as the First Cause of all being.

Part One of the book considers Greek Philosophy from Thales (624 B. C.) to Plotinus (270 A. D.). The author calls the first period one of naturalism in which he briefly summarizes the thought of the Ionians, the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus, the Eleatic School, and of such Pluralists as Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the Atomists. Because of his misconception of philosophy, Fr. Mascia vainly attributes to Anaximander the search for a metaphysical principle. The first Greek philosophers were at most natural philosophers looking for an explanation of the material universe. They were not metaphysicians who had penetrated to an immaterial object in reality through the highest degree of abstraction. This, of course, does not deny that their speculation paved the way for the metaphysical period which reached its perfection in the philosophy of Aristotle.

In the Metaphysical Period of Greek Philosophy, Fr. Mascia considers the Sophists, Socrates, the Minor Socratic Schools, Plato and Aristotle.



Even here he tends to confuse an otherwise orderly treatment by trying to make the principles of Aristotle's physics metaphysical. This can only obscure the real contribution of Aristotelian metaphysics to the development of truth. For, although metaphysics sheds additional light upon the other parts of philosophy, it remains essentially distinct from them. In this section while commenting upon Aristotle's psychology, the author misrepresents St. Thomas' teaching on the agent intellect. The Angelic Doctor does not affirm that "the agent intellect is the same as the human soul . . . considered as capable of abstracting the universal forms from the individuating characteristics." (p. 84) He very definitely teaches that it is a power distinct from the essence of the soul. (cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 29, a. 4)

The Ethical Period of Greek Philosophy includes Stoicism, Epicureanism, Skepticism and Eclecticism. The history of this philosophy ends with the Religious Period or the doctrine of Plotinus. In his conclusions on Greek thought, Fr. Mascia points out both its perfection and deficiencies, and gives a general indication of the contribution that Christianity would make to philosophical thought.

Part Two, Christian Philosophy, begins with Christ and terminates with the decadence of Scholastic Philosophy in the fourteenth century. Providing the term, Christian Philosophy, is understood to mean the philosophy of men who are Christians, no confusion need arise from it. As the author is careful to note, Christianity is essentially religion and so distinct from philosophy. But his manner of distinguishing them is not completely correct. These two entities are not so disparate that they cannot combine in speculative theology in which the light of philosophical reason becomes the instrument of Faith for the better understanding of Christian principles. The superior light of revelation elevates reason to a consideration of truths beyond its natural powers. The light of theology combines Christianity and philosophy without confusing them. But any incorporation of Christian truth into a philosophical system that is not independently derived from principles of reason alone is *theologism*, for it would be the use in philosophy of a method that is purely theological. Only theology can formulate arguments based upon the revealed principles of Faith. Therefore, not to see clearly how philosophy is used in the service of Christianity in the science of Catholic theology, is to run the risk of designating theological concepts as philosophical. And this seems to be why the author looks upon the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas as a philosophical treatise. (p. 193) In this magnificent synthesis of Sacred Doctrine, philosophy is found in a theological context and is elevated to become an instrument of Faith. In other words, it is no longer really philosophy but a part of theological truth. Now this in no way means that philosophy has not received much from the Christian Religion and Theology, but only that

truth is to be called philosophical which can be attained according to the method of philosophy from its own rational principles.

The section on Christian Philosophy consists of the Period of Evangelization, Patristic Philosophy, and finally Scholastic Philosophy. If the author had preserved more accurately the autonomy of philosophy as a distinct discipline, he could have treated more completely the development of philosophical truth during this most fruitful period. While there is a philosophical thought to be abstracted from the theological treatises of an Augustine or an Aquinas, the mystics do not warrant formal consideration in a history of philosophy. Someone like St. Albert the Great ought to have been considered in their place.

The historian of philosophy is also a critic of philosophy. He not only records the ideas contained in the various philosophical systems, but also evaluates their contribution to the advancement of philosophical truth. The historian of philosophy, therefore, must be somewhat of a philosopher himself. His own mind must adhere steadfastly to a coherent system of philosophical concepts and principles as the criteria whereby he judges the validity of the ideas set forth by other philosophers. On the basis of his own intellectual conviction, he must make a choice. When confronted by two systems that are mutually opposed in their very premisses, he cannot be equally partial to both. Now Fr. Mascia, as a Catholic priest and a scholastic philosopher, has made his choice up to a point. Certainly he would pass judgment against any philosophical opinion that is opposed to supernatural truth or the sound reasoning of Scholasticism. But Scholasticism, as the term is used, is quite broad. It is used to embrace two systems as mutually opposed in their philosophical premisses as Scotism and Thomism. It is not fair, either to Scotus or to St. Thomas, to treat their systems as equally important in the development of philosophical truth. Neither one used words indiscriminately. And traditionally, Scotists and Thomists have interpreted their words to express philosophical principles that are mutually opposed. The author himself records the differences, but treats both systems as of equal value. In the introduction, Fr. Mascia says: "As these difference do not amount to any contradictory consequences and as the controversy is still open, it has seemed advisable to emphasize both positions." The fact of the matter is that their consequences are radically different because they flow from concepts and principles that are radically different. As an historian of philosophy, therefore, Fr. Mascia should have taken his stand because two systems so fundamentally different as Scotism and Thomism cannot have made an equal contribution to the development of philosophical truth.

Part Three, Modern Philosophy, is the most valuable section of the book. The author begins by contrasting modern philosophy with that of the Greeks and the Christians and sums up its essential characteristics in the

word immanentism. The absolutely first metaphysical principle is no longer God, the ultimate cause who transcends all finite reality. The moderns have tried to replace God with nature or man, a principle of immanentism. In a word, the moderns have tried to destroy metaphysics. Therefore, Fr. Mascia should not even use the word in connection with the philosophies of Rationalism, Empiricism, Illuminism, Kantian Criticism, Idealism, Positivism or most of the Contemporary philosophies. One hesitates to call many of these systems even philosophical. The author continually criticizes the particular form of immanentism in these systems. His summary of Kant's thought is done with special excellence. His appraisal of Blondel's system of philosophy, however, as a "truly Catholic parallel to classical Scholasticism but at the same time independent of it," (p. 460) is not too convincing. Fr. Mascia completes his consideration of Modern Philosophy with what he calls the Contemporary Philosophy of the Spirit in which is included the Intuitionism of Bergson, Modernism, American and English Neo-Realism, the Neo-Scholastic revival and the various forms of Existentialism. The conclusion of the book is a summary of the teachings of Neo-Scholasticism which "has inherited the fundamental philosophical truths of the past, and has enriched them by keeping in constant touch with the discoveries of the present."

The main criticism against this book is that it has attempted to say too much. Because the author has certain misconceptions on the true nature of philosophy, too many ideas were introduced. Although the philosopher has a definite relationship to the theologian, the artist, the physicist etc., his approach to the understanding of reality demands a distinct set of principles and ideas. In a history of philosophy these ideas must receive almost exclusive consideration. I say *almost* exclusive consideration because there is room for other notions insofar as they provide the raw material for philosophising. But the author has introduced too many of these extraneous ideas, and has obscured an otherwise orderly history of philosophy by his *metaphysicism* and tinges of *theologism*. Realizing these facts, the reader of this book can learn much about the philosophical thought of the past twenty-five centuries. And, with the same qualifications, the professor might judiciously use the book as a text for a survey course in history of philosophy.

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*Freud, Psychoanalysis, Catholicism.* By PETER J. R. DEMPSEY, O.F.M. Cap. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956. Pp. 204, with select bibliography. \$3.00.

In making a comprehensive comparison of broad systems of thought, and especially of systems so broad that they constitute ways of life, one is inevitably faced with problems of selection and omission, of level and degree of analysis, of mode of expression, and so on. The fundamental problem, that of point of view, is, of course, already settled for those who possess a framework of basic principles in which they have lived and thought for many years, as is the case with Fr. Dempsey, priest, religious and Catholic scholar. The other problems he seems to have solved with an eye to the brevity of the book and a prospective reading public which is educated but not scholarly.

The book opens with a general conspectus of psychological positions, necessarily cursory, with a certain emphasis on the notion of soul or spirit in psychology. This is followed by a treatment of Freud's religion, not so much of his theoretical concepts on this subject as of the personal experiences which molded, even unconsciously, his religious outlook. These sections form the setting after which the doctrine of psychoanalysis is compared with Catholic thought.

The expository section of the book follows what might be termed a topical outline of Freudian metapsychology, considering first the fundamental concepts—instincts, libido and aggression, Id, Ego and Super-ego,—and then several subsidiary notions. Not much is said of investigational techniques, of therapy or of the philosophical positions involved in or deduced from psychoanalysis. Each idea is developed and compared with Catholic thought on or around the same general concept, and naturally judged on the strength of its comparative accuracy, richness, clarity and coherence.

The final sections of the book purport to apply the ideas worked up in the preceding sections to the field of literary interpretation, but would seem to be more accurately described as an exposition of Aristotelian principles of dramatic criticism with some apposite comments from modern authors, particularly Freud and Jung.

Within the limits he has set for himself Fr. Dempsey has turned out a readable and understandable book, a book which will appeal to the public for which he is writing. He writes in the manner of a popular lecturer, with the strengths and weaknesses which that implies. The language is generally simple and non-technical, and the ideas are presented without complications. However, the level of analysis is not consistent, veering, sometimes confusingly, from the empirical to the theological to the anecdotal.



dotal. Comparisons are sometimes made too abruptly, before the ground has been sufficiently prepared, as, for instance, when libidinal impulses are compared with the activity of charity, or phases of infantile development according to Freud with St. John of the Cross' descriptions of phases in the life of spiritual beginners. It would seem that such comparisons of analogous terms should not be made without painstaking care, lest the similarities on which the analogies are founded should blur the perception of the differences, which are fundamentally more significant. This problem, of course, is one which must necessarily face the author who tries to handle profound and intricate ideas in a few sentences or paragraphs. Something is bound to be lost when the fineness of the analysis is governed not by the nature of the matter but by the limitations of space. It should be noted in this connection that the several mentions of Thomistic concepts, e. g., the *vis cogitativa* and the passions, would have been better omitted than treated so briefly, and, in fact, deficiently.

In general, however, it should not be denied that the work of the sort that Fr. Dempsey has done is tending basically in the right direction. The study of psychoanalytic doctrines and opinions is bound to enhance a psychological system, and eventually extend a good influence into many parts of philosophy and theology. Granting that much must be done to purify and refine the tenets of Freudian psychoanalysis (and that much has already been done), it is also granted that a book which aims to integrate them into Christian doctrine has a good aim. Moreover, such work must be presented not only at the levels of serious scholarship but also at more popular levels, pursuing, in a sense, the trails left by earlier psychoanalytic writings. From such a point of view Fr. Dempsey deserves the credits which go to trail makers.

MICHAEL STOCK, O. P.

*Dominican House of Philosophy,*  
Dover, Mass.

*Logic and Knowledge.* By BERTRAND RUSSELL. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. Pp. 393. \$4.50.

*Logic and Knowledge* is the philosophical profile of Bertrand Russell. Thanks to an excellent editorial assist from Robert C. Marsh, this collection of ten Russellian essays, covering fifty years of writing (1901-1950), gives us a superb insight into the mind of a world-famous mathematician and an internationally known critic of faith and morals. Probably between no other two covers are contained so much of Russell's serious philosophical thought as that found in *Logic and Knowledge*.

Russell identifies himself as a logical atomist. By this he means all

things can be and should be subjected to analysis and broken down to their smallest component parts. This is to be achieved through the instrumentality of that great tool which Russell did so much to popularize, mathematical logic. Included in his logical atomism is the attempt to reduce all thought to a few basic principles. Throughout his system, Russell adheres to the reality of things as apprehended by common sense and a dualism which is often agnostic but totally so as concerns God and the immortality of the human soul. Russell does not deny the reality of God or the spirituality of the soul but simply has not established them to his own satisfaction.

As for knowledge, Dr. Russell does not set forth, in these essays, any complete theory of ideogenesis. He does state flatly his belief in universals and their dependence on things. Indeed, one chapter is especially interesting from the point of view of how a philosopher can back into the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory without realizing it. Of course, Bertrand Russell is by no means in perfect harmony with the scholastic concept of knowledge or universals but he does, at least verbally, share many of its doctrines.

In the process of expounding his own theory of knowledge, Russell attacks Idealism and the Neutral Monism of William James. Also he takes issue with many points held by the logical positivists, Dewey's Pragmatism, and Watson's Behaviorism. Constantly Russell makes remarks about the traditional philosophy of Aristotle. For Russell this is a dead, discarded system of thought. Although he has a knowledge of the syllogism and some facets of the Greek school, nowhere does he indicate a direct knowledge of Aristotle. He does tell us of his readings in philosophy, and these were extensive, but Aristotle and St. Thomas apparently were not among them.

Bertrand Russell writes with humor and in *Logic and Knowledge* he really spells out his philosophy. Anyone who would attempt a serious critical study of Russell would have to read *Logic and Knowledge*. His wit makes the reading very pleasant, and his apparent honesty makes the reader sympathetic even though it is not always, or usually, possible to agree with Russell's conclusions.

Further, nothing that this reviewer has read on mathematical logic, and that includes the Preface and Introductions of the second edition of *Principia Mathematica*, explains so well the purpose of that instrument of thought as does *Logic and Knowledge*. One sentence is a real eye opener. Russell is claiming for mathematical logic the perfection of a near perfectly logical language. Then he adds: "A logically perfect language, if it could be constructed, would not only be intolerably prolix, but, as regards its vocabulary, would be largely private to one speaker. That is

to say, all the names that it would use would be private to that speaker and could not enter into the language of another speaker." (p. 198)

For the Thomist, the weakness of Russell lies in the fact that he is really not a philosopher at all but a student of philosophy. His first love is mathematics and he never really abandons it. He simply wants to reduce everything back to it and hopes all problems will be solved through it. It is a vain hope but by no means a new one.

Russell was really overwhelmed by Ludwig Wittgenstein who was his student in 1912. For the next ten years Russell is under a semantic cloud. Being a realist at heart, Russell finds Wittgenstein quite fantastic, but not being a genuine philosopher himself, Russell is unable to see the weaknesses in the position of Wittgenstein's attack on language. Russell absorbs some of Wittgenstein's ideas, alters them to suit his own concept of reality and then tries to adapt his system so that Wittgenstein's barbs will not be valid against him. Essay after essay betrays this attempt by Russell who in the end must admit that Wittgenstein exaggerated. Wittgenstein himself would eventually admit the same and so only Carnap remains to hold the torch against language.

Unfortunately, Russell jumped into philosophy without having some very important notions clear in his own mind. Hence, he writes like one just thinking on the problems for the first time and comes up with the answers people usually do who philosophize for the first time. Russell confuses the intentional and existential orders constantly; he ruins his treatment of the universals and particulars by not distinguishing the particular from the singular or individual; he is not clearcut on the difference between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge; unconsciously he tends to Idealism; and he makes foolish errors, as for example, when he repudiates the syllogism *Darapti*, not realizing that the real mistake arises from the use of four terms, a mistake which is ultimately traced back to his lack of understanding of analogy.

Also Russell's main thesis is not borne out in fact. He claimed that mathematical logic would solve all problems facing man, not at once of course but eventually. He then cites Whitehead's work, his co-author of the *Principia*, as an example. In 1924 when Russell made the comparison of his system and Whitehead's there was some ground for his optimism. However, anyone who has read all of Whitehead and some of Russell knows that their respective systems have little in common.

Finally, it might be said that Russell is not an unimportant figure in philosophy. He should outlast many of his contemporaries. For one thing, Russell presented the problems of thought clearly although his solutions were not complete or accurate. He did see the problems and that alone is a sign of genius. What he might have done had he been more sympathetic to the Aristotelian-Thomistic school is one of those "if's" of

history. At any rate, he has left us a legacy of thought and perhaps his own description in a note of gratitude to Robert Marsh puts it best as regards *Logic and Knowledge*: "It is not for me to judge whether it is worth while to perpetuate the record of what I thought at various times, but if any historian of bygone lucubrations should wish to study my development he will find this volume both helpful and reliable."

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